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STRIKING BARGAINS: THE AT-WILL
EMPLOYMENT OF PERMANENT STRIKE
REPLACEMENTS
Michael D. Moberly*

I. INTRODUCTION
The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or the "Act"), ' also
commonly known as the Wagner Act,2 was arguably the first,3 and is
"B.B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; Shareholder, Ryley, Carlock & Applewhite, Phoenix, Arizona;
Chairman, Arizona Agricultural Employment Relations Board; Editor, The Arizona Labor Letter.
The author wishes to thank his "notorious" partner, Nathan R. Niemuth, for commenting on a draft
of this article. See Chuck Stinnett, Union chief thinks strike looks likely, HENDERSON, KY.
GLEANER, Feb. 18, 1998, at A12 (quoting a local UAW president's description of Niemuth's
reputation as a labor negotiator).
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994). By Congressional amendment in 1947, the NLRA was
incorporated into, and effectively renamed, the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1994). However, "the term NLRA is still frequently used to describe those
portions of the original NLRA still having force and effect." Wallace v. Ryan-Walsh Stevedoring
Co., 708 F. Supp. 144, 156 n.27 (E.D. Tex. 1989); see also Isbrandtsen Co. v. Dist. 2, Marine
Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 256 F. Supp. 68, 71-72 (E.D.N.Y. 1966) ("When the LMRA of 1947 was
enacted, it absorbed the seventeen sections (as amended) of the NLRA. They became Title I of the
LMRA.... When one refers to the 'National Labor Relations Act,' therefore, he is referring only to
Title I of the Labor Management Relations Act ....).
2. See Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co., 826 F.2d 857, 862 n.8 (9th Cir. 1987); Pasillas v. Agric.
Labor Relations Bd., 202 Cal. Rptr. 739, 745 n.8 (CL App. 1984); Trust Fund Servs. v. Heyman,
565 P.2d 805, 808 (Wash. 1977). The reference is to the NLRA's principal sponsor, Senator Robert
Wagner. See N.Y. Tel. Co. v. N.Y. Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 541 (1979); cf. Matthew W.
Finkin, Revisionism in Labor Law, 43 MD. L. REV. 23, 48 (1984) (describing Wagner as the Act's
"animating spirit"). For a biography discussing Wagner's role in the NLRA's enactment, see J.
JOSEPH HUTHMACHER, SENATOR ROBERT F. WAGNER AND THE RISE OF URBAN LIBERALISM
(1968).
3. See Sheet Metal Workers Local Union No. 20 v. Baylor Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc.,
877 F.2d 547, 548 n.1 (7th Cir. 1989) (observing that "[m]odem labor law started" with the
NLRA's enactment); Palm Beach Co. v. Journeymen's & Prod. Allied Servs. Int'l Union Local 157,
519 F. Supp. 705, 708 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (stating that the NLRA's enactment "marked the
beginning of a significant federal labor policy in this country"). The Railway Labor Act ("RLA"),
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1994), which predated the NLRA, also reflected "a pioneer[ing] federal
attempt to secure the peaceful settlement of employer-employee disputes, previously characterized
by strikes, lockouts, and other disruptive forms of self-help." O'Donnell v. Wein Air Alaska, Inc.,
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labor-management

legislation in this country.4 Enacted in 1935' "inresponse to one of the
most monumental social crises of the century,, 6 the principal purpose of
the Act was to establish the right of workers to organize and bargain
collectively 7 "for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment[,] or [for] other mutual aid or protection."8
551 F.2d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1977). However, the RLA's coverage is far more limited than that of
the NLRA. See Aircraft Mechs. Fraternal Ass'n v. United Airlines, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 492, 508
(N.D. Cal. 1976).
4. See Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383 (1969) ("To
the extent that there exists today any relevant corpus of 'national labor policy,' it is in the law
developed during the ... years of administering our most comprehensive national labor scheme, the
National Labor Relations Act."); Midwest Motor Express, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local
120, 512 N.W.2d 881, 884 (Minn. 1994) ("The principal expression of federal labor law has since
1935 been found in the... NLRA"); Falls Stamping & Welding Co. v. Int'l Union, UAW, 485 F.
Supp. 1097, 1135 n.13 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (describing the NLRA as "the primary federal statute
regulating labor-management relations").
5. There have been two significant intervening amendments to the NLRA. See Driscoll v.
Carpenters Dist. Counsel, 536 A.2d 412, 415 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). In 1947, the NLRA was
amended by the Taft-Hartley Act "to prevent abuses by unions of the power that the 1935 act had
given them[,]" Bald v. RCA Alascom, 569 P.2d 1328, 1335 (Alaska 1977), by "prohibit[ing] unfair
labor practices of unions." Wallace, 708 F. Supp. at 156 n.27 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)). The
Landrum-Griffin amendments were passed in 1959 "to eliminate the intolerable and corrupt
conditions which prevailed throughout segments of organized labor during the 1950's." Hodgson v.
Chain Serv. Rest. Employees Union, Local 11, 355 F. Supp. 180, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). There also
have been other more modest amendments to the Act. See Midwest Motor Express, Inc., 512
N.W.2d at 890 ("In addition to [the] major revisions.., in 1947 and 1959, Congress has
frequently... amend[ed] the statute to conform with its regulatory intention.").
6. Bald, 569 P.2d at 1335. The social crisis was, of course, the Great Depression. See Fafnir
Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 716, 717 (2d Cir. 1966) (observing that the NLRA was "conceived
during the Great Depression and founded upon a frank recognition that our boom-and-bust economy
was attributable in part to labor-management unrest"); Brandon C. Janes, The Illusion of
Permnencyfor Mackay Doctrine Replacement Workers, 54 TEX. L. REV. 126, 127 (1975) (stating
that Congress enacted the NLRA "[als a part of the great economic reconstruction during the
depression of the 1930's"); Bryan M. Churgin, Comment, The ManagerialExclusion Under the
National Labor Relations Act: Are Worker ParticipationPrograms Next?, 48 CATH. U. L. REV.
557, 571 (1999) (noting that the NLRA was "[e]nacted... during the height of the Great
Depression").
7. See NLRB v. U.S. Sonics Corp., 312 F.2d 610, 615 (1st Cir. 1963) ("[T]he basic
philosophy of the Act... is the encouragement of collective-as opposed to individualbargaining.'). Inthis context, collective bargaining refers to:
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994); see also Thomas v. LTV Corp., 39 F.3d 611, 618 (5th Cir. 1994)
("Collective bargaining has been defined as bargaining by an organization or group of workmen on
behalf of its members with the employer.... ") (citation omitted).
8. Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 609 (1991) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 151); see also
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In enacting the NLRA,9 Congress consciously elected to regulate
some aspects of labor relations, while leaving others to the "free play of
economic forces."' This dichotomy has created a limited sphere of labor
combat" in which employers and employees are free to use certain selfhelp weapons to advance their respective economic interests.' 2 The
prohibition of some economic weapons while permitting others reflects
Congress's balancing of the competing interests of unions, employees
and employers in the collective bargaining process. 3
An economic strike 4 is one of the self-help weapons available to
NLRB v. Thompson Prods., Inc., 162 F.2d 287, 293 (6th Cir. 1947) ("The primary purpose of the
enactment of the National Labor Relations Act was to give employees the right to self-organization
and 'the right... to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing."') (quoting
29 U.S.C. § 157); Price v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 49, 83 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2967, 2970 (D.N.M. 1973) ("Two significant policies of the National Labor Relations Act
are to encourage collective bargaining and to eliminate practices by employers and unions which
obstruct the free flow of commerce.").
9. For academic discussions of the circumstances surrounding the NLRA's enactment, see
Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol and Workplace
Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1381 (1993), and Theodore J. St. Antoine, How the Wagner Act
Came to Be: A Prospectus,96 MICH. L. REv. 2201 (1998).
10. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n'of Machinists v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S.
132, 140 (1976) (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971)). See generallyBhd.
of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383 (1969) (observing that the NLRA
"represents the only existing congressional expression as to the permissible bounds of economic
combat").
11. See Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491,499 (1983); Lodge 76, Int'lAss'n of Machinists,
427 U.S. at 146. See generally Valdiviezo v. Phelps Dodge Hidalgo Smelter, Inc., 995 F. Supp.
1060, 1071 (D. Ariz. 1997) ("[T]his country has a tradition of labor union representation where
conflict between management and workers frequently exists."); William R. Corbett, Taking the
Employer's Gun and Bargaining About Returning It. A Reply to "A Law, Economics, and
NegotiationsApproach" to Striker Replacement Law, 56 OHIo ST. L.J. 1511, 1516 (1995) ("[W]ar
and battle terminology has long provided the metaphors of choice to describe disagreements
between employers and organized labor under the National Labor Relations Act.").
12. See Employers Ass'n v. United Steelworkers, 803 F. Supp. 1558, 1564 (D. Minn. 1992),
aff'd, 32 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Midwest Motor Express, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, Local 120, 512 N.W.2d 881, 889 (Minn. 1994) (observing that "federal labor law
intends to permit the use of economic weapons by both sides of a labor dispute"). See generally
NLRB v. Ins. Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960) ('The presence of economic weapons in
reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the system that the
Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized.").
13. See Employers Ass'n, 803 F. Supp. at 1564; Illinois v. Fed. Tool & Plastics, 344 N.E.2d 1,
4 (111. 1975); see also Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 819 v. Byrne, 568 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir.
1977) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) ("As originally passed and as amended in 1947, the NLRA reflects a
careful balancing of the differing powers and viewpoints of labor and management."); Van-Go
Transp. Co. v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 53 F. Supp. 2d 278, 284 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing
"Congress' express decision that generally no governmental regulation interfere with the balance of
power in union-manogement relations").
14. A strike exists "when employees withhold their services in a manner that interferes with
their employer's production with the object of pressuring the employer into granting a work-related
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further the employees' interest in collective bargaining."5 Indeed, the
right of employees to engage in such a strike has been described as "a
cornerstone of the Congressional scheme under the NLRA,' 6 without
which their ability to bargain effectively would be seriously (if not
totally) undermined. 7 As one commentator has stated:
The strike (and the credible threat of a strike) is an essential
component of the collective bargaining system. There are, obviously,
other costs of disagreement that disgruntled workers can impose upon
an employer: they may quit, producing higher turnover and increased
training costs; they may slow down; they may produce bad work; and,
even without resort to sabotage, they may merely withhold important
information, such as the need for maintenance, that results in excessive
wear, increased repair costs, and lost production. But, in the context of
the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement, the strike has
been thought of as virtually indispensable to the 'agreement-making
process.""

concession or of protesting any of their employer's employment policies." Serv. Elec. Co., 281
N.L.R.B. 633, 636 (1986). "An economic strike is one neither prohibited by law nor by collective
bargaining agreement nor caused by employer unfair labor practices." NLRB v. Transp. Co. of Tex.,
438 F.2d 258, 262 n.6 (5th Cir. 1971); see also Rose Printing Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 252, 275 (1988)
(observing that an economic strike "is one not caused by an employer's unfair labor practices").
Examples include strikes "over wages, hours, working conditions, or other conditions of
employment." NLRB v. Herman Wilson Lumber Co., 355 F.2d 426, 430 (8th Cir. 1966); see also
Houston County Elec. Coop., 285 N.L.R.B. 1213, 1259 (1987) (describing an economic strike as
"one in which employees strike in order to bring economic pressure against their employer for the
purpose of securing better wages and employment conditions").
15. See Transp. Co. of Tex, 438 F.2d at 262 n.6 ("Economic strikes are typically [called] for
the purpose of forcing employer compliance with union collective bargaining demands.");
Birkenwald, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 954, 961 (1987) (observing that "the strike is an economic weapon
protected specifically by the Act"); Michael H. LeRoy, The Mackay Radio Doctrine of Permanent
StrikerReplacements and the MinnesotaPicket Line Peace Act: Questionsof Preemption,77 MINN.
L. REV. 843, 844 (1993) (indicating that strikes were "intended by Congress as the workers'
'weapon' of self-help for furthering collective bargaining").
16. NLRB v. United States Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 1195, 1199 (6th Cir. 1987); see also NLRB
v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181 (1967) ("The economic strike against the employer
is the ultimate weapon in labor's arsenal for achieving agreement upon its terms.. . ."). See
generally MeClatchy Newspapers, Inc. v. NLRB, 131 F.3d 1026, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (indicating
that "the right to strike is fundamental") (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Gary-Hobart
Water Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 742,744 (1974)).
17. See McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 131 F.3d at 1031 ("[W]ithout the right to strike, the
union's.., bargaining position would be devastated."); County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. L.A.
County Employees Ass'n, Local 660, 699 P.2d 835, 847 (Cal. 1985) ("[W]ithout the right to strike,
or at least a credible strike threat, ... employees have little negotiating strength."); United Bhd. of
Carpenters v. Pascagoula Veneer Co., 89 So. 2d 711,714 (Miss. 1956) ("Without the right to strike,
collective bargaining would be of no consequence whatever.").
18. Matthew W. Fimkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike, 1990 U.
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Employers, on the other hand, are free to use reasonable measures
to discourage strikes by pressuring the economic interests of their
employees.19 The principal weapon available to an employer faced with

an economic strike is the right to hire replacements for its striking
workers.2 These new employees may be temporary replacements"
employed only for "the duration of the strike,"2 or permanent

replacementsa who may have the right to retain their jobs when the
strike ends and the striking workers seek to return to work."
ILL. L. REV. 547, 547 (quoting DEREK C. BOK & JOHN T. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 229 (1970)); see also NLRB v. Gould, Inc., 638 F.2d 159, 166 (10th Cir. 1980) ('The
employees' statutory right to strike lies at the core of the Congressional scheme for promoting
collective bargaining.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
19. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 39 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
see also H. & F. Binch Co. v. NLRB, 456 F.2d 357, 361-62 (2d Cir. 1972) ("When strikers have
resorted to the economic weapon of endeavoring to impair production, the employer is entitled to
respond with efforts to preserve it .... ); cf. NLRB v. Gen. Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736, 772-73 (2d
Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (indicating that the Act permits
employers to "attempt[ ] to persuade employees that they should not strike... because a strike will
cost too much in lost pay").
20. See NLRB v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 189 F.2d 82, 86 (9th Cir. 1951) ("[H]iring
replacements... is regarded as a legitimate weapon of economic warfare."); Van-Go Transp. Co. v.
New York City Bd. of Educ., 53 F. Supp. 2d 278,289 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (describing "the right to hire
strike replacement workers" as "an important right guaranteed to an employer under federal labor
law"); Illinois v. Fed. Tool & Plastics, 344 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. 1975) ("An employer has a right to hire
replacements for striking employees, and that right constitutes an important economic weapon left
to the employer by Congress when it struck the balance of power between labor and management.")
(authorities omitted). See generally Superior Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 721,725 (1979)
("The Act protects the right to strike to press economic demands. Balancing this, however, must be
the employer's right to continue in business. Thus economic strikers ... may be replaced.").
21. See Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 205 N.L.R.B. 23, 23 (1973) (Fanning & Jenkins, dissenting)
('The use of temporary replacements during a strike is permitted under legal principles long since
settled .... "); Midwest Motor Express, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 120, 494 N.W.2d 895,
899 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (observing that "employers are free to hire temporary replacements
during a labor dispute"), rev'd, 512 N.W.2d 881 (Minn. 1994); LeRoy, supra note 15, at 844
(referring to the "employer practice of hiring temporary replacements to work only through a
strike") (emphasis omitted).
22. Gibson Greetings, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1293 (1993) (Raudabaugh, concurring in part
and dissenting in part), aff'd in partand rev'd in part,53 F.3d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
23. See Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 499 (1983) (referring to "the right to hire
permanent replacements" as "one of the employer's primary weapons during an economic strike");
NLRB v. Herman Wilson Lumber Co., 355 F.2d 426, 430 (8th Cir. 1966) ("[1]t is ... well settled
that employees who engage in an economic strike may be permanently replaced."); Indep. Fed'n of
Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2422, 2424 (W.D. Mo. 1989)
("Mhe offer of permanence to replacements ... can be used as an economic weapon to discourage
or overcome a strike."). But see Midwest Motor Express, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 120,
512 N.W.2d 881, 893 (Minn. 1994) (Wahl, J., dissenting) (asserting that "the practice of hiring
permanent replacements cannot be considered a protected 'weapon' of the employer").
24. See Midwest Motor Express, Inc., 494 N.W.2d at 899 n.4 (observing that "permanent
replacements are employees whom the employer need not discharge even if the strikers offer to

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2000

5

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 3
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 18:167

The rationale for permitting employers to hire permanent
replacements for economic strikers has frequently been questioned.25 For
example, the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or the "Board")26

has occasionally indicated that the practice discourages union
membership, 27 and thus it is potentially violative of section 8(a) (3) of
the Act.2 Precisely because the employer's ability to hire permanent29

replacements also may deter employees from participating in strikes,

return to work unconditionally") (internal punctuation and citation omitted); cf LeRoy, supra note
15, at 844 ("An employer does not dismiss permanent striker replacements once a strike is ended.").
See generally Burr E. Anderson, "Permanent" Replacements of Strikers After Belknap: The
Employer's Quandary, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 321,325 (1985) ("[T]he Board initially shaped an
undifferentiated replacement doctrine, but subsequently adopted tests to determine whether the
employer's purpose for replacement was lawful temporary replacement or permanent
replacement.").
25. See, e.g., Employers Ass'n v. United Steelworkers, 803 F. Supp. 1558, 1565 n.9 (D.
Minn. 1992) (referring to the "academic theory" that "the first case to permit the hiring of
permanent replacement workers," NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), is "in
error," and that "this error has compounded itself over 50 years of Supreme Court precedent"),
aft'd,32 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1994); Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc,,
643 F. Supp. 470,474-75 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (implicitly questioning the soundness of Mackay Radio,
and noting that "some academic critics advocate disabling employers from hiring permanent
replacements for strikers"), aff d in partand rev'd in part,819 F.2d 839 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 489
U.S. 426 (1989); see also Finkin, supra note 18, at 548 ("[I]n Mackay Radio.... the United States
Supreme Court... defined the statutory right to engage in an economic strike as a privilege of the
employee to be replaced permanently for having exercised it.").
26. The Board is the federal agency vested with responsibility for administering the NLRA.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-56, 159-61, 164(c) (1994); Rochester Joint Bd. v. NLRB, 896 F.2d 24, 28 (2d
Cir. 1990); fIT Lamp Div. of the Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Minter, 435 F.2d 989, 992 (lst Cir.
1970); Driscoll v. Carpenters Dist. Counsel, 536 A.2d 412, 415 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). For
academic discussions of the Board's role in the statutory scheme, see William P. Murphy, The
NationalLabor Relations Board-An Appraisal,52 MINN. L. REV. 819 (1968), and Robert Douglas
Brownstone, Note, The National Labor Relations Board at 50: Politicization Creates Crisis, 52
BROOK. L. REV. 229 (1986).
27. See Bio-Sci. Labs., 209 N.L.R.B. 796, 803 (1974); Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 205
N.L.R.B. 23, 23 n.2 (1973); see also Belknap Inc., 463 U.S. at 516 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(observing that "discourag[ing] union membership... is a deleterious side effect of... the power to
hire permanent strike replacements"); Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, Local 613 v. NLRB, 303 F.2d
359, 364 (3d Cir. 1962) (asserting that "a replacement policy... may tend to discourage union
membership"), rev'd sub nom. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
28. Section 8(a) (3) prohibits certain types of employer conduct that would "discourage
membership in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1994); see also Teamsters Local
Union Nos. 822 & 592 v. NLRB, 956 F.2d 317, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("[A]n employer violates
section[ ] 8(a) (3)... when it intends to discourage union membership.").
29. See Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (suggesting
that "the prospect of permanent replacements deters strikes"); Am. Home Sys., 200 N.L.R.B. 1151,
1155 (1972) ("[E]mployees often cut a strike off for fear of losing their jobs to permanent
replacements."); Midwest Motor Express, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 120, 512 N.W.2d
881, 893-94 (Minn. 1994) (Wahl, J., dissenting) (finding it "impossible to believe that a worker's
will to strike is not greatly diminished" by the "threat, or actual hiring, of replacement workers").
But see Erie Resistor Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. 621, 628 (1961) (asserting that "the threat of replacement

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol18/iss1/3

6

Moberly: Striking Bargains: The At-Will Employment of Permanent Strike Rep
2000]

Striking Bargains

the practice conceivably could violate sections 8(a) (1)30 and 13 of the
Act as well.3'
In any event, many observers maintain that the use of permanent
strike replacements undermines cooperative labor relations,32 and the
practice has become perhaps the "most contentious labor law issue since
the 1980s. ' 33 As one court has noted: ....[T]here is substantial
disagreement over these issues .... the House and Senate have in the
by outsiders may solidify the strikers in their collective efforts"), enforcement denied, 303 F.2d 359
(3d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 373 U.S. 221 (1963), enforced on remand sub nom. Int'l Union of Elec.
Workers, Local 613 v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1964).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1994). Section 8(a) (1) prohibits employers from interfering with
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by section 7 of the Act. Am. Motors
Corp., 214 N.L.R.B. 455, 462 (1974); see also Eisenberg v. Lenape Prods. Inc., 781 F.2d 999, 1007
(3d Cir. 1986) (Becker, J., dissenting) ("Section 8(a) (1) prohibits an employer from interfering with
the exercise of Section 7 rights, which include concerted activities for mutual aid and protection.").
A strike constitutes concerted activity generally protected from employer interference under
sections 7 and 8(a) (1). See NLRB v. Transp. Co. of Tex., 438 F.2d 258, 263 (5th Cir. 1971); see
also Midwest Motor Express, Inc., 512 N.W.2d at 891 (Wahl, J., dissenting) ("The primary
'concerted' activity... is the strike.").
31. Section 13 provides that the Act generally is not to be construed "so as either to interfere
with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike." 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1994). One jurist has
asserted that the hiring of permanent replacements "contradicts ... the express language of the
NLRA" because it impedes the statutory right to strike. Midwest Motor Express, Inc., 512 N.W.2d
at 892-93 (Wahl, J., dissenting); see also LeRoy, supra note 15, at 845 (stating that the hiring of
permanent replacements "seemingly contradict[s] an express statutory prohibition against
diminishing or interfering with a worker's right to strike"). But see Midwest Solvents, Inc. v.
NLRB, 696 F.2d 763, 765 (10th Cir. 1982) ("[T]he right to strike is not absolute. An employer can
hire permanent replacements for employees engaged in an economic strike."); TNS, Inc., 1999-2000
NLRB Dec. (CCH) 15,322, at 28,541 (Sept. 30, 1999) (describing the right to hire permanent
replacements as "an exception to the Act's general prohibition on interference with the right to

strike").
32. See Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 897 F. Supp. 570,580 (D.D.C. 1995), rev'd, 74 F.3d
1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Schaub ex rel. NLRB v. Detroit Newspaper Agency, 984 F. Supp.
1048, 1055 (E.D. Mich. 1997) ("The well-advised employer contemplating [the] use [of permanent
replacements] should think long and hard about its immediate and long-term impact on the
employer's relationship with its union-represented employees (and, for that matter, its unrepresented
employees)."), aff'd, 154 F.3d 276 (6th Cir. 1998); Bardane Mfg. Co. v. Jarbola, 724 F. Supp. 336,
342 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (discussing the "strong possibility of severe confrontations.., in the course of
[a] company's efforts to replace striking employees"); Midwest Motor Express, Inc., 512 N.W.2d at
887 (describing "a labor dispute attended by violence after the employer hired permanent
replacements for its striking workers").
33. Michael H. LeRoy, Regulating Employer Use of Permanent Striker Replacements:
EmpiricalAnalysis of NLRA and RLA Strikes 1935-1991, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 169, 169
(1995); see also Schaub, 984 F. Supp. at 1055 (characterizing the hiring of permanent replacements
as "one of the most odious and inflammatory uses of an employer's economic weaponry"); Corbett,
supra note 11, at 1511 (describing the employer's right to hire permanent replacements as "one of
the most vehemently debated of all labor law principles"); Note, One Strike and You're Out?:
Creating an Efficient Permanent Replacement Doctrine, 106 HARv. L. REV. 669, 669 (1993) ("A
fiery debate currently rages in American labor law about whether employers should be able to
replace striking workers permanently.").
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past few years held hearings on different approaches to the problem
although no legislation has in fact been enacted, and... the debate itself

is rather emotional.""
Nevertheless, the precedent for hiring permanent replacements is
well-established, 3 having been judicially created36 in NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co.3 7 shortly after the NLRA was enacted. 38 Some jurists
and commentators have noted that, in contrast to the employees' right to
strike,39 there is no specific reference to the employer's right to hire
34. Reich, 897 F. Supp. at 580; see also Bldg. Serv. & Maint. Union Local No. 47 v. St.
Luke's Hosp., 227 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ohio C.P. Cuyahoga County 1967) ("Strikes and replacement
of strikers have long been, and still are, sensitive and emotional areas for both employer and
employee."); Samuel Estreicher, Strikers and Replacements, 3 LAB. LAW. 897, 897 (1987)
(asserting that the use of permanent replacements "has always been a troubled area of American
labor law").
35. See, e.g., Van-Go Tmnsp. Co. v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 53 F. Supp. 2d 278, 284
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (observing that the Supreme Court has "approved and reaffirmed" the employer's
right to permanently replace economic strikers "on numerous occasions"); Employers Ass'n v.
United Steelworkers, 803 F. Supp. 1558, 1565 (D. Minn. 1992) ("It is well-established federal labor
law that an employer may hire permanent replacement workers during an economic strike by
employees."), affid, 32 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1994); Midwest Motor Express, Inc., 512 N.W.2d at 889
(discussing the "time-honored position that the employer's right to hire permanent replacements
whom it need not discharge in order to accommodate strikers seeking reinstatement is protected
under federal labor law").
36. See Giddings & Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating that "the
[Supreme] Court established.., the power of an employer to replace... striking employe[es]")
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Cent. iUl. Pub. Serv. Co., 159 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1217, 1222 n.19 (1998) (noting that the employer's right to hire permanent strike replacements
"originated" in Mackay Radio); Stephanie Lea Stromire, Recent Development, The NationalLabor
Relations Act Does Not Preempt a DischargedPermanent Replacement Worker's State Cause of
Action, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1228 (1984) ("The [Supreme] Court developed this economic
weapon ....
").
37. 304 U.S. 333 (1938). For a few of the many academic discussions of Mackay Radio, see
Brendan Dolan, Mackay Radio: If It Isn't Broken, Don't Fix It, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 313 (1991);
William Feldesman, Dictum Carriedto Extremes: Mackay Radio Revisited, 12 LAB. LAW. 197
(1996); Hal Keith Gillespie, Comment, The Mackay Doctrine and the Myth of Business Necessity,
50 TEX. L. REV. 782 (1972); LeRoy, supra note 15; Daniel Pollitt, Mackay Radio: Turn It Off, Tune
It Out, 25 U.S.F. L. REv. 295 (1991); and Joseph E. Sales, Note, Replacing Mackay: Strikebreaking
Acts and OtherAssaults on the PermanentReplacement Doctrine,36 RUTGrERS L. REv. 861 (1984).
38. See Midwest Motor Express, Inc., 512 N.W.2d at 884; see also TNS, Inc., 1999-2000
NLRB Dec. (CCH) 15,322, at 28,541 (Sept. 30, 1999) (indicating that the right to hire permanent
strike replacements was recognized "only 3 years after Congress had passed the Act"); Janes, supra
note 6, at 127 (describing Mackay Radio as "one of the earliest decisions under the Act"); cf.
Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (referring to "the longrecognized NLRA right to hire permanent replacements"); Employers Ass'n, 803 F. Supp. at 1566
("[H]iring permanent replacements in an economic strike has been permitted for over 50 years.").
39. See 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1994); see also Nat'l Football League Mgmt. Council, 309 N.L.R.B.
78, 81 n.12 (1992) ("The right to strike is expressly protected by Sec. 13 of the Act."); Clear Pine
Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1046 (1984) (observing that "the Act specifically recognizes
the right to strike"); MCC Pac. Valves, 244 N.L.R.B. 931, 946 (1979) (stating that "the right to
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permanent replacements in the NLRA itself.4° However, Congress has
implicitly confirmed the latter right by addressing the voting rights of
economic strikers who are "not entitled to reinstatement' (that is, those

who have been permanently replaced), 2 and also by electing not to
exclude

replacement

"employee.' ' 3

workers

from the

statutory

definition

of

One administrative law judge has observed that the legislative
history of these NLRA provisions "unquestionably prove[s] that
strike is... specifically provided for in the Act").
40. See Midwest Motor Express, Inc., 512 N.W.2d at 892 (Wahl, J., dissenting) ("[Niothing in
the NLRA expressly provides protection for an employer's hiring of permanent replacement
workers."); William R. Corbett, A Proposalfor Procedural Limitations on Hiring Permanent
Striker Replacements: "A Far, Far Better Thing" Than the Workplace FairnessAct, 72 N.C. L.
REV. 813, 838 (1994) ("The NLRA does not include any reference to a right of an employer to
replace striking employees permanently .... ); Stromire, supranote 36, at 1228 ('Congress... did
not choose to grant employers the right to hire permanent replacement workers.").
41. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (3) (1994). For an extended academic analysis of this NLRA
provision, see Michael H. LeRoy, Severance of Bargaining Relationships During Permanent
Replacement Strikes and Union Decertifications:An EmpiricalAnalysis and Proposal to Amend
Section 9(c) (3) of the NLRA, 29 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1019 (1996).
42. See C.H. Guenther & Son v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 983, 986 (5th Cir. 1970) (indicating that the
quoted statutory provision refers to "permanently replaced economic strikers"); St. Joe Minerals
Corp., 295 N.L.R.B. 517, 517 (1989) ("By its own terms, the provision preserves full voting rights
to strikerswho are not entitled to reinstatement.... mhe Board has construed this section and its
legislative history to mean... permanently replaced strikers .... ) (emphasis added); Gulf States
Paper Corp., 219 N.L.R.B. 806, 806 (1975) (holding that the provision governs "[t]he eligibility of
[permanently] replaced economic strikers to vote"); Note, supranote 33, at 673 n.31 (indicating that
the statutory reference to "workers who are 'not entitled to reinstatement[ ]'... implicitly
recognize[s] that Congress might have sanctioned a class of permanently replaced workers.")
(citation omitted).
43. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994); see also Greenspan Engraving Corp., 137 N.L.R.B. 1308,
1312-13 (1962) (Rodgers and Leedom, dissenting) (indicating that "the Board [has] held that striker
replacements... [are] 'employees' within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Ace') (citing Rudolph
Wurlitzer Co., 32 N.L.R.B. 63 (1941)); Janet L. Braun, Comment, Belknap, Inc. v. Hale-Problems
with Preemption and the Rights of Economic Strikers, 46 OHio ST. L.J. 381, 405 (1985) (noting that
"replacements are employees as defined in section 2(3) of the NLRA"). See generally NLRB v.
Monterey County Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 335 F.2d 927,930 n.4 (9th Cir. 1964) (observing
that the NLRA definition of employee "was designed to include all employees not specifically
excepted"). One commentator has asserted that "Congress' rejection of [statutory language] which
would have excluded replacements from the definition of 'employee[ ]' ... can only be read as an
endorsement of permanent replacement of economic strikers." Sales, supra note 37, at 881 n.158;
see also Ronald Turner, Banning the Permanent Replacement of Strikers by Executive Order: The
Conflict Betveen Executive Order12954 and the NLRA, 12 J.L. & POL. 1, 23 (1996):
As initially proposed by Senator Robert Wagner, the NLRA would have excluded striker
replacements from the statutory definition of employee. That exclusion was subsequently
deleted; as explained in a Senate committee report, the bill's definition of "employee"
should not lead to the conclusion that an employer could not hire new workers,
temporary or permanent, for strikers.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Congress was keenly aware of the Mackay rule which permit[s]
employers who [are] guilty of no unfair labor practice to hire permanent
replacements" for their striking employees. 44 Despite this awareness, 4
Congress has repeatedly declined to enact legislation that would

overturn Mackay Radio4 6 and make it unlawful for employers to hire
permanent replacements.47
In terms of policy, employers frequently argue that they would be
unable to hire qualified replacement workers unless they could offer
them some degree of permanency. 48 Whatever the merits of this
44. TNS, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1348, 1449 (1992), remanded, 46 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see
also Union Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 532, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ("[The Mackay] case involved
an affirmative act by the employer-replacement,-and its citation in the Senate Report is an
indication that the Senate had that situation in mind.").
45. See 7NS, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1450 (referring to "Congressional recognition of Mackay's
consequences on strikers"); Greenspan Engraving Co., 137 N.L.R.B. at 1309 n.7 ("There are
frequent references throughout the legislative history to the possibility of an employer's hiring
replacements ...").
46. Several states, on the other hand, have enacted legislation purporting to limit the use of
permanent strike replacements. See Note, supra note 33, at 671 n.13, 676 n.40. However, these state
statutes have almost invariably been invalidated on federal preemption grounds. See, e.g.,
Employers Ass'n v. United Steelworkers, 32 F.3d 1297, 1301 (8th Cir. 1994) (Minnesota statute);
Charlesgate Nursing Ctr. v. Rhode Island, 723 F. Supp. 859, 864-67 (D.R.I. 1989) (Rhode Island
statute); Mich. Chamber of Commerce v. Michigan, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2887, 2888-89 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. 1984) (Michigan statute); Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey, 445 A.2d 353, 361-64,
370 (NJ. 1982) (New Jersey statute); cf. City of Columbus v. Guay, 577 N.E.2d 122, 124-25 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1989) (invalidating a comparable municipal ordinance). But see Bardane Mfg. Co. v.
Jarbola, 724 F. Supp. 336, 339-42 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (upholding Pennsylvania statute). See generally
David Westfall, Striker Replacements and Employee Freedom of Choice, 7 LAB. LAW. 137, 152
(1991) ("Any ...curtailment of [this] recognized employer weapon in collective bargaining would
require federal legislation, in the case of employers subject to the NLRA, as state and local
regulation presumably is preempted.").
47. See Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Schaub ex rel.
NLRB v. Detroit Newspaper Agency, 984 F. Supp. 1048, 1055 (E.D. Mich. 1997), aft'd, 154 F.3d
276 (6th Cir. 1998); Rakestraw v. United Airlines, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 474, 490 (N.D. Ill. 1991);
Midwest Motor Express, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 120, 512 N.W.2d 881, 890-91 n.5
(Minn. 1994); TNS, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1372 & n.6 (Devaney, dissenting); Oil Workers Int'l
Union v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 821 (1995); see also TNS, Inc.,
1999-2000 NLRB Dec. (CCI-I) 15,322, at 28,545 (Sept. 30, 1999) (Hurtgen, dissenting) (referring
to the "total absence of any indication of Congressional intent to limit the Mackay doctrine
permitting permanent replacement of employees engaged in work stoppages") (footnote omitted).
For academic discussions of this issue, see Corbett, supra note 40; Samuel Estreicher, Collective
Bargaining or "Collective Begging"?: Reflections on Antistrikebreaker Legislation, 93 MICH. L.
REv. 577 (1994); Sales, supranote 37.
48. See, e.g., Butterworth-Manning-Ashmore Mortuary, 270 N.L.R.B. 1014, 1014 (1984)
(affirming administrative law judge's finding that an individual who was hired as a permanent
replacement "would not have accepted employment on a temporary basis"); Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists, Dist. No. 8 v. J. L. Clark Co., 471 F.2d 694, 696 (7th Cir. 1972) (referring to "the
necessity of offering the inducement of permanent employment to secure employees willing to
violate a picket line"); NLRB v. Transp. Co. of Tex., 438 F.2d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 1971) (discussing
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argument may be,'9 it appears that employers are increasingly hiring (or
at least threatening to hire) permanent replacements when their
employees strike,50 although the empirical evidence on this point is not
extensive.5'
This article considers one important aspect of hiring permanent
strike replacements-the employer's ability to preserve its right to
terminate them at will." The issue stems from the fact that the
termination of employees who were offered permanent employment at

the time of hire53 may result in the assertion of common law claims

employer's contention that "in order to fill a large number of vacancies, the employer must be able
to assure the replacements that their jobs will be permanent"); Midwest Motor Express, Inc. v. Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 120, 494 N.W.2d 895, 899 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) ("[The employer]
contends it would be difficult to hire qualified employees unless they were assured some
permanency."); cf Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 537 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[l]f
an employer decided not to hire replacements on a permanent basis, his ability to hire replacements
might be affected adversely.").
49. See Midwest Motor Express, Inc., 494 N.W.2d at 899 (asserting that the argument was
rejected in Belnap); Inter Collegiate Press, 199 N.L.R.B. 177, 180 (1972) (Fanning & Jenkins,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[The employer] has not come forward with any evidence
suggesting why it would have been unable ... to hire replacements for striking employees. Logic
and experience strongly suggest that workers ... willingly take the jobs of striking employees.");
Westfall, supra note 46, at 147 (noting that "[m]ost friends of labor ...question the [employer's]
asserted need to offer permanency to replacements").
50. See Midwest Motor Express, Inc., 512 N.W.2d at 892 n.1 (Wahl, J.,
dissenting) ("Since
1980 there has been.., an increase in the expressed willingness of employers to hire permanent
replacements for strikers."); Caterpillar, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 1130, 1133 (1996) (separate statement
of Chairman Gould) (referring to "employers' increasing willingness to use permanent replacement
workers"); LeRoy, supra note 15, at 843-44 ("A growing number of employers with unionrepresented employees are hiring or threatening to hire permanent replacements when their
employees strike."); LeRoy, supra note 33, at 169 (observing that "permanent replacement strikes"
occurred at "unusually high rates from 1975-1991").
51. See Finkdn, supra note 18, at 548 n.12 ("Hard data on the use of permanent strike
replacements is nonexistent."); Estreicher, supra note 47, at 594 & n.73 (observing that "[tihere are,
as yet, no definitive data" confirming the "apparently greater willingness of firms... to resort to
permanent replacements"); cf Corbett, supra note 40, at 859 (noting disagreement concerning
whether "there is, in fact, an increasing resort to the threat of hiring, or the actual hiring, of
permanent replacements"). See generally Jeffrey A. Spector, Comment, Replacement and
Reinstatementof Strikers in the United States, GreatBritain, and Canada, 13 COMP. LAB. L.J. 184,
221 (1992) ("Few formal studies of the current replacement phenomenon exist.").
52. See, e.g., Target Rock Corp., 324 N.L.R.B. 373, 379 (1997) (describing employer's
requirement that replacements acknowledge its employment-at-will policy), enforced, 172 F.3d 921
(D.C. Cir. 1998); Gibson Greetings, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1291 & n.23 (1993) (discussing
employer's desire to hire replacements on an at-will basis), afftd in partand rev'd in part, 53 F.3d
385 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Karmazin Prods. Corp., No. 7-CA-27767, 1988 NLRB GCM LEXIS 12, at *8
(Dec. 23, 1988) (referring to "strike replacement employees [who] were employees-at-will").
53. The Board has indicated that in order to be considered "permanent" strike replacements
under the NLRA, individuals hired to work during a strike must be "regarded by themselves and the
[employer] as having received their jobs on a permanent basis." Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 165
N.L.R.B. 514, 516 (1967) (citing Hot Shoppes, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 802, 804 (1964)), afTd sub nom.
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under the implied contract exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine.55
The potential viability of such a claim presents a particular

dilemma for an employer required to reinstate its striking employees
when, for example, what was originally thought to be an economic strike

instead is found to be an unfair labor practice strike. 6 In that situation, or
alternatively when a settlement with the union provides for the
reinstatement of strikers, s5 the employer could be contractually liable to
any permanent replacements it is forced to terminate in order to make
room for the returning strikers."8
This dilemma is compounded by the fact that a strike's character

Truck Drivers & Helpers Local No. 728 v. NLRB, 403 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
54. See generally Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549, 554 (Okla. 1987) ("Under the implied
contract restrictions of the freedom to discharge an at-will employee, courts have found from
particular facts that the parties had intended a contract of permanentemployment or one of tenured
job security."). For a general discussion of the contractual implications of offering permanent
employment, see Robert A. Brazener, Annotation, Validity and Duration of ContractPurportingto
befor PermanentEmployment, 60 A.L.R. 3d 226 (1974).
55. The "classic" formulation of the employment-at-will rule emphasizes the employer's right
to terminate the employment relationship "for good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally
wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong." Hillesland v. Fed. Land Bank Ass'n, 407
N.W.2d 206, 211 (N.D. 1987) (quoting Payne v. W. & At. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884),
overruledon other grounds by Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915)); see also Novosel v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 896 n.2 (3d Cir. 1983) (describing the Payne court's
characterization of the employment-at-will rule as "an oft quoted statement of [the] doctrine").
56. See NLRB v. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 782 F.2d 7, 10-11 (Ist Cir. 1986) ("It
is well settled Board law that the conversion of a strike into an unfair labor practice strike...
give[s] the strikers the right to force the dismissal of any replacement hired after conversion, upon
an unconditional request for reinstatement."); Janes, supra note 6, at 128 ("As a practical matter...
a replacement hired on terms of permanent employment becomes a temporary employee if the strike
ripens into an unfair labor practice strike, because the replaced strikers are entitled to reinstatement
upon termination of any such dispute.") (footnotes omitted).
57. Justice Scalia has opined that in any strike settlement negotiations, the union not only can
be expected to, but "indeed, would have a legal obligation[ ] to seek displacement of the
strikebreakers by the returning strikers." NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775,
809 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Dold Foods, Inc., 289 N.L.R.B. 1323, 1323 (1988)
("[U]nions often demand, at least in the first instance, that the replacements be discharged and the
strikers rehired.").
58. See E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 744 F. Supp. 1140, 1144 (S.D. Fla.
1990) (observing that an employer "may be liable in contract to ousted replacement [workers], even
though forced to reinstate strikers in an unfair labor practices dispute"); Indep. Fed'n of Flight
Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2422, 2423 (W.D. Mo. 1989) ("A
promise made in the context of a strike exposes the employer to a breach of contract suit if later
repudiated to accommodate returning strikers .... "); DeGraff Mem'l Hosp., Nos. 3-CA-14257 & 3CB-5253, 1998 NLRB GCM LEXIS 41, at *3 n.4 (May 25, 1988) ("Of course, if the replacement
employees were promised that they would not be ousted by the strikers at the end of the strike, they
may have a private cause of action against the [e]mployer.").
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generally cannot be determined while it is occurring." And even if the
strike is ultimately found to be an economic one, the question of whether
the replacements are temporary or permanent (and thus whether the
employer was required to terminate them to accommodate returning
strikers) 6° is also typically determined in a Board proceeding following
the conclusion of the strike and the employer's receipt of the strikers'
request for reinstatement. 6' The uncertainty inherent in this situation
leaves an employer that has attempted to hire permanent replacements
for what it perceives to be economic strikers with exposure for enormous

potential back pay liability if its assessment of the strike's character (or
the replacements' status) proves to be inaccurate. 62
This article explores this issue, and concludes that the dilemma can
be avoided, at least in part, by permitting employers to hire replacements
on an at-will basis without sacrificing their permanency for NLRA
purposes. 63 In that regard, the Supreme Court has indicated that
"conditional" offers of permanence do not necessarily make
replacements temporary employees,6' and there appears to be no
59. See Detroit Newspaper Agency, 161 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1033, 1034 (1999); see also
Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 530 n.2 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Whether a particular
strike is an economic strike or an unfair labor practice strike ... is often unclear until the strike has
ended. Where the character of a strike is contested, as it frequently is, the issue must be resolved in
an unfair labor practice proceeding before the Board.") (quoting the Board's amicusbrief).
60. CompareNLRB v. Transp. Co. of Tex., 438 F.2d 258,264 (5th Cir. 1971) ("An employer
need not discharge permanent replacements to make room for returning economic strikers.") with
Harvey Mfg., Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 465, 470 (1992) (indicating that the reinstatement of economic
strikers "[routinely... comprehends the discharge of temporary replacements").
61. See Gehnrich & Gehnrich, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 1122, 1129 n.17 (1977). Because employers
may be required to terminate temporary replacements to make room for returning economic strikers,
"[i]t is often disputed whether an employer has, in fact, hired 'permanent' replacements." Braun,
supra note 43, at 402 n.153. In that situation, the burden is on the employer to prove that the
replacements were hired "permanently." See NLRB v. Murray Prods., 584 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir.
1978); Harvey Mfg., 309 N.L.R.B. at 467. Absent such proof, a refusal to reinstate striking
employees at the conclusion of an economic strike constitutes an unfair labor practice. Murray
Prods., 584 F.2d at 939.
62. See Gatliff Bus. Prods., 276 N.L.R.B. 543, 563 (1985) ("The economic consequences to
the parties because of a determination about the nature of a strike can be substantial."); Corbett,
supranote 11, at 1521 nA8:
Suppose an employer, concluding that it lawfully could hire permanent replacements and
that it in fact has done so, denies reinstatement to striking employees who offer to return
to work. If the employer's conclusions are later determined to be incorrect by the NLRB
(and perhaps a court of appeals), the employer will be held liable for potentially large
back pay and other make-whole relief.
Id.
63. There appears to have been no prior academic consideration of this specific issue. Indeed,
commentators have generally "ignored the rights of... permanent replacements." Janes, supra note
6, at 126.
64. Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 503.
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persuasive basis for refusing to extend this analysis to permit offers of
permanent "at-will" employment to strike replacements.65
I1. THE RESPECTIVE RIGHTS OF STRIKERS AND THEIR REPLACEMENTS

A. The ReinstatementRights of Striking Workers

1. Rights of Economic Strikers
The reinstatement rights of striking workers generally depend on
the nature of the strike in which they are engaged.6 An economic striker
who was permanently replaced is entitled to reinstatement if there is a
vacancy in the striker's former position,67 or in another substantially

equivalent position for which the striker is qualified.6 An employer also
must recall all qualified strikers who have made unconditional requests
65. See Target Rock Corp., 324 N.L.R.B. 373, 376 (1997) (Higgins, concurring) ("[Tihe
intention of permanence need not be a binding unconditional promise. For example, an employer
can couple its 'intention' language with a statement that... employment is 'at will."') (citing
Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 503 n.8), enforced, 172 F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
66. See NLRB v. Harding Glass Co., 80 F.3d 7, 10 n.3 (lst Cir. 1996) ("The nature of the
strike determines the reinstatement rights of striking employees once the work stoppage ends.");
NLRB v. Colonial Haven Nursing Home, 542 F.2d 691, 703 (7th Cir. 1976) ("The characterization
of the strike has a significant impact upon the claimed right of the strikers to reinstatement.");
Harowe Servo Controls, 250 N.L.R.B. 958, 962 (1980) (referring to the "distin[ction] between
reinstatement rights accorded employees, depending upon the nature of the strike").
67. See Keller Mfg. Co., 272 N.L.R.B. 763, 786 (1984) ("Economic strikers are entitled to
reinstatement upon application and if their prestrike positions are filled at the time of application,
they retain the right to their former position when it becomes vacant.") (emphasis omitted).
68. See Medite of N.M., Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 1145, 1148 (1994) (indicating that economic
strikers "are entitled to... a substantially equivalent position" that is "left vacant by the departure
of permanent replacements"). The Board has held that employers are not obligated "to offer to
reinstate replaced economic strikers to vacancies in jobs which they are qualified to perform but
which are not substantially equivalent to their former jobs," although economic strikers "are entitled
to nondiscriminatory treatment in their applications for other jobs." Rose Printing Co., 304 N.L.R.B.
1076, 1078 (1991). By the same token:
an economic striker has no obligation to accept an offer of reinstatement to a position
which is not the same [as] or substantially equivalent to his prestrike position. A refusal
to accept such an offer does not extinguish entitlement to full reinstatement to the former
or substantially equivalent job....
In addition.... a striker's acceptance of a position which is not the same as or
substantially equivalent to that striker's prestrike position does not extinguish the
statutory right to subsequent reinstatement to a vacant prestrike position or a
substantially equivalent one.
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for reinstatement before it can hire new employees for jobs created by
post-strike expansion of the employer's business, or by a replacement
worker's having left the job. 6' This right to reinstatement continues until
the strikers abandon their employment for substantial and equivalent
employment elsewhere. 0 However, the employer is not required to
terminate permanent replacements to make room for economic strikers

who request reinstatement.7'
2. Rights of Unfair Labor Practice Strikers

If an unfair labor practice is a contributing factor in causing or
prolonging a strike, 72 the strike is (or becomes) an unfair labor practice
strike.73 This contributing factor test is quite broad. The unfair labor
practice need not be the only or even the major cause of the strike.75 The
test instead is met if an unfair labor practice had anything to do with

69. See Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1368-69 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir.
1969); NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 381 (1967); Rose Printing Co., 289 N.L.R.B.
252, 275 (1988); see also Bio-Sci. Labs., 209 N.L.RB. 796, 803 (1974) ("[A]lithough the initial
replacement of the striking employees is proper, a subsequent refusal to reinstate them when
vacancies arise may be unlawful.").
70. See Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. at 1369.
71. See Hornigonera Del Toa, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 956, 957 (1993) ("An employer need not
discharge permanent replacements it has hired for economic strikers .... ").
72. Subject to certain limitations, the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section [7 of the Act];
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor
organization or contribute financial or other support to it... ;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization... ;
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed
charges or given testimony under [the Act];
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1994).
73. See Teamsters Local Union No. 515 v. NLRB, 906 F.2d 719,723 (D.C. Cir. 1990); NLRB
v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 574 F.2d 835, 840 (5th Cir. 1978).
74. See Chicago Beef Co., 298 N.L.R.B. 1039, 1052 (1990) (referring to "the minimal causal
criterion on which the Board will base a finding of conversion of an economic strike into an unfair
labor practice strike"), enforced, 944 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1991); Corbett, supra note 40, at 867
(describing the contributing factor test as "nebulous and labor-friendly"); Corbett, supra note 11, at
1521 n.48 ("[T]he standards for determining the characterization of a strike favor unions and the
striking employees.").
75. See Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 574 F.2d at 840; see also NLRB v. Harding Glass Co., 80
F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1996) ("It need not be shown... that the employer's unfair labor practice was
the sole or even the primary factor in aggravating the strike .... ).
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causing or prolonging the strike.76
Nevertheless, there clearly must be a causal connection between an
unfair labor practice and the strike,' which is not established by the

mere occurrence of an unfair labor practice." Thus, an employer's unfair
labor practice may be too inconsequential to convert an economic strike

into an unfair labor practice strike,79 or may be sufficiently remedied to
convert the strike back to an economic one.8O
In NLRB v. Harding Glass Co.,"' for example, the First Circuit
refused to sustain a finding of a strike conversion,2 noting that the type

of unfair labor practice at issue is a relevant consideration in evaluating
that issue. 3 In particular, the court held that an economic strike was not

76. See Gen. Drivers Union, Local 662 v. NLRB, 302 F.2d 908, 911 (D.C. Cir.1962); Domsey
Trading Corp., 310 N.L.R.B. 777, 791 (1993), enforced, 16 F.3d 517 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Rose
Printing Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 252, 275 (1988) ("It is horn book law that a strike caused in whole or it
partby an employer's unfair labor practices constitutes an unfair labor practice strike.") (emphasis
added).
77. See NLRB v. Proler Int'l Corp., 635 F.2d 351,354 (5th Cir. 198-1); see also Rose Printing
Co., 289 N.L.R.B. at 275. See generally HardingGlass Co., 80 F.3d at 10:
Causation is crucial: It must be found not only that the employer committed an unfair
labor practice after the commencement of the strike, but that as a result the strike was
expanded to include a protest over the unfair labor practice, and that settlement of the
strike was thereby delayed and the strike prolonged.
Id. (internal punctuation and citation omitted).
78. See C-Line Express, 292 N.L.R.B. 638, 638 (1989) ("The Board has long held that an
employer's unfair labor practices during an economic strike do not ipso facto convert it into an
unfair labor practice strike."); Tufts Bros., Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 808, 810 (1978) ("The requirement of
a causal connection between the unfair labor practice and the strike is not satisfied merely because
the two coincide in time."); Typoservice Corp., 203 N.L.R.B. 1180, 1180 (1973) ("An unfair labor
practice strike does not result merely because the strike follows the unfair labor practice.").
79. See Radiator Specialty Co. v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 1964); see also Moore
Bus. Forms,Inc., 574 F.2d at 840 ("[A] violation of the Act alone does not convert an economic
strike into an unfair labor practice strike."); TNS, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1369 n.6 (1992)
(Raudabaugh, concurring) (indicating that the strike must have been eaused by "serious unfair labor
practices") (emphasis added); J.W. Rex. Co., 308 N.L.R.B. 473, 499 (1992) (discussing a
"somewhat atypical" case in which "the employer did engage in unfair labor practices during the
strike, although they [were] not alleged to have converted it into an unfair labor practice strike").
80. See Outdoor Venture Corp., 160 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1178, 1182 (1999); Chicago Beef Co.,
298 N.L.R.B. 1039, 1040 (1990), enforced, 944 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1991); Carlsen Porsche Audi,
Inc., 266 N.L.R.B. 141, 152 (1983); cf. Mohawk Liqueur Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 1075, 1086 (1990)
(noting that "not every unfair labor practice is causally connected to a contemporaneous strike," and
finding "no proof of a causal connection between [the employer's] failure to completely cure its
unlawful conduct and the employees' decision to continue the strike"), affd sub nom. Gen. Indus.
Employees Local 42 v. NLRB, 951 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
81. 80 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1996).
82. See id. at 10.
83. See id at 11; cf Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055, 1080 (1st Cir. 1981)
(observing that "the Board and reviewing court may properly consider the probable impact of the
type of unfair labor practice in question on reasonable strikers in the relevant context"); Gibson
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converted into an unfair labor practice strike by the employer's
implementation of its final offer prior to reaching a bargaining impasse,'
even though implementing the offer under those circumstances was itself
unlawful." In reaching this result, the court concluded that the conduct at
issue was not the "type. of unfair labor practice[] that inevitably
impact[s] the length of a strike."86

Unlike economic strikers, unfair labor practice strikers have a
substantially unqualified right to reinstatement upon making an

unconditional offer to return to work." In particular, unfair labor practice
strikers must be reinstated even if the employer has hired permanent
replacements who will be displaced by the returning strikers."8 Indeed,
Greetings, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1311 (1993) ("Economic strikes are not automatically
converted to unfair labor practice strikes upon the commission of unfair labor practices during the
strike. Whether a strike will be held to have been converted depends on the nature of the unfair
aff'd in partand rev'd in part,53 F.3d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
labor practices committed ..."),
84. See Harding Glass Co., 80 F.3d at 13. An impasse is "a breakdown in bona fide
negotiations, not brought about.., by a party's own unfair labor practices." Beyerl Chevrolet, Inc.,
221 N.L.R.B. 710, 722 (1975); see also Larsdale, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1318 (1993) ("The
Board has defined impasse as the point in time of negotiations when the parties are warranted in
assuming that further bargaining would be futile.").
85. The court upheld the Board's finding that the employer had committed an unfair labor
practice by "unilaterally implement[ing] changes in employment conditions in the absence of a valid
impasse in bargaining." Harding Glass Co., 80 F.3d at 10. See generally Genstar Stone Prods. Co.,
317 N.L.R.B. 1293, 1301 (1995) ("Under existing precedent, an employer may, upon the arrival of a
lawful impasse in negotiations, unilaterally implement its final offer without having committed an
unfair labor practice. But impasse must have been lawfully arrived at.").
86. Harding Glass Co., 80 F.3d at 11-12; see also Mohawk Liqueur Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 1075,
1075 n.1 (1990) (finding that evidence "failed to establish a nexus between the [employer's]
continuing implementation of its final offer and the prolongation of the strike"), affd sub nom. Gen.
Indus. Employees Local 42 v. NLRB, 951 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1991). However, the Board's
General Counsel apparently disagrees with this analysis, having more recently asserted that a strike
"constituted an unfair labor practice strike, because [the employer's] unfair labor practice[] in...
implementing its final offer without a valid impasse having been reached[] inherently tainted and
prolonged negotiations." United States Testing Co., 324 N.L.R.B. 854, 858 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Board itself has acknowledged that "[c]ertain types of unfair labor
practices by their nature will have a reasonable tendency to prolong the strike and therefore afford a
sufficient and independent basis for finding conversion." C-Line Express, 292 N.L.R.B. 638, 638
(1989).
87. See Teamsters Local Union No. 515 v. NLRB, 906 F.2d 719, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
Pecheur Lozenge Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 496, 498 (1952), enforced as modified, 209 F.2d 393 (2d Cir.
1953). In fact, merely offering permanent employment to replacements for unfair labor practice
strikers may violate the NLRA. See NLRB v. Laredo Coca Cola Bottling Co., 613 F.2d 1338, 1341
(5th Cir. 1980).
88. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 346 (1938); NLRB v. Efco Mfg.,
Inc., 227 F.2d 675, 676 (1st Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 130 F.2d 919, 927-28 (2d
Cir. 1942). See generally E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 744 F. Supp. 1140, 1142
(S.D. Fla. 1990) ("[IThe rights of... replacement employees do not determine whether the
employer has an obligation to reinstate past strikers.").
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the Board routinely directs that replacements be discharged if necessary
to make room for returning unfair labor practice strikers. 9 In Covington
FurnitureMfg. Corp.,90 for example, the Board stated:
The law is settled that a strike in response to an employer's violations
of the Act is an unfair labor practice strike, and the striking employees
are entitled to full reinstatement to their former or substantially
equivalent jobs immediately upon their unconditional offer to return to
work, even if permanent replacements for them have been made and
discharge of such replacements is necessitated. 9'
B. The Rights ofPermanentReplacement Workers

1. Rights Under the NLRA
Because replacement workers are themselves exercising statutory
rights,92 they should perhaps be given greater protection than they are
currently afforded under the NLRA. 93 Under this view, employers who
89. See, e.g., Schaub ex rel.NLRB v. Detroit Newspaper Agency, 154 F.3d 276, 278 (6th Cir.
1998) (characterizing a Board order "directing the [employer] ... to reinstate all of the strikers and
discharge the permanent replacements if necessary" as "relief [that] would be available, under the
governing law, if the strike was an 'unfair labor practice strike"'); Stephenson-Yost Steel, 294
N.L.R.B. 395, 406 (1989) (ordering employer to "dismissol, if necessary, any [replacement]
employees hired on or after [the date on which] the unfair labor practice strike began"), enforced,
904 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1990).
90. 212 N.L.R.B. 214 (1974), enforced, 514 F.2d 995 (6th Cir. 1975).
91. ld. at 219; see also Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491,493 (1983):
Where employees have engaged in an economic strike, the employer may hire permanent
replacements whom it need not discharge even if strikers offer to return to work
unconditionally. If the work stoppage is an unfair labor practice strike, the employer
must discharge any replacements in order to accommodate returning strikers.
Id.; Houston County Elec. Coop., 285 N.L.R.B. 1213, 1300 (1987) (noting that "unfair labor
practice strikers ... [are] entitled to reinstatement to their former positions even if permanent
replacements had to be discharged to make room for them").
92. See Legal Aid Soc'y v. Ass'n of Legal Aid Attorneys, 554 F. Supp. 758, 762 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) ("Section 7 ... guarantees the right of employees.., not to strike."); Int'l Paper Co., 309
N.L.R.B. 31, 36 (1992) (referring to the Section 7 rights of "striker replacements"); Gloversville
Embossing Corp., 297 N.L.R.B. 182, 194 (1989) (discussing "the right, guaranteed to [nonstrikers]
by Section 7 of the Act, to refrain from strike activity"); Drivers Local 695, 174 N.L.R.B. 753, 758
(1969) (discussing "the rights guaranteed in Section 7, among which is the right not to join a strike
in which other employees participate"); Westfall, supra note 46, at 150 ("[Ihe Act protects
replacements as well as strikers.").
93. See, e.g., Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 543 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("It might be a better
world if strike replacements were afforded greater protection."); Janes, supra note 6, at 146
(asserting that "federal rights... do not adequately serve the needs of the employee who wishes to
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discharge replacement workers to make room for returning strikers may
be discriminating against the replacements on the basis of their
statutorily protected decision to refrain from participating in a strike. 94

This implies that, rather than ordering that replacements be discharged
when strikers return,95 the Board should require the employer to continue
to employ both groups!'
Fortunately for employers, this view has rarely been seriously
entertained*9 Although the Board recognizes that the interests of strikers
and their replacements are typically in conflict," both the Board and the
hold the employer to the promise of permanent employment"); Westfall, supra note 46, at 156
(observing that "job-seekers who refrain from engaging in a strike.., should be given greater
protection than the Board and the courts now afford").
94. See Baldwin v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1046, 1051 (M.D. Tenn. 1996)
(discussing the contention that it is a "violation of federal labor law" for an employer to terminate
permanent replacement workers in order to make room for striking union members who request
reinstatement); Janes, supra note 6, at 133 ("The disgruntled ex-replacement may have a cause of
action against the employer under section 8(a) (3) of the NLRA based on unlawful discrimination
against him, alleging that the employer deprived him of his section 7 rights because of his
nonunion ... status.") (footnote omitted); Westfall, supra note 46, at 150 ("[F]or employers to deny
permanency to replacements would seem to constitute discrimination on the basis of their choice to
refrain from participating in the strike.").
95. See Harvey Mfg., Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 465, 470 (1992) ("Routinely, the economic strikers'
entitlement to immediate reinstatement comprehends the discharge of temporary replacements
occupying the strikers' prestrike or substantially similar jobs."); Westfall, supra note 46, at 156
("The Board routinely orders replacements for unfair labor practice strikers to be discharged, if
necessary, to make room when the strikers return... ").
96. See Macy's Mo.-Kan. Div. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 835, 846 (8th Cir. 1968) (concluding that
"consideration should be given to the rights of permanent replacements for economic strikers, even
when the economic strikers have been returned to their jobs"); Westfall, supra note 46, at 156
(suggesting that the Board should "plac[e] the burden on the employer to continue to pay both
groups"); see also Transp. Co. of Tex., 177 N.L.R.B. 180, 186 (1969) (suggesting that "[r]einstated
strikers [should be] treated uniformly with non-strikers and replacements"), enforced, 438 F.2d 258
(5th Cir. 1971); cf. Beaird Indus., Inc., No. 15-CA-11923, 1993 NLRB LEXIS 937, at *9 (Sept. 21,
1993) (discussing an employer that "did not release [its] temporary replacements, but simply
absorbed the returning strikers into the workforce").
97. In NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775 (1990), for example, Justice
Scalia flatly dismissed the proposition that "the employer should double its work force, paying both
the replacement workers and the returning strikers." Id. at 809 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
Estreicher, supra note 34, at 906 (observing that "dicta can be found in many Board decisions,
recognizing, as the Supreme Court in Belknap v. Hale plainly assumed, the legitimacy of...
'bumping' arrangements"). But see E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 744 F. Supp.
1140, 1142 (S.D. Fla. 1990) ("Mhe rights of... replacement employees are enforceable even if
antithetical to the rights of the returning strikers."); Janes, supra note 6, at 146-47 (asserting that
"the replacement arguably has some... recourse against the party that deprives him of his section 7
rights").
98. See Serv. Elec. Co., 281 N.L.R.B. 633, 641 (1986) (observing that because "[t]he
replacements' ability to continue employment... [is] subject to their displacement by the strikers,"
the interests of these two groups of employees are "diametrically opposed"); Leveld Wholesale,
Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 1344, 1350 (1975) (observing that "the interests of the two groups are not the
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courts have tended to ignore the rights of replacements," and
occasionally even fail to recognize that replacements are engaging in
protected activity.Ire As a result, the permanent replacement debate has
focused primarily on the rights of returning strikers,'0 ' rather than those
of replacement workers.' °2
In United Steelworkers, Local 8560,'0° for example, the Board's
General Counsel issued an advice memorandum acknowledging that

unions (like employers) cannot discriminate against employees who
exercise their statutory right not to participate in a strike 4 Nevertheless,
the General Counsel effectively concluded that the rights of replacement

same"); see also Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. at 792 (assuming that "the interests of
strikers and replacements conflict"). See generally Mike Yurosek & Son, Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 304,
306 (1989) (discussing "the balance between the.. . rights of permanent replacements and the...
rights of strikers").
99. See, e.g., NLRB v. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 782 F.2d 7, 10 (Ist Cir. 1986)
("[Ulnfair labor practice strikers have rights to their positions greater than any replacements hired
during their strike .... ); Rivera-Vega v. Conagra, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 1350, 1370 n.24 (D.P.R.
1995) (observing that the rights of picketing employees "outweigh the job rights of... temporary
replacements"). See generally Anderson, supra note 24, at 332 n.62 ("The section 7 rights secured
to strike replacements have historically been ignored by the Board and the courts .... ").
100. See, e.g., Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1126, 1145 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Wisdom, J., dissenting) (asserting that replacement workers are "not exercis[ing]... section 7
rights"); Int'l Paper Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 31, 36 (1992) (referring to strike replacements' "right to
refrain from engaging in protected activity") (emphasis added); cf Estreicher, supra note 34, at 900
(indicating that strike replacements are "refrain[ing] from section 7 activities").
101. See, e.g., Chesapeake Plywood, Inc., 294 N.L.R.B. 201, 202 n.5 (1989) ("In economic
strikes, the rights of strikers can be affected by... the hiring of permanent replacements."). See
generally Janes, supra note 6, at 126 (noting that "the Mackay doctrine's effect on striking
employees has generated substantial debate") (emphasis added).
102. See E. Air Lines, Inc., 774 F. Supp. at 1142; see also Westfall, supra note 46, at 156
("Most discussions of the replacement of strikers treat the matter as a contest between striker and
employer interests and give scant heed to the interests of ... newly hired replacements (and wouldbe replacements)."); cf. NLRB v. Pope Maint. Corp., 573 F.2d 898, 907 (5th Cir. 1978) (discussing
"the conflicting rights of an employer to hire permanent replacements with the employees' right to
strike"). But see Macy's Mo.-Kan. Div. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 835, 846 (8th Cir. 1968) ("Both the
economic strikers and the permanent replacements have a legitimate interest in theirjobs .... .).
103. 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1238 (1979), analyzed in Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union
No. 11,273 N.L.R.B. 183 (1984).
104. See id. at 1239; see also Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 11,273 N.L.R.B. at
193 ("[l]t is well established that a union may not discriminate against employees who exercise their
Section 7 right not to join a strike."). See generally Allen Bradley Co. v. NLRB, 286 F.2d 442, 445
(7th Cir. 1961), overruled by U.O.P Norplex, Div. Of Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 445 F.2d
155 (7th Cir. 1971):
Section 7 protects an employee in his right to refrain from concerted activities and this
includes, of course, the right to refuse to participate in or recognize a strike. Coercion or
interference with that right, whether by the employer or by the union, is made an unfair
labor practice by the terms of the Act.
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workers can be circumvented in this context by basing'reinstatement on
seniority 5 (assuming there is a legitimate contractual basis for doing
so)," because employers can lawfully award jobs on this
nondiscriminatory basis.5 As one administrative law judge colorfully
stated: "In that event, one hired as a permanent replacement may not be
a permanent replacement permanently. ' '
Despite its questionable underpinnings,'O9 the analysis in United
105. See United Steelworkers, Local 8560, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1239; cf.Mike Yurosek &
Son, Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 304, 306 (1989) (discussing the contention that economic strikers should be
treated more favorably than their replacements "because the permanent replacements' seniority
was.., less than the seniority of the unreinstated strikers"); Bio-Sci. Labs., 209 N.L.R.B. 796, 796
(1974) (discussing union's contention "that the replacements should be 'bumped' out of their jobs
by the former strikers who... had greater seniority"). See generally Gehnrich & Gehnrich, Inc.,
232 N.L.R.B. 1122, 1129 n.17 (1977) ("It is not unlawful for an employer to permit all employees,
strikers as well as permanent replacements, to compete on a seniority basis for available jobs.");
Corbett, supra note 40, at 848 n.181 (indicating that the "use of seniority to give preference for
placement in jobs does not run afoul of the [NLRA]").
106. Economic strikers have "no statutory right to be recalled by seniority." Bingham
Willamette, 282 N.L.R.B. 1192, 1194 n.5 (1987), enforced, 857 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1988). Instead,
"an economic striker's right to recall by seniority must be established by a collective-bargaining
agreement or a binding past practice of reinstatement by seniority." Mike Yurosek & Son, Inc., 295
N.L.R.B. at 304; see, e.g., Bubbel v. Wien Air Alaska, Inc., 682 P.2d 374, 376 (Alaska 1984)
(referring to a collective bargaining agreement pursuant to which striking employees were reinstated
while their replacements were laid off "based on seniority"). See generally Aeronautical Indus. Dist.
Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 526 (1949) (observing that "seniority rights derive their
scope and significance from union contracts").
107. See UnitedSteelworkers, Local 8560, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1239; cf Int'l Bhd.of Elec.
Workers, Local Union No. 11, 273 N.L.R.B. at 193 (observing that "a union may lawfully seek the
reinstatement of economic strikers and the layoff of strike replacements pursuant to a
nondiscriminatory system of layoff and recall"). See generally Transp. Co. of Tex, 177 N.L.R.B.
180, 186 (1969) (stating that an employer is "not required to give preference to strikers or place
non-strikers and replacements in a subordinate position when deciding who to retain, and in
choosing among [these] 'equals' it [can give] controlling weight to ...factors unrelated to
concerted activity"); Janes, supra note 6, at 134-35 ("The employer may be able to remove...
replacements] by nondiscriminatory means... ").
108. Gehnrich & Gehnrich, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. at 1129 n.17; cf. Molded Fiber Glass Body Co.,
182 N.L.R.B. 400, 403 (1970) (discussing cases in which "the 'permanent' replacement proved
impermanent"); Janes, supra note 6, at 128 (indicating that "a replacement hired on terms of
permanent employment [may] become[ ] a temporary employee").
109. Seniority in theory may provide a lawful basis for preferring the reinstatement rights of
strikers over the rights of replacement workers. See, e.g., Giddings & Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB, 675
F.2d 926, 931 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding a "seniority system [that did] not discriminate between
strikers and non-strikers"). But see Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, Dist. No. 8 v. J. L. Clark Co., 471 F.2d
694, 700 (7th Cir. 1972) (Pell, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that "seniority should be no basis for
displacing a person accepting employment during the course of an economic strike"). However,
employers cannot advance pretextual justifications for favoring strikers over replacements if there
actually are statutorily prohibited motives behind their preferences. See Braun, supra note 43, at
406; cf.Janes, supranote 6, at 142 (suggesting that the NLRA would be violated by "the discharge
of nonunion replacements and reinstatement of union workers on the pretext of retaining jobs on a
seniority basis").
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Steelworkers was subsequently confirmed in DeGraffMem'l Hosp."0 In

that case, employees engaging in an economic strike were permanently
replaced by the employer."' The union and the employer subsequently

entered into a strike settlement agreement that provided for the
reinstatement of all striking employees, and the termination of as many
of the permanent2 replacements as necessary to accommodate the
returning strikers."

One of the replacement employees then filed an unfair labor
practice charge with the Board under section 8(a) (1) of the Act."3 The
employee contended that the employer had violated her rights under
section 7 of the Act"4 by agreeing to a strike settlement pursuant to
which replacements would be discharged to accommodate returning
economic strikers."15 The charge was submitted to the General Counsel
for review." 6
The General Counsel concluded that the charge should be
dismissed." 7 It reasoned that because a union can seek the reinstatement
110. Nos. 3-CA-14257 & 3-CB-5253, 1988 NLRB GCM LEXIS 41 (May 25, 1988); cf.
Corbett, supra note 40, at 847-48 ("Although there is little law on this issue, apparently unions
[accused of violating the NLRA by seeking the discharge of replacements to make room for
returning strikers] would be able to defend successfully ...on the ground that they sought to have
employees placed in the jobs on the basis of seniority rather than union affiliation.").
111. See DeGraffMem'lHosp., 1988 NLRB GCMLEXIS 41, at *1.
112. See id. See generally Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc. v. NLRB, 859 F.2d 362, 369 (5th
Cir. 1988) (Williams, J., dissenting) ('The settlement of an active economic strike almost always
requires reinstatement of the strikers with full seniority rights."), rev'd,494 U.S. 775 (1990); Sales,
supranote 37, at 881 n.157 ("Commonly, when an employer and a union settle a dispute in which
replacements have been utilized, the terms of the settlement require dismissal of the replacements
and immediate reinstatement of all strikers.").
113. See DeGraffMem'lHosp., 1988 NLRB GCM LEXIS 41, at *1, *2.
114. One of the "basic elements" of a section 8(a) (1) violation is "employer action that
effectively interferes with, restrains, or coerces employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights."
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1126, 1144 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J.,
dissenting).
115. See DeGraffMem'lHosp., 1988 NLRB GCM LEXIS 41, at *1; cf. Estreicher, supra note
34, at 906 (stating that "the legality of 'bumping' [replacement workers when a strike is settled]
cannot be... lightly assumed"); Janes, supra note 6, at 141-42 ("The permanent replacement who
loses his job because of union pressure at the conclusion of an economic strike may have a federal
claim ... against the union and the employer .... ).
116. See DeGraffMem'lHosp., 1988 NLRB GCM LEXIS 41, at *1. Under section 3(d) of the
NLRA, the Board's General Counsel is authorized to investigate unfair labor practice charges and
issue complaints based on such charges, and also has the authority to prosecute those complaints
before the Board. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1994).
117. See DeGraffMem'l Hosp., 1988 NLRB GCM LEXIS 41, at *2. Such a decision is not
appealable. See Truck Drivers & Helpers Union, Local No. 170 v. NLRB, 993 F.2d 990, 997 n.4
(1st Cir. 1993) (observing that "the General Counsel's decision to dismiss is final"); Baker v. Int'l
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 691 F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 1982) ('The General
Counsel's decision not to issue an unfair labor practice complaint is generally not reviewable,").
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of economic strikers even if reinstatement would result in the
displacement of permanent replacements," unions and employers may
lawfully enter into agreements to that effect as long as their motive is
simply to obtain the reinstatement of the strikers," 9 rather than to
retaliate against the replacements for exercising their statutory right to
work during the strike.'20 Because there was no evidence of unlawful
motive, 2 ' the General Counsel concluded that the employer had not
violated the Act.'2
118. See DeGraffMem'l Hosp., 1988 NLRB GCM LEXIS 41, at *2 & n.2 (citing Portland
Stereotypers Union No. 48, 137 N.L.R.B. 782, 786, n.6 (1962) and Skydyne Div. of Brooks &
Perkins, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 976 (1987)); see also Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 532 n.5
(1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[l]t is a legitimate bargaining demand for a union to seek
reinstatement of strikers in preference to replacements."); Hansen Bros. Enters., 279 N.L.R.B. 741,
741 (1986) ("[W]here the striker replacements are only temporary, an offer to return to work which
demands... the discharge of those replacements is perfectly appropriate."), enforced, 812 F.2d
1443 (D.C. Cir. 1987). But see Baldwin v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1046, 1051
(M.D. Tenn. 1996) (discussing the contention that it is unlawful for a union to seek "the termination
of... permanent replacement workers in order to make positions for Union members") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
119. See DeGraffMem'l Hosp., 1988 NLRB GCM LEXIS 41, at *2-*3; cf. S. Fla. Hotel &
Motel Ass'n, 245 N.L.R.B. 561, 579 (1979) (describing union's contention that, as a condition to
settling a strike, "all replacements must be dismissed and all strikers returned"); Local 457, United
Rubber Workers, 147 N.L.R.B. 980, 985 (1964) (discussing union's efforts during negotiations "to
obtain the Employer's agreement to discharge the replacements upon settlement of the strike"). See
generally Corbett, supra note 40, at 847 ("The Board, although never deciding the issue, has made
statements in its decisions indicating its recognition that unions routinely seek the discharge of
replacements and its belief that the practice is a necessary incident of a union's duty to represent the
strikers.").
120. See DeGraff Mem'l Hosp., 1988 NLRB GCM LEXIS 41, at *2-*3; but cf. Estreicher,
supra note 34, at 906 (characterizing the similar analysis in United Steelworkers, Local 8560, 103
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1238 (1979), as "formally correct but unsatisfying," because "in virtually all cases
the union is not seeking to accommodate the rights of conflicting groups of workers but is acting out
of an understandable, but unremitting hostility to the replacements"). See generally Gem City Ready
Mix Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 1260, 1264 (1984) (indicating that strike settlement agreements may not be
used "as schemes to deny employees statutory rights").
121. The discharge of permanent replacements does not, in and of itself, violate the NLRA. See
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 458 n.2 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The employer, of course, may agree to discharge permanent
replacements, subject to any claims the replacements may have under state law.") (emphasis added);
Copaz Packing Corp., No. 9-CA-19929-1, 1983 NLRB GCM LEXIS 33, at *2 (Sept. 28, 1983) ("Of
course, the Employer does not violate the Act if it terminates permanent replacements at the end of
the strike."); cf. Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 519 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (observing that "federal
law apparently does not obligate the employer to fulfill its promises to the replacements").
However, an employer would violate the Act by terminating permanent replacements "based on the
fact that [they] were not union members." Baldwin, 927 F. Supp. at 1051 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
122. See DeGraff Mem'l Hosp., 1988 NLRB GCM LEXIS 41, at *3; cf Belknap, Inc., 463
U.S. at 507 (discussing the contention that "as a matter of federal law the employer cannot be
foreclosed from discharging.., replacements pursuant to a contract with a bargaining agent"). See
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Although debatable,'2 this result is a reflection of the NLRA policy
encouraging collective bargaining, including the negotiation of strike
settlement agreements, as a means of resolving labor disputes.' In Gem
City Ready Mix Co.,'2 for example, the Board relied on this policy to
uphold a strike settlement agreement that favored the interests of strike
replacements over those of returning strikers.1 6 The Board held that the
union had properly waived the strikers' statutory rights in exchange for
the opportunity to end the strike. 27 Similar protection presumably
extends to the employer as well.'
generally Corbett, supra note 40, at 848 n.181 (asserting that "a successful action by replacements"
is unlikely "if the union [and employer] can articulate some basis other than union affiliation for the
allocation of positions").
123. See Corbett, supranote 40, at 847 (questioning "whether permanent replacements who are
discharged at a union's insistence could prevail if they filed [unfair labor practice] charges against
the union"). The General Counsel's inquiry into the employer's motive in DeGraff was in contrast
to the typical analysis in the converse situation. In Gem City Ready Mix Co., for example, the
administrative law judge concluded that a strike settlement agreement that "discriminates in favor of
striker replacements and against returning strikers" is "inherently destructive of important employee
interests," and thus "no specific evidence of unlawful motive is needed to make out a violation" in
that situation. Gem City Ready Mix Co., 270 N.L.R.B. at 1264-65; see also O'Neill v. Air Line
Pilots Ass'n, Int' 1, 886 F.2d 1438, 1447 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that a "negotiated division of
[employees] into strikers and nonstrikers" that results in "unfavorable discriminatory treatment of
returning strikers" is "inherently destructive of employee rights") (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted), rev'd, 499 U.S. 65 (1991). As one commentator has noted, "[t]he Board might
[likewise] consider blanket removal of replacements at the end of the strike inherently destructive of
the replacements' section 7 rights." Janes, supranote 6, at 134.
124. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); NLRB v. U.S. Sonics Corp., 312 F.2d 610,
615 (lst Cir. 1963); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1081-82 (1955). See generally Thomas
v. LTV Corp., 39 F.3d 611, 618 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Collective bargaining has been defined... [to
include] the settlement of disputes by negotiation between an employer and the representatives of
his employees.").
125. 270 N.L.R.B. 1260 (1984).
126. See id. at 1260-61. The Board stated: "The policy of the National Labor Relations Act is
to encourage the practice and procedure of collective bargaining as a means of resolving labor
disputes, including the encouragement of the negotiation of strike settlement agreements." Id.
(footnotes omitted). For an academic discussion of this issue, see Matthew W. Finkin, The
Truncation of Laidlaw Rights by CollectiveAgreement, 3 INDUS. REL. L.J. 591 (1979).
127. Gem City Ready Mix Co., 270 N.L.R.B. at 1261; see also Van Holding Corp., 293
N.L.R.B. 182, 185 (1989) (observing that "a union may waive strikers' reinstatement rights in a
strike settlement agreement when the waiver is part of a quid pro quo agreement") (citing Hotel
Holiday Inn de Isla Verde, 278 N.L.R.B. 1027 (1986)); Estreicher, supra note 34, at 908 (stating
that "the Board has made clear.., that unions can agree to limitations on the.., rights of
unreinstated strikers"). But cf Little Rock Airmotive, Inc. v. NLRB, 455 F.2d 163, 168-69 n.9 (8th
Cir. 1972) ("[W]e have grave doubts that a union in collective bargaining can simply barter away
the employment of some of its members."); Brooks Research & Mfg., 202 N.L.R.B. 634, 637 n.12
(1973) (noting that former Board member John Fanning "[did] not subscribe to the view that a
union has an unqualified right to waive recall rights of economic strikers").
128. See Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 11, 273 N.L.R.B. 183, 193 (1984)
(stating that "the... reinstatement rights of economic strikers may be cut off by an agreement
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The same analysis may apply to a strike settlemehnt agreement like
the one in DeGraff that favors the interests of returning strikers over
those of their replacements, 29 because in theory the union negotiating the
agreement represents, at least in some respects, the interests of all

employees, including replacements.

In other words, a union may be

entitled to waive the statutory rights of replacement workers in order to

achieve a strike settlement, 3' just as it can waive the rights of returning
strikers for that purpose.

2

Indeed, the Board has indicated that the

between the union and the employer reached in the give-and-take of collective bargaining"); see
also Macy's Mo.-Kan. Div. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 835, 846 (8th Cir. 1968) ("Employers should not be
penalized in their efforts to minimize industrial strife by settling strikes."). But see Estreicher, supra
note 34, at 900-01 (characterizing "the permissibility of securing waiver of [reinstatement] rights in
bargaining with the union" as an "open question[]").
129. See generally Greyhound Lines, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 554, 563 (1995) (observing that
"competing interests ... permissibly may be compromised by a bargaining agent in the context of a
comprehensive strike settlement agreemene'). This undoubtedly is the more likely scenario, because
there is "at least a reasonable concern that the union would not be a vigorous bargainer for the
replacement employees because of the direct conflict of interest between the strikers and their
replacements." Detroit Newspaper Agency, 161 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1033, 1034 (1999); see also
Leveld Wholesale, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 1344, 1350 (1975) ("It would be asking a great deal of any
union to require it to negotiate in the best interests of strike replacements during the pendency of a
strike, where the strikers are on the picket line.").
130. See Woodward Sand Co. v. W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 789 F.2d
691, 697 (9th Cir. 1986); see also NLRB v. Alva Allen Indus., 369 F.2d 310, 320 (8th Cir. 1966)
(indicating that a union is "obligated by law to represent the strike breakers along with the Union
employees whom they had totally replaced"); Leveld Wholesale, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. at 1350 ("[A]
union represents all the employees.in the bargaining unit. That includes both strikers and strike
replacements."). As a practical matter, however, "a union is not expected simultaneously to
represent the interests of the replacements as it would the interests of the strikers." Goldsmith
Motors Corp., 310 N.L.R.B. 1279, 1279 (1993); see also Capitol-Husting Co. v. NLRB, 671 F.2d
237, 246 (7th Cir. 1982) ("Mhe interests of strike replacements are different from those of strikers
and the Union cannot be expected to effectively represent these conflicting interests."); Serv. Elec.
Co., 281 N.L.R.B. 633, 641 (1986) (referring to "the inability of a striking representative to bargain
simultaneously in the best interests of both strikers and their replacements"). For this reason, "struck
employers have no obligation to bargain about employment terms for replacements during the
course of an economic strike." GHR Energy Corp., 294 N.L.R.B. 1011, 1012 (1989).
131. See Serv. Elec., 281 N.L.R.B. at 641 (discussing "the normal risk of negotiations leading
to replacements being terminated to make way for returning strikers"). But see Trustees ex rel.
Teamsters Local 287 Trust Fund v. Fleming Cos., No. C-91-2686-VRWv, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19233, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 1992) ("The interests of strike replacement workers and striking
union members are inherently adverse and a union cannot simultaneously represent both interests in
a negotiation."); IT Serv., 263 N.L.R.B. 1183, 1188 n.17 (1982) (discussing the contention that a
union's "demand for the discharge of... strike replacements indicate[s] that [it] would not
represent those employees fairly").
132. See DeGraff Mem'l Hosp., Nos. 3-CA-14257 & 3-CB-5253, 1988 NLRB GCM LEXIS
41, at *2-*3 (May 25, 1988); cf S. Richard Pincus & Steven L. Gilman, The Common Law Contract
and Tort Rights of Union Employees: What Effect After the Demise of the "At Will" Doctrine? 59
CHi.-KENT L. REv. 1007, 1019 (1983) (referring to "the federal policy granting a union broad
authority to negotiate and contract for all bargaining unit members, including strike replacements").
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statutory rights of replacement workers may be entitled to less deference
than those of strikers in this situation, 33 and there are judicial decisions
making the same distinction."
2. Rights Under the Common Law
For much of the NLRA's existence, replacement workers also
enjoyed little in the way of state common law protection.' This point is
illustrated by cases such as Hope v. Nat'l Airlines,'36 Albers v. Wilson &
Co.,'37 and Bixby v. Wilson & Co.,'3s in which courts from various

jurisdictions have rejected claims
that permanent replacement workers
39
were wrongfully discharged.

a. Hope v. Nat'l Airlines
In the first case, Hope v. Nat'l Airlines,'4 the plaintiff accepted
See generally Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967) (referring to "the congressional grant of
power to a union to act as exclusive collective bargaining representative," which "of necessity
subordinates the interests of an individual employee to the collective interests of all employees in a
bargaining unit").
133. See, e.g., DetroitNewspaperAgency, 161 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1034 n.5:
[Clurrently a union may bargain with respect to the return of the strikers-and... this
presents a... conflict of interest. Concededly, such bargaining can have an impact on
the replacements. However, such bargaining is on behalf of the strikers; the impact on
the replacements is simply a consequence of the bargaining on behalf of the strikers.
Id. But see Greenspan Engraving Corp., 137 N.L.R.B. 1308, 1314 (1962) (Rodgers & Leedom,
dissenting) (asserting that "permanent replacements ... possess[] a stake in the employer's
operations at least equal, if not superior, to the strikers' interest").
134. See Alva Allen Indus., 369 F.2d at 320 (stating that while a union is legally obligated to
represent all members of the bargaining unit, including replacement workers, it owes "primary
responsibility" to its "striking members"); cf. Midwest Motor Express, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, Local 120, 512 N.W.2d 881, 890 (Minn. 1994) (assuming that "a replacement
employee.., is unrepresented in... negotiations between union and employer").
135. See Janes, supra note 6, at 148 ("The replacement wishing to pursue his claim on state
grounds has a limited arsenal for attack."). The lack of affirmative common law protection available
to replacement workers is implicit in one state court's observation that "[t]he common law.., does
not condemn ordinary strikebreaking as either a civil or criminal wrong." Bldg. Serv. & Maint.
Union, Local No. 47, v. St. Luke's Hosp., 227 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ohio C.P. Cuyahoga County 1967)
(emphasis added).
136. 99 So. 2d 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
137. 184 F. Supp. 812 (D. Minn. 1960).
138. 196 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Iowa 1961).
139. See generally Finkin, supra note 18, at 551 ("At the time [the Supreme Court] fashioned
the 'permanent replacement' rule (and well after), the displaced replacement had a scant claim to
state."); Note, supra note 33, at 674-75 ("Despite assurances of permanence, [strike replacements]
historically have lacked a legal remedy if they are discharged.").
140. 99 So. 2d 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
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employment with an airline during a pilot's strike that had seriously
limited the airline's ability to meet its scheduling demands. 14 ' The
plaintiff received verbal assurances at the time of hire that if he worked
through the strike, he would be employed "permanently" as long as the
airline was in business. 42
When the plaintiff was subsequently discharged, he brought suit
claiming the airline had wrongfully discharged him in violation of a
contract of permanent employment. 143 Although there was some support
for the plaintiff's contention under the pertinent state law,' 44 the trial
court dismissed the complaint without specifying the grounds upon
which it was deemed to be deficient. 145 The plaintiff then appealed.'
The appellate court began by noting that the plaintiff himself was
not precluded by the terms of the alleged employment contract from
terminating the employment relationship at will. 147 The court concluded
from this that the employer's alleged commitment to permanent
employment was unilateral,' 4" and mutuality of obligation was therefore

lacking.4 4 Accordingly, the alleged contract was enforceable against the

141. See id. at 245.
142. See id.
143. See id.; cf. Russell & Axon v. Handshoe, 176 So. 2d 909, 914 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965)
(considering contention that "the word 'permanent' as contained in [an employment] contract means
that [the employee] is entitled to remain as an employee... so long as he is capable of rendering
the... services for which he was employed").
144. The Florida Supreme Court had previously indicated that:
the words "permanent employment" would be understood as meaning that, so long as the
defendant.., had work which the plaintiff could do and desired to do, and so long as the
plaintiff was able to do his work satisfactorily, the defendant would employ him, but that
in that sense the employment would be permanent; that is, the plaintiff would be under
no necessity of looking for work elsewhere, but could rely on the arrangement thus
made.
Hall v. Hardaker, 55 So. 977, 980 (Fla. 1911) (discussing Camig v. Carr, 46 N.E. 117 (Mass.
1897)).
145. See Hope, 99 So. 2d at 245. Although the trial court in Hope did not offer an explanation
for its ruling, the Florida District Court of Appeal has stated that "[clontracts for... 'permanent'
employment are not favored in the law, and courts rarely enforce them because of their
indefiniteness and uncertainty." Hesston Corp. v. Roche, 599 So. 2d 148, 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
146. See Hope, 99 So. 2d at 245.
147. See id.
at 246. See generally Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (111.
1981) (indicating that the employment at will doctrine originated in the proposition that "the
employee can end his employment at any time under any condition").
148. See Hope, 99 So. 2d at 246; cf Hesston Corp., 599 So. 2d at 151 (questioning "the
inherent fairness of an agreement that places the entire burden of the long-term commitment on the
employer since no comparable commitment exists on the part of the employee").
149. See Hope, 99 So. 2d at 246; cf. Weatherly v. Int'l Paper Co., 648 F. Supp. 872, 875-76
(D.P.R. 1986) ("The employment-at-will doctrine is based on a strict interpretation of the basic,
common law contract principle of mutuality of obligation. If the employee is free to quit at any
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employer only if the plaintiff had provided additional consideration
beyond the mere provision of his personal services 50
The plaintiff argued that his employment during a strike constituted
the necessary additional consideration' because he had effectively
foregone his right to join the pilot's union,' and incurred the disfavor of
his fellow employees.' The court disagreed.' 54 While acknowledging
that a detriment suffered by a promisee may provide the consideration
necessary to support a contract, 55 the court concluded that the facts
time, the employer must be equally free to terminate employment."). But see Gorrill v.
Icelandair/Flugleidir, 761 F.2d 847, 852 (2d Cir. 1985) (discussing authority "[riejecting the
proposition that an employee's freedom to quit his employment at will is conclusive of whether, as a
matter of mutuality, an employer could, in turn, terminate at will").
150. See Hope, 99 So. 2d at 246. See generally Hesston Corp., 599 So. 2d at 151 ("[Flor
reasons of lack of mutuality and indefiniteness, it is usually held that contracts for permanent...
employment, when unsupported by consideration additional to services, are indefinite in nature and
terminable at the will of either party.") (quoting Brazener, supra note 54, at 233).
151. See Hope, 99 So. 2d at 246; see also Burkhimer v. Gealy, 250 S.E.2d 678, 682 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1979) ("Generally, employment contracts that attempt to provide for permanent
employment.., are terminable at will by either party. Where the employee gives some special
consideration in addition to his services, such as... assisting in breaking a strike, such a contract
may be enforced."), overruled on other grounds by, Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Indus., Inc.,
493 S.E.2d 420 (N.C. 1979).
152. See Hope, 99 So. 2d at 246. Replacements conceivably could want to join the union
"despite their willingness to cross the picket line." NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494
U.S. 775, 789 (1990). However, the NLRA specifically recognizes "the right of a labor organization
to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein." 29
U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1994). Thus, "a union can expel or suspend a member who works during a
strike," Meat Cutters Union, Local 81, 284 N.L.R.B. 1084, 1084 n.6 (1987) (citing NLRB v. AllisChalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967)), and undoubtedly can deny membership to a nonunion
strike replacement in the first instance. See, e.g., Local 1255, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB,
456 F.2d 1214, 1217 (5th Cir. 1972) (observing that a union "may absolutely bar [an individual]
from membership" for "strikebreaking"); W.G. Diehl Distrib. Co., 283 N.L.R.B. 524, 524 (1987)
(referring to a union that "refused to permit [strike replacements] to join"). See generally Int'l Ass'n
of Machinists, Dist. Lodge Nos. 99 & 2139, 194 N.L.R.B. 938, 939 (1972) ("In only one type of
case has the Board found unlawful under Section 8(b) (1) (A) the right to deny membership, and
that is where the union has acted to restrain an individual from filing an unfair labor practice
charge."), 489 F.2d 769 (Ist Cir. 1974), overruled by Meat Cutters Union Local 81, 284 N.L.R.B. at
1084.
153. See Hope, 99 So. 2d at 246; cf. Wien Air Alaska v. Bubbel, 723 P.2d 627, 629 (Alaska
1986) (noting that replacement workers "subject themselves to... opprobrium"). See generally
Illinois v. Fed. Tool & Plastics, 344 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. 1975) ("Mhe crossing of [a] picket line by
newly employed strike breakers ... might subject those persons, their children and their families to
abuse and obloquy."); Rape v. Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co., 100 So. 585, 589 (Miss. 1924) (Ethridge,
J., dissenting) ("It is a notorious fact that taking the place of strikers places an employee in an
unenviable position. He incurs the enmity of a large number of his fellow workmen and of that part
of the general public who are in sympathy with the object and purpose of the strike.").
154. See Hope, 99 So. 2d at 246.
155. See id. But see Hesston Corp., 599 So. 2d at 151 ("In order for additional consideration to
be sufficient to support a promise of permanent ... employment, it would appear that there must be
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relied upon by the plaintiff were insufficient to show any consideration
other than personal services, or to place him in a more favorable
position
15 6
than that contemplated by the employment at will rule.
b. Albers v. Wilson & Co.
The court in Albers v. Wilson & Co 5 7 similarly refused to find the
additional consideration necessary to support a contract for permanent
employment in the fact that the plaintiff in that case had accepted
employment as a replacement even though the strike at issue was

violent, and any person crossing the picket line was subject to potential
harm.' The court noted that all persons who lived in the area were
aware of the fact that anyone who accepted employment as a
replacement might be subjected to violence.'59 This potential for violence

thus was a condition of, rather than consideration for, the plaintiff's
employment 60 Because the alleged contract for permanent employment
was not supported by any consideration independent of the plaintiff's
personal services, it was terminable at will and the employer did not
wrongfully discharge the plaintiff when it terminated his employment,

and that6 of other replacement workers, to make room for returning
strikers. '

a deteriment absorbed by the employee which results in a corresponding benefit to the employer.")
(quoting Brazener, supra note 54, at 234).
156. See Hope, 99 So. 2d at 246.
157. 184 F. Supp. 812 (D. Minn. 1960).
158. See id. at 813; see also Janes, supra note 6, at 149 (discussing Albers); cf. Diamond
Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB, 80 F.3d 485, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (describing a strike in which
"replacement workers had been the targets of violence, vandalism and threats"); Brown & Sharpe
Mfg. Co., 299 N.L.R.B. 586, 590 (1990) (discussing "violence directed against strike replacements,
occurring not only at the picket line but at their homes and other places away from the plane').
159. See Albers, 184 F. Supp. at 813; see also Rape v. Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co., 100 So. 585,
589 (Miss. 1924) (Ethridge, J., dissenting) ("[Strikes are] frequently attended with danger of
physical violence, and this is so well known that no intelligent person could fail to appreciate the
significance of this fact."); Longview Furniture Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 301,304 (1952) ("[I]t is common
knowledge that in a strike where vital economic issues are at stake, striking employees resent those
who cross the picket line and will express their sentiments .... "), enforced as modified, 206 F.2d
274 (4th Cir. 1953).
160. SeeAlbers, 184 F. Supp. at 813; cf Gloversville Embossing Corp., 297 N.L.R1B. 182, 194
(1989) (observing that "replacement workers must be prepared to contend with some unpleasantries
in a strike situation"). This phenomenon may reflect the Board's purported reluctance to hold unions
accountable for violence directed against strike replacements. See Westfall, supranote 46, at 156 &
n.l 13 (citing authorities). But see Drivers Union Local 695, 174 N.L.R.B. 753, 758 (1969) ("If a
union is unwilling, or unable, to take the necessary steps to control its pickets, it must then bear the
responsibility for their misconduct.").
161. SeeAlbers, 184F. Supp. at813.
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c. Bixby v. Wilson & Co.
A similar result was reached in Bixby v. Wilson & Co.,' 62 where
replacements hired during the same strike that was at issue in Albers'O

brought suit against the employer for breach of contract when their
employment was terminated to accommodate returning strikers. 4
Several of the plaintiffs had been required to relocate and forego other
employment in order to replace the strikers, and thus had sought, and
received, assurances of permanence from the employer prior to

accepting their positions.'6
When the employer and the union subsequently settled the strike,
they agreed that the respective employment rights of the striking
employees and the replacement workers would be decided by

arbitration.'6 When the arbitration panel (with one member dissenting)
subsequently concluded that the strikers should have seniority over the
replacements, the employer discharged the replacements. 67 The
replacements then brought suit for breach of contract.'6
The court began its analysis by observing that the plaintiffs' right to
recover was dependent upon state law, 9 and in particular upon the
contractual significance of the employer's characterization of the
replacements as permanent employees.7 Citing various state court

162. 196 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Iowa 1961).
163. See id. at 901; Janes, supranote 6, at 149 & n.122 (discussing Bixby and Albers).
164. See Bixby, 196 F. Supp. at 890-92.
165. See id. After they began working, the replacements received yet additional assurances that
their employment would not be temporary. In particular, the employer called them together on
several occasions and stated: "You may have been told that you were going to be laid off when the
strike is ended. We are here to tell you [that] you are going to be kept on regardless." Id. at 891.
166. See id.; cf Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, Lodge 1652 v. Int'l Aircraft Servs., Inc., 302 F.2d
808, 814-15 (4th Cir. 1962) (ordering parties to arbitrate the propriety of the employer's "refusal
after the termination of the strike... to dismiss the replacement workers... and to reinstate strikers
to their positions").
167. See Bixby, 196 F. Supp. at 892, 901. The dissenting panelist refused to concur in the
arbitration award because its effect was to "nullify the assurances given by the [employer] to those
who were employed during the strike." L at 892.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 892-93. The court noted:
There might be several possible durations for a contract of "permanent employment."
Among those could be employment for a reasonable period; employment for life; for as
long as the employee was able to perform the services (for his work life); for as long as
the employee's services were satisfactory; for as long as employment was available in
the business with which the employment was connected.
Id. At 902; cf Stromire, supra note 36, at 1228 ("The duration of a contract for permanent
employment depends entirely on the meaning that the state court ascribes to the term.").
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decisions,171 the Bixby court concluded that under the applicable state
law, a contract for permanent employment means only that the contract
is to continue indefinitely until one of the parties elects to terminate the
relationship, and thus is deemed to be terminable at will by either
party.73
Like the courts in Hope'74 and Albersf' the Bixby court
acknowledged that an employer's assurance of permanent employment
may nevertheless be enforceable if, in exchange for that assurance, the
employee has given consideration in addition to the mere rendering of
services.' 76 However, relinquishing other employment and incurring
expense in relocating to the new place of employment generally do not
constitute such additional consideration. 177 The Bixby court explained:
171. E.g., Lewis v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 37 N.W.2d 316 (Iowa 1949); Faulkner v. Des
Moines Drg Co., 90 N.W. 585 (Iowa 1902).
172. See id. at 893 (discussing Faulkner); see also Janes, supra note 6, at 149 (indicating that
the Bixby court "denied recovery on the basis that the 'permanent' term was indefinite"). See
generally Midwest Motor Express, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 120, 494 N.W.2d 895, 900
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that "there will be cases in which an employer's offer of employment
to a replacement worker will clearly meet only the definition of 'permanent' as defined under
federal labor law"), rev'd, 512 N.W.2d 881 (Minn. 1994).
173. See Bixby, 196 F. Supp. at 893-94 (discussing Lewis). The court indicated that this
analysis was not altered by the fact that employers have a federally protected right to hire permanent
replacements for their striking workers under NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333
(1938). The Bixby court explained that the fact that the employer could have continued to employ
the replacements under Mackay Radio was not determinative of whether it was legally obligated to
do so. See Bixby, 196 F. Supp. at 903.
174. See Hope v. Nat'l Airlines, 99 So. 2d 244,246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (suggesting that
a contract of permanent employment would be enforceable where the employee has given
"additional consideration over and beyond his personal services").
175. See Albers v. Wilson & Co., 184 F. Supp. 812, 813 (D. Minn. 1960) (indicating that "a
contract of permanent employment contemplates more than a contract terminable at will" if the
employee "has provided an additional valuable consideration to the [employer] outside of that
normally considered a condition of employment").
176. See Bixby, 196 F. Supp. at 902; see also Romack v. Pub. Serv. Co., 499 N.E.2d 768, 772
(Ind.Ct. App. 1986):
The employment relation is at will unless there is a promise of employment for a fixed
duration or the employee has given independent consideration beyond his services in
exchange for the employment. An employment at will relationship may be converted to
one requiring good cause before termination if the employee, in exchange for permanent
employment, provides independent consideration that results in a detriment to him and a
corresponding benefit to the employer.
Id. (citations omitted).
177. See Bixby, 196 F. Supp. at 900-01; cf Page v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 167 So. 99,
100 (La. 1936) (finding no additional consideration in the fact that the plaintiff "surrendered a
lucrative position [with another employer] to accept employment with the defendant during a
strike"). But cf Beyda v. USAir, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 1394, 1396 (W.D. Pa. 1988) ("[R]elinquishing
or foregoing other employment opportunities... may in appropriate circumstances constitute
sufficient additional consideration to rebut the at-will presumption. Likewise the expense and
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It would seem the courts which hold that the rejection of offers of other
employment, the giving up of other employment, and the moving to
the place of employment do not constitute good additional

consideration regard those matters as normally incident to contracts of
employment in 17general
and not as being "permeative" of the duration
8
of the contract.
III. BELKNAP, INC. V. HALE

Despite the holdings in the foregoing and other similar cases, 79
some measure of state common law protection for permanent
replacements now exists as the result of the Supreme Court's decision in
Belknap, Inc. v. Hale.'80 The specific issue addressed in Belknap was
whether the NLRA preempted state law breach of contract and
misrepresentation claims asserted by strike replacement workers who
were displaced by reinstated strikers despite having been hired on a
permanent basis,' with assurances that they would not be terminated to
accommodate the strikers. 2
When contract negotiations between the employer and the union
resulted in an impasse, many of the employer's employees went on
personal hardship of relocating one's family may be additional consideration.").
178. Bixby, 196 F. Supp. at 901; see also Stack v. Allstate Ins. Co., 606 F. Supp. 472, 476
(S.D. Ind. 1985):
Moving one's household to a new location or surrendering prior employment, without
more.... will not constitute adequate consideration ....[1I]n moving and/or giving up
her prior job, the employee is merely placing herself in a position to accept the new
employment. There is no independent detriment to the employee because she would have
had to do the same things in order to accept the job on any basis, and there is no
independent benefit bestowed upon the employer."
Id. (quoting Ohio Table Pad Co. v. Hogan, 424 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind.Ct. App. 1981)).
179. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 323 S.E.2d 238 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); Page v. New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 167 So. 99 (La. 1936). But see Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Foar, 84 F.2d 67
(7th Cir. 1936). See generallyJanes, supra note 6, at 149 (indicating that the holdings in Bixby and
Albers "demonstrate the lack of viable state-grounded actions available to the discharged
replacement").
180. 463 U.S. 491 (1983). For academic discussions of Belknap, see Anderson, supra note 24;
Braun, supra note 43; James P. Cavanaugh III, Note, LaborLaw PreemptionAfter Belknap, Inc. v.
Hale: Has Preemptionas UsualBeen PermanentlyReplaced?, 17 IND. L. REv. 491 (1984); Kevin J.
Fay, Comment, Strikebreakers, the Supreme Court, and Belknap, Inc, v. Hale: The Continuing
Erosion of FederalLabor Preemption,33 BuFF. L. REV. 839 (1984); John W. O'Meara, Comment,
Labor Law Preemption and the Rights of Strike Replacements: Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 5 U.
BRIDGEPORTL. REV. 311 (1984).

181. One commentator has observed that "[t]he initial problem encountered in investigating
state-grounded rights of replacements is one basic to the federal system-federal preemption."
Janes, supra note 6, at 145-46.
182. See Belknap, 463 U.S. at 493.
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strike."" In order to continue operating, the employer granted a wage
increase to the employees who remained on the job.'" It also placed an
advertisement in the local newspaper seeking applicants to "permanently
replace" its striking employees.' 5 Upon being hired, these applicants
signed a statement acknowledging that they were being hired as regular
full-time permanent replacements.' 6
The union filed an unfair labor practice charge challenging the
employer's unilateral wage increase to employees who remained on the
job. "' The employer then distributed the following notice to "all
permanent replacement employees":
We recognize that many of you continue to be concerned about
your status as an employee. The Company's position on this matter has
not changed nor do we expect it to change. You will continue to be
permanent replacement employees so long as you conduct yourselves
in accordance with the policies and practices that are in effect here at
Belknap.
We continue to meet and negotiate in good faith with the Union. It
is our hope and desire that a mutually acceptable agreement can be
reached in the near future. However, we have made it clear to the
Union that we have no intention of getting rid of the permanent
replacement employees just in order to provide jobs for the replaced
strikers if and when the Union calls off the strike.'
The Board's regional director subsequently issued a complaint'89
183. See id. at 493-94.
184. See id. at 494,507.
185. Id. at494.
186. See id. at 494-95. The statement's reference to "full time" employment is irrelevant to the
issue of whether the replacements were permanent. See O.E. Butterfield, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 1004,
1006 (1995) (observing that "[u]nder Board law, 'full-time' is not the equivalent of 'permanent,"'
but "merely the opposite of part time"); Gibson Greetings, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1290 n.20
(1993) (stating that "'full time' is the opposite of 'part time,' and is not synonymous with
'permanent"), aff'd in partand rev'd in part,53 F.3d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
187. See Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 495. See generally Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 324 N.L.R.B.
485, 492 (1997) ("[A] unilateral change in benefits is an important concern to employees."),
enforcement denied, 146 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
188. Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 495.
189. The pertinent Board rule states: "After a charge has been filed, if it appears to the regional
director that formal proceedings in respect thereto should be instituted, he shall issue and cause to
be served on all other parties a formal complaint in the name of the Board stating the unfair labor
practices .... 29 C.F.R. § 102.15 (1999); see also Indep. Stave Co., 287 N.L.R.B. 740, 742 (1987)
(indicating that "the complaint issue[s] after the Region's investigation and determination that
reasonable cause exists to believe the allegations occurred").
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asserting that the employer's unilateral wage increase violated the Act.'"
At that point, the employer again addressed the strike replacements,
stating:
We want to make it perfectly clear, once again, that there will be no
change in your employment status as a result of the charge by the
National Labor Relations Board, which has been reported in this
week's newspapers.
We do not believe there is any substance to the charge and we feel
confident we can prove in the courts satisfaction [sic] that our intent
and actions are completely within the law. 9'
The regional director subsequently convened a settlement
conference in which he indicated that if a strike settlement could be
reached, he would agree to the withdrawal of the unfair labor practice
charge.'9 As a result, the parties ultimately reached a settlement that
provided for the return of the striking workers.'9 In order to make room
for these employees, the employer laid off its replacement workers.'94
Some of the replacement workers then sued the employer in state
court for breach of contract and misrepresentation.'95 After
190. See Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 495; cf Soule Glass & Glazing Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 792, 797
(1979) (holding that employer violated the Act "by granting [a] unilateral wage increase for
nonstriking employees, greater than what was offered to employees in the bargaining unit"),
enforced in part and enforcement denied in part, 652 F.2d 1055 (1st Cir. 1981). Unilateral wage

increases have been described as "one of the most pernicious unfair labor practices." NLRB v.
Koenig Iron Works, Inc., 856 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1988) (Oakes, L, dissenting); see also NLRB v.
Minute Maid Corp., 283 F.2d 705, 710-11 (5th Cir. 1960) ("We have no doubt but that an employer
may be guilty of an unfair labor practice by a unilateral wage increase... during the time when the
employees are represented by a union as their bargaining agent."). However, not all unilateral wage
increases are prohibited. See, e.g., Morse Electro Prods. Corp., 210 N.LR.B. 1075, 1077 (1974)
(upholding increase implemented "at a time when the contract between the parties had expired by its
terms" and the employer had "serious doubt of a continuing majority status of the Union").
191. Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 495-96 (internal quotations omitted).
192. See id. at 496. The Board's rules permit the withdrawal of a charge at the pre-hearing
stage "only with the consent of the regional director," and in that event also authorize the regional
director to dismiss "any complaint based thereon." 29 C.F.R. § 102.9 (1998); see also Robinson
Freight Lines, 117 N.L.R.B. 1483, 1485 (1957) ("[Ihe Board alone is vested with lawful discretion
to determine whether a proceeding, when once instituted, may be abandoned.").
193. See Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 496.
194. See id.

195. See iL Although the Supreme Court was not presented with the question, the
replacements' breach of contract claim, in particular, appears to have been somewhat tenuous as a
matter of state law. See, e.g., United Parcel Serv. Co. v. Rickert, 996 S.W.2d 464, 472 (Ky. 1999)
(Stephens, J., dissenting) (observing that "indefimite 'permanent' employment constitutes
employment at-will in Kentucky") (citing Shah v. Am. Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489
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unsuccessfully seeking to remove the case to federal court,'96 the
employer moved for summary judgment on the ground that the
plaintiffs' claims were preempted by the NLRA.'97 The trial court
agreed, and granted the employer's motion.'
The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed,' 99 concluding that the

action was not preempted because the claims at issue were of only
peripheral concern to the Board and were deeply rooted in local law.7
The United States Supreme Court granted the employer's petition for
certiorari 2' and ultimately affirmed the state appellate court's decision.2
The Supreme Court began its analysis with an overview of the
NLRA preemption doctrines articulated in San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon"3 and Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wis.
Employment Relations Comm'n.O Addressing first the employer's
(Ky. 1983)).
196. See Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 497. The employer contended that the case was removable
because the state law claims were governed by the NLRA. See Hale v. Belknap, Inc., 110 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2397, 2397 (Ky. Ct. App.), aff'd, 463 U.S. 491 (1983). However, the Supreme Court has
stated: "The fact that a defendant might ultimately prove that a plaintiff's claims are preempted
under the NLRA does not establish that they are removable to federal court." Caterpillar, Inc. v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398 (1987); see also Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1400
(9th Cir. 1988) (holding that "state law actions claimed to be preempted by sections 7 and 8 of the
NLRA are not removable to federal court"); Baldwin v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 927 F. Supp.
1046, 1052 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (concluding that 'NLRA preemption is not enough to remove state
[law] claims to federal court").
197. See Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 497.
198. See id. The trial court effectively concluded that the plaintiffs' claims involved conduct
that would constitute an unfair labor practice, and thus fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Board under section 8 of the NLRA. See Hale, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2398 (discussing 29 U.S.C.
§ 158 (1994)). See generally In re Careau Group, 923 F.2d 710, 711 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991) (indicating
that "courts generally lack jurisdiction to hear unfair labor practice charges and must defer to the
NLRB") (discussing S.D. Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)).
199. See Hale, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2398.
200. Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 497 (discussing lower court's holding); see Hale, 110 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) at 2398. The court reached this conclusion despite acknowledging a "strong bias in favor of
federal preemption." Id.
201. See Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 457 U.S. 1131 (1982). The Kentucky Supreme Court had
originally granted a petition for discretionary view, see Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 622 S.W.2d 918 (Ky.
1981), but subsequently vacated its order as having been improvidently entered. See Belknap, Inc.,
463 U.S. at 497.
202. See Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 497,512.
203. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). For an extended discussion of Garmon preemption, see
Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971). Among the significant
academic discussions of Gannon are Norton J. Come, FederalPreemption of Labor-Management
Relations: Current Problems in the Application of Garmon, 56 VA. L. REV. 1435 (1970), and
Howard Lesnick, PreemptionReconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 CoLuM. L.
REV. 469 (1972).
204. 427 U.S. 132 (1976). For a recent academic discussion of this branch of NLRA
preemption, see Robert Rachal, Machinists Preemption Under the NLRA: A Powerful Tool to

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2000

35

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 3
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 18:167

contention that, the plaintiffs' claims were preempted under
Machinists,2 the Belknap Court concluded that allowing the plaintiffs to
proceed would not undermine the employer's right to invoke self-help
economic weapons in its dispute with the union, or otherwise interfere
with the policies underlying the NLRA. 26
In particular, the Court noted that holding employers to the
assurances of permanent employment they make to induce "innocent
third parties" to work as strike replacements2' would not impermissibly
burden their right to hire permanent replacements. 2° The Court stated:
[F]ederal law permits, but does not require, the employer to hire...
replacements that it need not discharge in order to reinstate strikers if it
hires the replacements on a "permanent" basis within the meaning of
the federal labor law. But when an employer attempts to exercise this
very privilege by promising the replacements that they will not be
discharged to make room for returning strikers, it surely does not
follow that the employer's otherwise valid promises of permanent
employment are nullified by federal law and its otherwise actionable
misrepresentations may not be pursued. We find unacceptable the
notion that the federal law on the one hand insists on promises of
permanent employment if the employer anticipates keeping the
replacements in preference to returning strikers, but on the other hand
forecloses damages suits for the employer's breach of these very
promises.2

Protectan Employer's Freedom to Bargain,58 LA. L. REV. 1065 (1998).
205. State law claims are preempted under Machinists where Congress intended for the
conduct at issue to be unregulated because it is among the self-help remedies left to the combatants
in a labor dispute. See Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 499.
206. See id. at 501-02; see also Janes, supra note 6, at 147 ("[S]tate regulation of the particular
replacement's contractual rights vis-h-vis his employer will probably not obstruct the policies of the
federal actfl.").
207. See Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 500-01. One court has observed that "[t]he key factor in
Belknap was that the causes of action were brought by third parties to the labor dispute i.e., the
permanent replacements." Young v. Caterpillar, Inc. 629 N.E.2d 830, 834 (I1. Ct. App. 1994).
208. See Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 499-500. Indeed, one federal court has asserted that it is
precisely because "[a] promise made in the context of a strike exposes the employer to a breach of
contract suit if later repudiated to accommodate returning strikers" that the hiring of permanent
replacements constitutes an adequate business justification for retaining replacements and declining
to reinstate strikers. Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 132 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2422,2423 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
209. Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 500 (authorities omitted); cf. White v. Nat'l Steel Corp., 938
F.2d 474,485 (4th Cir. 1991) ("Indeed, it seems wrongful in an elemental sense for an employer to
secure an employee's performance of a contractual bargain and then to escape via preemption any
liability for breach of that same contract.").
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Turning next to the question of Garmon preemption,2 0 the Belknap
Court noted that the states can regulate conduct that is of only peripheral
concern to the Board, or that is so deeply rooted in local law that courts
should not assume Congress intended to preclude the application of state
law.2" Citing previous cases in which it had found that state law causes
of action were not preempted,2 2 the Court indicated that the critical issue
was whether the controversy was one over which the Board had
exclusive jurisdiction.2 3
The Court concluded that the facts and issues to be addressed in the
state court action were not within the Board's jurisdiction:
[W]hether the strike was an unfair labor practice strike and whether the
offer to replacements was the kind of offer forbidden during such a
dispute were matters for the Board. The focus of these determinations,
however, would be on whether the rights of strikers were being
infringed. Neither controversy would have anything in common with
the question whether [the employer] made misrepresentations to
replacements that were actionable under state law. The Board would be
on strikers not with whether the employer
concerned with the impact
214
deceived replacements.

Although the Court did not address the merits of the replacement
workers' state law claims, 215 Belknap has significantly bolstered the state
law rights of permanent replacement workers. 21 6 Indeed, the Court's
holding that the NLRA does not prohibit terminated permanent
replacements from pursuing state law breach of contract claims against

210. Under Garmon, state law regulating conduct arguably governed by the NLRA is
presumptively preempted. S.D. Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,243-44 (1959). One
court has observed that "the rule in Gannon has been the subject of much criticism," but
nevertheless "remains the law today." Illinois v. Fed'l Tool & Plastics, 344 N.E.2d 1, 2 (111.1975).
211. See Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 509.
212. See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (action for
injuring reputation); Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977)
(intentional infliction of emotional distress); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. S.D. County Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978) (trespass).
213. See Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 509-10. See generallyMidwest Motor Express, Inc. v. Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 120, 512 N.W.2d 881, 887 (Minn. 1994) ("A case that involves an unfair
labor practice falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.").
214. Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 510.
215. See Corbett, supra note 40, at 851 n.203; cf. Finkin, supra note 18, at 553 ("The Court
merely held the state law of individual employment to be nonpreempted.").
216. See Finkin, supra note 18, at 549. As one federal court applying Belknap has stated, it is
now clear that "not all [state] laws regulating the replacement of picketing workers are preempted."
Bardane Mfg. Co. v. Jarbola, 724 F. Supp. 336, 342 (M.D. Pa. 1989).
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their former employers"7 has prompted one commentator to observe
(with some hyperbole)2 8 that individuals asserting such claims should
now be "virtually certain of success."" 9
IV. AN EMPLOYER'S POTENTIAL CIVIL LIABILITY TO TERMINATED
REPLACEMENTS AFTER BELKNAP

A. Jacobs v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.
Despite the potential significance of Belknap, - the case's actual
impact on state law breach of contract claims has been somewhat
mixed.22' In Jacobs v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,2 for example, the

employer responded to a strike at one of its plants by "initiat[ing] a
campaign to hire replacements for [its] striking workers."'
The
campaign included the use of local radio and newspaper advertisements
stating that "the hired applicants would be 'permanent replacements' for
the striking [workers]."224
The plaintiff was hired after responding to one of these
advertisements.22 The strike was resolved less than a month later.26

217. See Roberts v. Auto. Club of Mich., 360 N.W.2d 224, 227 (Mich. CL App. 1984)
(characterizing Belknap); McNealy v. Caterpillar, Inc., 154 L.R.R.M. 2695, 2699 (N.D. Ill.
1996)
(same), vacated and remanded, 139 F.3d 1113 (7th Cir. 1998); Bingham Willamette, 282 N.L.R.B.
1192, 1196-97 (1987) (same), enforced, 857 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1988).
218. See infra Section VI.
219. Finkin, supra note 18, at 552; cf.James M. Rabbitt, Comment, Reconversion of UnfairLabor-PracticeStrikes to Economic Strikes, 64 GEo. L.J. 1143, 1146 n.20 (1976) ("Presumably,
any replacement who had been promised a permanent position and then was discharged to
accommodate a returning... striker would have a contract remedy against the employer.").
220. See Finkin, supranote 18, at 552 ("Belknap, Inc. v. Hale takes on importance because of a
fundamental shift in the state law of individual employment. An assurance of permanence in the
sense of not being dismissed except for good cause would increasingly be actionable in
contract....").
221. Commenting on the decision's anticipated impact shortly after it was issued, one
commentator predicted that "inconsistent state interpretations.., are likely to result from Bellaip."
Stromire, supranote 36, at 1230; cf. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 518 (1983) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) ("One would not expect that Congress would have left anything so basic as the
respective rights and duties of strike replacements and employers to the nonuniform regulation of
the States.").
222. 323 S.E.2d 238 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
223. Id. at 238.
224. Id.
225. See id.
226. See id.
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When the plaintiff and other replacements 27 were discharged to permit
the striking workers to return to work, the plaintiff brought suit for
breach of contract and fraud.2n He alleged that the employer had
breached its agreement that the replacements would be permanent
employees, and fraudulently represented their status.9
The trial court granted the employer's motion for summary
judgment320 and the plaintiff appealed. 23' The Georgia Court of Appeals
held that the trial court had properly concluded that the plaintiff was an
at-will employee subject to discharge for any reason, notwithstanding

the employer's representation that he would be a permanent
replacement3 2 The court noted that, under Georgia law, at least in the
absence of a written contract, assurances of permanent employment
merely establish employment for an indefinite period, terminable at the
will of either party, and can give rise to no cause of action for wrongful

termination?3 That fact required dismissal
of the plaintiff's fraud
5

claim as well as his contract claim.3
In contrast to the analysis in Jacobs,23 several lower courts have
applied Belknap to uphold terminated replacement workers' state law
breach of contract claims. 37 As one court has stated, employees who
227. The employer apparently had been able to replace its entire striking work force through its
advertising campaign. See Jacobs, 323 S.E.2d at 238.
228. See id. at 238-39.
229. See id. at 239.
230. See id.
231. See id. at 238.
232. See id. at 239.
233. See iL (citing Ga. Power Co. v. Busbin, 250 S.E.2d 442 (1978), rev'd, 289 S.E.2d 514
(Ga. 1982).
234. The court stated that "promises that the [plaintiff's] employment would be permanent and
that the striking employees would not be returned to their jobs do not afford the [plaintiff] a remedy
in fraud, because the underlying employment contract, being terminable at will, is unenforceable."
Id.; cf Price v. Mercury Supply Co., 682 S.W.2d 924, 934 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (observing that an
offer of "lifetime" employment "cannot provide the basis of an allegation of fraud because, at most,
it created a contract terminable at the will of either party").
235. See Jacobs,323 S.E.2d at 239.
236. Although Jacobs was decided more than a year after the Supreme Court's decision in
Belknap, the Georgia Court of Appeals did not discuss Belknap. See Corbett, supra note 40, at 852
n.207 (indicating that the Jacobs court rejected the claims of the permanent replacement workers
"[e]ven absent the [use of a] 'Belknap waiver').
237. See generally Roberts v. Auto. Club of Mich., 360 N.W.2d 224, 227 (Mich. Ct. App.
1984) ("[1]n Belknap ...the Court held that employeesl] hired to replace striking workers could
maintain causes of action in state court for misrepresentation and breach of contract."); McNealy v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 154 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2695, 2699 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (referring to the Belknap Court's
holding "that striker replacements could pursue State-law breach-of-contract claims"), vacated and
remanded, 139 F.3d 1113 (7th Cir. 1998); Estreicher, supra note 34, at 907 ("'Bumped'
replacements may... have a cause of action under state law for breach of contract or
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have entered into valid individual contracts that conflict with subsequent

collective bargaining agreements can still bring damage claims against
their employers for breach of contract2 5 Implicit in these cases is the

assumption that a promise that replacement workers will not be
discharged to make room for returning strikers is "more than a vague
promise of 'permanent' employment which creates no more than an
employment at will."' 9

B. Bubbel v. Wien Air Alaska, Inc.
In Bubbel v. Wien Air Alaska, Inc.40 for example, an airline pilot
hired as a permanent strike replacement during a strike brought a breach
of contract claim against the airline after being laid off to make room for
returning economic strikers. He based his claim on the airline's
repeated representations that he and the other replacements were
permanent employees, and would not lose their jobs if the strike was
settled.242

The trial court granted the employer's motion for summary
judgment, holding that any contractual rights that might have arisen as
the result of the airline's representations were superseded by the
collective bargaining agreement executed as part of the strike
settlement.? Relying primarily on Belknap," the Alaska Supreme Court
misrepresentation").
238. See White v. Nat'l Steel Corp., 938 F.2d 474, 485 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Belknap). The
Board has also made reference to "the independent right of replacements to sue under Belknap."
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 554, 572 (1995); see also Waterbury Hosp., 300 N.L.R.B.
992, 994 n.16 (1990) ("The [Belknap] Court held that permanent replacements for strikers could sue
an employer for breach of contract and misrepresentation if they were terminated at the end of an
economic strike"); Bingham Willamette, 282 N.L.R.B. 1192, 1196 (1987) ("[I]n the Belknap case
the Supreme Court... allowed striker replacements to sue an employer for breach of contract for
replacing them with returning strikers... ") (footnote omitted), enforced, 857 F.2d 661 (9th Cir.
1988).
239. Baldwin v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 3 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
240. 682 P.2d 374 (Alaska 1984).
241. See id. at 375-76. Alaska recognizes an exception to the employment-at-will rule when
employer representations give rise to an implied contract limiting the employer's right to discharge,
See Jones v. Cent. Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 785-87 (Alaska 1989).
242. See Bubbel, 682 P.2d at 376. Alaska has rejected the general rule, recognized in cases
such as Hope v. Nat'l Airlines, Inc., 99 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957), Albers v. Wilson
& Co., 184 F. Supp. 812, 812-13 (D. Minn. 1960), and Bixby v. Wilson & Co., 196 F. Supp. 889,
893-94 (N.D. Iowa 1996), that "contracts for permanent employment are necessarily terminable at
will by the employer unless supported by independent consideration." Eales v. Tanana Valley Med.Surgical Group, Inc., 663 P.2d 958, 960 (Alaska 1983).
243. See Bubbel, 682 P.2d at 376.
244. See id. at 377-80.
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reversed that ruling and reinstated the plaintiffs claim."5 The court
explained that while an individual employment contract generally must
give way to a valid collective bargaining agreement4 67 an action for
breach of the individual contract can still be maintained?
On remand, the trial court granted the plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment, and the Alaska Supreme Court subsequently
affirmed that ruling.m The court stated that while employers have the
right to hire permanent replacements during an economic strike, they

must bear the consequences if they subsequently "change their minds"
and terminate those replacements to achieve a strike settlement.49
C. Baldwin v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp.
Essentially the same result was reached in Baldwin v. Pirelli
Armstrong Tire Corp.20 The plaintiffs in Baldwin were also replacement
workers hired with an understanding that they would not be terminated
to make room for returning strikers.2' They were nevertheless
terminated when the employer began reinstating the strikers after the
strike was settled."
The plaintiffs subsequently brought suit against the employer for
breach of contract,253 and against the union for intentional interference
with contract.' The trial court dismissed both claims, holding that the
245. See id at 380.
246. See generally J. L Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332,338 (1944):
The very purpose of providing by statute for the collective agreement is to supersede the
terms of separate agreements of employees with terms which reflect the strength and
bargaining power and serve the welfare of the group. Its benefits and advantages are
open to every employee of the represented unit, whatever the type or terms of his preexisting contract of employment.
Id.
247. Bubbel, 682 P.2d at 378.
248. See Wien Air Alaska v. Bubbel, 723 P.2d 627, 629-30 (Alaska 1986).
249. Id. at 628.
250. 3 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). For a previous discussion of Baldwin, see John B.
Phillips, Jr., Firing Replacement Workers Puts Employer in Hot Water, TENN. EMPLOYMENT L.
UPDATE (John-Carroll-Ellis, LLC, Brentwood, Tenn.), Oct. 1999, at 3.
251. See Baldwin, 3 S.W.3d at 3,4-5.
252. See id. at 2,3.
253. See id. at 2. Tennessee holds that "a contract for permanent employment means nothing
more than that the employment is to continue indefinitely subject to the continuing satisfaction of
both parties and may be terminated at the will of either party." Savage v. Spur Distrib. Co., 228
S.W.2d 122, 124 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949). In Baldwin, however, the employer's assurances that the
replacements "would not be terminated solely to make room for the returning strikers" went beyond
a mere promise of "permanence." Baldwin, 3 S.W.3d at 3, 5.
254. See Baldwin, 3 S.W.3d at 2.
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plaintiffs' "individual contracts had been subsumed into the collective
bargaining agreement" executed by the employer and the union when the
strike was settled."'
The Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed *5 6 It equated the trial
court's ruling with a finding that the plaintiffs' breach of contract claim

was preempted by the NLRA.2 7 It then noted that a similar argument had
been rejected in Belknap on facts remarkably similar to those in

Baldwin.5 Because the plaintiffs' claim was not dependent upon the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement,29 but instead was based on
a contract purportedly entered into at a time when neither the plaintiffs

nor the employer were subject to a collective bargaining agreement,2
the court held that the plaintiffs had alleged a viable cause of action. 6'
D. Branson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.
A comparable result was reached in Branson v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc.,22 a case arising out of the widely publicized Greyhound Bus
strike.23 The plaintiff in Branson was a former Greyhound employee
who returned to work as a strike replacement. 2 4 At the time he returned,
255. Id.at2,5.
256. See iL at 2, 7. See generally Thomas v. LTV Corp., 39 F.3d 611, 618 (5th Cir. 1994)
(asserting that "individual contracts between employer and employee are not precluded by the
existence of a collective-bargaining agreement").
257. See Baldwin, 3 S.W.3d at 5-6.
258. See id. at 6. See generallyJohn E. Gardner, Note, FederalLaborLaw Preemption of State
Wrongful Discharge Claims, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 491, 555-56 (1989) ("Third party replacement
workers discharged by an employer to make room for union employees returning after settlement of
a strike do not fall within the intended scope of federal labor relations regulations ... "
259. See Baldwin, 3 S.W.3d at 6.
260. See id. at 5.
261. Seeid.at4.
262. 126 F.3d 747 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1047 (1998). Branson has been
described as a "noteworthy" decision. Lisa A. May, Labor and Employment Law, 30 TFX. TECH. L.
REV. 811, 865 (1999). For other academic discussions of the case, see Cyndi M. Benedict et al.,
Employment and Labor Law, 52 SMU L. REV. 1001, 1102-03 (1999), and Jayne Zanglein, Getting
Something for Nothing: Are Employee Benefits an Entitlement or a Gratuity?, 30 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 627,657-60 (1999).
263. See Corbett, supra note 40, at 849-50 (referring to the "highly publicized strike of
Greyhound Lines" in which the employer "hired more than 2000 permanent replacements"). The
violence that accompanied the Greyhound strike was in part the motivation for the enactment of
state legislation prohibiting the hiring of permanent strike replacements in Minnesota. See
Employers Ass'n v. United Steelworkers, 803 F. Supp. 1558, 1567 & n.ll (D. Minn. 1992), affid,
32 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1994). The strike also drew the attention of federal legislators. See Leader of
Greyhound Strike Tells Congress Permanent Replacements Have Blocked Settlement, DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA), June 14, 1990, at A12.
264. See Branson, 126 F.3d at 749; see also Benedict, supranote 262, at 1102.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol18/iss1/3

42

Moberly: Striking Bargains: The At-Will Employment of Permanent Strike Rep

2000]

Striking Bargains

the most recent collective bargaining agreement had expired, and

negotiations between the company and the union concerning a new
agreement were ongoing.'
In order to encourage experienced bus drivers to cross the picket
line and work during the strike,26 the company offered replacement
workers and returning strikers superseniority 67 in the form of seniority
credit for any past commercial driving experience not only at
Greyhound, but also for any other employer.m The union vehemently
objected to this decision,2 and filed an unfair labor practice charge with
the Board challenging the company's unilateral implementation of this

benefit.20
265. See Branson, 126 F.3d at 749,755; see also May, supranote 262, at 865.
266. Finding sufficiently skilled and experienced individuals willing to cross a picket line is
one of the difficulties faced by an employer hiring strike replacements. See, e.g., Choctaw Maid
Farms, 308 N.L.R.B. 521, 528 (1992) (noting that "more replacements might be necessary to
perform the same volume as the number of employees who went on strike"); F. Strauss & Son, Inc.,
216 N.L.R.B. 95, 97 (1975) (analyzing a strike in which "[tihe replacements were not as
experienced as the strikers," and thus "additional employees were required to carry on.. .the
operation"); Chemtech Indus., Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 617 S.W.2d 121, 124
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (discussing contention that employer "experienced difficulties with the
inexperience of replacement workers"). But cf. Carpenters Dist. Council, 221 N.L.R.B. 876, 878
(1975) (Murphy, Chairman, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing a strike in which
the employer "was able to hire highly skilled and competent replacements").
267. The term "superseniority" refers to "the practice of granting nonstrikers or strike
replacements an artificial seniority." Frank H. Stewart, Conversion of Strikes: Economic to Unfair
Labor Practice: II, 49 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1301 (1963). In essence, an employee granted
superseniority "is given credit for longer service with the employer than he actually has." Id.
268. See Branson, 126 F.3d at 749-50, 754; Greyhound Lines, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 554, 568
(1995); see also Zanglein, supra note 262, at 658 (noting that the employees in Branson "would
receive credit not only for years of service with Greyhound, but also for driving experience gained
while working for other commercial employers"). See generally Erie Resistor Corp., 132 N.L.R.B.
621, 626 (1961) ("It is obvious that, in some instances, an employer may more readily secure
replacements if he can offer them superseniority."), enforcement denied, 303 F.2d 359 (3d Cir.
1962), rev'd, 373 U.S. 221 (1963), enforced on remand sub nom. Int'l Union of Elec. Workers,
Local 613 v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1964).
269. See Greyhound Lines, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. at 561, 568. The Branson court noted that the
awarding of superseniority to replacement workers and returning strikers was "a major issue in the
continuing negotiations between Greyhound and the Union." Branson, 126 F.3d at 750. The union's
objection undoubtedly stemmed from the fact that offering superseniority to replacements is an
extremely effective weapon against a strike. See NLRB v. Harrison Ready Mix Concrete, Inc., 770
F.2d 78, 80 (6th Cir. 1985); Stewart, supra note 267, at 1306. See generally Brady v. Consol.
Freightways Corp., 82 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2245, 2247 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (indicating that "the
guarantee of seniority is one of the most important benefits that a union has to offer its members").
270. See Branson, 126 F.3d at 750. The leading superseniority case is NLRB v. Erie Resistor
Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963), where "the Supreme Court held that the employer had violated section
8(a) (1) and (3) [of the Act] by offering, during the course of a strike.... additional seniority to
those hired as replacements for striking employees." Great Lakes Carbon Corp. v. NLRB, 360 F.2d
19, 21 (4th Cir. 1966) (characterizing Erie Resistor); see also Greyhound Lines, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B.
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Although the company and the union ultimately reached agreement
on a new collective bargaining agreement, they were unable to agree on
the superseniority issue, and thus included a provision in the agreement
leaving resolution of that issue to the Board.2' When the Board

ultimately concluded that the company's implementation of the
superseniority policy was an unfair labor practice,2 the company
established a "buy out" program whereby employees who had been
awarded superseniority credit would receive cash payments in exchange
for waiving their superseniority rights. 3
The plaintiff refused to sign a waiver,2 insisting upon receiving his
additional seniority credit rather than the cash buy out.2s When the

employer apparently refused to comply,' 6 the plaintiff brought suit for

breach of contract based upon its alleged promise of superseniority. 7
The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs claim, holding that it was

at 571 (describing Erie Resistor as the "lead case on inherently destructive conduct... [and]
superseniority").
271. See Branson, 126 F.3d at 750,754 n.3; Greyhound Lines, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. at 558, 56163, 565; May, supranote 262, at 866; Benedict, supra note 262, at 1102.
272 See Greyhound Lines, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. at 575 (finding that the policy was "inherently
destructive of employee rights," and thus was "violative of Section 8(a) (5), (3), and (1) of the
Act"). In fact, the Board apparently "has never found the grant of superseniority to returning strikers
or strike replacements lawful." Erie Resistor Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. at 624. However, a few courts
prior to Erie Resistor, concluded that "it would be lawful and proper to grant superseniority to
replacements" for economic strikers. NLRB v. Lewin-Mathes Co., 285 F.2d 329, 333 (7th Cir.
1960). But cf. Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720, 726 (6th Cir. 1964) ('To grant
superseniority to replacements and returning strikers is discrimination in violation of § 8(a) (3) of
the Act.") (citations omitted).
273. See Branson, 126 F.3d at 750; Benedict, supranote 262, at 1102; May, supra note 262, at
866.
274. See Branson, 126 F.3d at 750; Benedict, supra note 262, at 1102. See generally O'Connor
v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, No. 92 Civ. 7414 (CLB), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13156, at *6-*7
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 1993) (questioning "why... anyone [would] contract voluntarily to relinquish
seniority").
275. See Branson, 126 F.3d at 750. Although the amount of the proposed buy out is not set
forth in the court's opinion, employees are unlikely to relinquish significant seniority rights absent
"substantial consideration." Ireland v. Charlesworth, 98 N.W.2d 224, 232-33 (N.D. 1959). See
generally Kennedy v. Chem. Waste Mgmt. Inc., 79 F.3d 49, 50 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Seniority is an
important employee benefit because.., it provides job protection."); Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 225 n.16 (5th Cir. 1977) ("Seniority systems and the entitlements
conferred by credits earned thereunder are of vast and increasing importance in the economic
employment system of this Nation.").
276. There presumably would have been no basis for a contractual claim if the employer had
simply given the plaintiff the option of relinquishing seniority credit in exchange for the buy out
payment. Cf. Bockmon v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 739 P.2d 887, 888 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987)
(describing employee who was given "the option to elect to... relinquish her seniority status...
and in exchange receive payments from the employer").
277. See Branson 126 F.3d at 750,751; Benedict, supra note 262, at 1102-03.
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preempted by the NLRA.72 8 The plaintiff then appealed.29
The Fifth Circuit reversed.so Relying primarily on Belknap,2' the
court held that the plaintiff's breach of contract claim was not preempted

under Garmonm because it was not based on activity that was either
protectedU 3 or prohibited by the NLRA.28 The court noted that, as in
Belknap, the Board's focus in enforcing the NLRA was on the impact of
the employer's conduct on the strikers,2 while "the expectations of
replacement employees, who trust that an employer will keep its
promises, stem from the different and more traditional source of state
contract law. ' '2r6 And also as in Belknap, the court's inability to compel
specific performance of the contract in view of the Board's abrogation of

278. See Branson, 126 F.3d at 749, 750; Benedict, supra note 262, at 1103; May, supra note
262, at 866.
279. See Branson, 126 F.3d at 750; May, supra note 262, at 866.
280. See Branson, 126 F.3d at 749,750 n.1, 758.
281. See id. at 750-54; May, supranote 262, at 866.
282. S.D. Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). Unlike the Court in Belknap,
the Fifth Circuit did not discuss the alternative basis for preemption under Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976). See May, supra note 262,
at 866 (noting that the Branson court "addressed preemption under the NLRA[I using the Garnon
preemption test").
283. The court stated:
The first prong of Garmon preemption requires us to decide whether [the plaintiff] bases
his claim on activity protected by section 7 of the NLRA. Section 7 protects the rights of
employees to organize, strike, and collectively bargain. [The plaintiff's] claim, however,
relies on his employer's alleged breach of contract. Because the employer's alleged
breach of contract does not constitute activity protected by section 7, the first prong of
Garmon preemption does not apply.
Branson, 126 F.3d at 751 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also May, supra note
262, at 866 ("Branson's claim was based on the breach of a contract entered into by the employer,
an action not protected under section 7.").
284. See Branson, 126 F.3d at 753. The court explained that the employer's alleged breachof
its contract with the replacements could not be prohibited by the NLRA if, as the Board had
concluded, the contract itself (or, more specifically, the superseniority program on which the
contract was based) was prohibited by the NLRA, because "[i]t cannot both be an unfair labor
practice to refuse to honor an implemented term and then also be an unfair labor practice to continue
to honor that same term." Id at 752.
285. See id. at 751; see also Rosner v. Whittlesea Blue Cab Co., 766 P.2d 888, 889 (Nev.
1988) ("In Belknap,. .. the unfair labor practice issues before the National Labor Relations Board
related to rights of the strikers, which had little in common with... the employer's liability in
damages to [the replacements] for breach of contract.").
286. Branson, 126 F.3d at 752. The court added: "To assert that such replacement workers
must bring their claims to the NLRB rather than to an appropriate court, seems to vest this federal
administrative body with power over disputes purely private and independent of an unfair labor
practice or collective bargaining agreement." Id.; cf. Janes, supra note 6, at 147 ("If the
replacement's claim against the employer ... is engulfed in... preemption, he is relegated to Board
proceedings as his only remedy. This circumstance is not an overly attractive result for the
replacement.").
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the superseniority program did not preclude an award of damages for the
employer's alleged breach of that contract.' Thus, the plaintiff's breach
of contract claim was not preempted by the NLRA, and because there
were genuine fact issues concerning the type of seniority credit the
plaintiff had been offered and whether the employer had breached that
offer, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for
further proceedings.2

The breach of contract claim at issue in Branson was premised
upon the employer's offer of superseniority,2 9 rather than on an offer of
permanent employmentm However, the employer had advertised for
permanent replacements, 291 and it unquestionably continued to operate
during the strike by hiring such replacements. m In addition, the plaintiff
in Branson described himself as a "strikebreaker"293 --a potentially
derogatory term often used to describe such replacements.2 94 The

employer, on the other hand, objected to that characterization of its
replacements precisely because a pertinent municipal ordinance defined
the term to include only replacements hired for the duration of the
strike,295 and its replacements were hired as permanent employees. 6
287. See Branson, 126 F.3d at 753. This conclusion had been foreshadowed in Belknap: "[I]t
might be eas[y] for an employer to obtain replacements by misstating the... fringe benefits that it
would provide. But if the employer did so, surely the employees affected could seek protection in
the state courts." Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 502 n.7 (1983).
288. See Branson, 126 F.3d at 758 & n.8. However, the court left open the possibility that, on
remand, the employer could "use the NLRB order as a defense to the state [breach of] contract
claim." Id. at 754.
289. Seeid. at750,751.
290. In fact, the court specifically distinguished its consideration of "a breach of contract claim
based on... seniority" with the Belknap Court's focus on "breach of contract claims against a
company which promised... permanent employment."Id. at 751 (parentheses omitted).
291. See Greyhound Lines, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. at 560.
292. See id. at 561, 574; see also Howell v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. C7-94-1477, 1995
Minn. App. LEXIS 185, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 1995) (considering the claim of another
employee who "joined Greyhound as a permanent replacement during [the] strike"); Leader of
Greyhound Strike, supra note 263 (discussing the "[p]ermanent job guarantees that Greyhound
officials gave to workers hired to replace striking drivers").
293. Branson, 126 F.3d at 756 n.6.
294. See, e.g., Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055, 1110 (1st Cir. 1981); Nash
v. Texas, 632 F. Supp. 951, 977 (E.D. Tex. 1986), aff'd in partand rev'd in part sub nom. Nash v.
Chandler, 848 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 470, 477 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (indicating that "strikebreakers [are]
sometimes called permanent replacements"), aifid in partand rev'd in part, 819 F.2d 839 (8th Cir.
1987), rev'd, 489 U.S. 426 (1989); Gem City Ready Mix Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 1260, 1263 n.3 (1984)
(discussing a contract provision stating that "permanent replacements ... were economic strike
breakers").
295. NEw YoRK Crry, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 22-501(a) (6) (1989), quoted in Amalgamated
Transit Union, Local 1202 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 561 N.Y.S.2d 118, 120 (Sup. Ct. 1990).
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These facts suggest that, if the plaintiff in Branson had lost his job
as the result of the employer's failure to honor its promise of
superseniority,2 he also could have based his breach of contract claim
on the employer's assurances of permanence. 298 In any event, the
analysis in Branson is clearly instructive here due to the similarity
29
between offers of superseniority and offers of permanent employment.
Indeed, the Branson court itself suggested that the issue it was
addressing was substantively indistinguishable from the one presented in
Belknap.
E. Cummings v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.
Finally, in Cummings v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.,3' the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied Belknap in a case arising under the
RLA.m The plaintiffs in Cummings, like those in Belknap, accepted
296. See Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1202, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 120; cf.Laredo Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 241 N.L.R.B. 167, 177 (1979) (quoting employer's assertion that its replacements
were "not strikebreakers" but "permanent replacements").
297. The effect of the superseniority policy was to "provide] some replacements with greater
overall seniority than some strikers," and the company had agreed with the union that in the event
the policy was found to be unlawful, it would recall certain strikers who, in the absence of the
policy, would have more seniority than their replacements. Greyhound Lines Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. at
563, 571. This undoubtedly might have required the termination of some of the replacements. See
Branson, 126 F.3d at 752 (indicating that it was foreseeable that "if... the strikers will return to
work... the strike replacements will be out of a job") (quoting Leveld Wholesale, Inc., 218
N.L.R.B. 1344, 1350 (1975)).
298. See, e.g., Ware v. Woodward Iron Co., 124 So. 2d 84, 87 (Ala. 1960) (discussing an
employee who "brought [an] action.., for breach of contract based on [his] discharge in violation
of his seniority rights"); Finkin, supra note 18, at 559 (observing that an "agreement with the
union.., to adhere strictly to seniority, to reinstate the strikers, and to displace [permanent
replacements] ... should subject the employer to... liability.., under Belknap"); cf. Rose v. Great
N. Ry. Co., 268 F.2d 674, 676 (8th Cir. 1959) ("By the allegation that he had been wrongfully
discharged plaintiff... [meant] that the company's denial of his claim to have seniority...
constituted an actionable 'discharge' of him....").
299. See, e.g., NLRB v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 189 F.2d 82, 86 (9th Cir. 1951) (comparing
employer's superseniority policy with "an explicit promise of permanent tenure" because the
purpose of the policy was to "make the places of the replacements as nearly permanent as may be").
But see Greyhound Lines, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. at 571 (concluding that "superseniority [is]
qualitatively different from the right to use permanent replacements").
300. See Branson, 126 F.3d at 751-53. See generally Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 470, 480 n.8 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (discussing "other remedies"
potentially available to replacements under Belknap, in addition to "claims against [the employer]
for displacing them with former strikers"), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 819 F.2d 839 (8th Cir.
1987), rev'd, 489 U.S. 426 (1989).
301. 523 A.2d 338 (Pa. 1987).
302. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1994). Citing Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.,
394 U.S. 369 (1969), the Cummings court observed that "courts should look to cases decided under
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positions in reliance on the employer's assurances of permanence. 3
When they were subsequently removed from those positions in
accordance with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement,3 4 they
brought suit against the employer for breach of contract.305 Noting the
factual similarity of the two cases and the comparable purposes of the
RLA and the NLRA,m the court found no reason to reach a result
different from that in Belknap&m It therefore reversed the judgment that
had been entered in favor of the employer,0 3 and reinstated the initial

judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiffs.3

These cases create an obvious dilemma for employers.3 0 Because of
the difficulty in hiring strike replacements, 31' an employer may need to
convey the impression that their employment will not terminate when
the strike ends. 312 Thus, the Board itself has indicated that the employer's
the NLRA when confronted with similar issues arising under the RLA." Cummings, 523 A.2d at
341. But cf. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 80 (1991) ("We have made
clear... that National Labor Relations Act cases are not necessarily controlling in situations...
which are governed by the Railway Labor Act.").
303. See Cummings, 523 A.2d at 342-43.
304. See id.at 342.
305. See id. at 343.
306. See id.at 341 ("The basic policy and purpose of both [acts] is the same: to foster
industrial peace and prevent strikes and disruptions in the flow of interstate commerce by
guaranteeing workers' right to organize and promoting collective bargaining.").
307. See id. at 343. But see Green v. Medford Knitwear Mills, Inc., 408 F. Supp. 577, 580
(E.D. Pa. 1976) ("Mhe Pennsylvania courts have taken the position that the use of the word
'permanent' contemplates a relationship of employment for so long as both employee and employer
are satisfied.").
308. See Cummings, 523 A.2d at 338-39, 344.
309. See id. at 344. See generallyMurphy v. Publicker Indus., Inc., 516 A.2d 47, 52 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1986) ("[W]here the employee can prove both that the employer agreed to employ the
employee.., permanently and that the employee gave the employer sufficient additional
consideration for this promise, over and above the employee's services, then the employee can
succeed in bringing himself out of the at-will presumption.").
310. See Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 505 n.9 (1983); see also Bingham Willamette,
282 N.L.R.B. 1192, 1193 (1987) (discussing contention that Belknap had placed the employer in "a
Catch 22 situation"), enforced, 857 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1988).
311. See Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 470,479
(W.D. Mo. 1986) (acknowledging that it may be "extremely difficult to recruit persons who will
replace strikers, most typically by going through a hostile picket line set up by persons endangered
by the prospective loss of a job"), affrd in part and rev'd in part, 819 F.2d 839 (8th Cir. 1987),
rev'd, 489 U.S. 426 (1989); Corbett, supra note 40, at 875-76 (referring to the "difficult (and in
some cases impossible) task of hiring temporary replacements"); Finkin, supra note 18, at 558
("From what little is known, it is not easy to hire strike replacements."); Sales, supra note 37, at 882
n.159 (stating that "recruitment of a sufficient number of qualified strikebreakers is not an easy
task").
312. See Int'l Ass'n of Machinist, Dist. No. 8 v. J. L. Clark Co., 471 F.2d 694, 699 (7th Cir.
1972) (Pell, L,dissenting) ("[I]t seems.., patent that [a] company would ... encounter[ ] great, if
not insuperable, difficulty in inducing prospective employees, whether striking employees or

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol18/iss1/3

48

Moberly: Striking Bargains: The At-Will Employment of Permanent Strike Rep

2000]

StrikingBargains

right to replace economic strikers encompasses the right to assure the
replacements that their positions will be permanent.313
However, any promise of permanent employment may be illusory
if, for example, an economic strike is converted into an unfair labor
practice strike. 14 In that situation, the Board can disregard private
employment agreements between strike replacements and the employer
to the extent necessary to obtain reinstatement of the strikers.3 3 When
that occurs, the employer now faces potential state common law liability
to discharged replacements for breach of contract.316 As one court has
stated:
[T]he Belknap decision serves as fair warning that an employer that
hires employees to permanently replace striking employees-without
qualification and without conditioning the offer of permanency on the
terms upon which the employer and the union representing the striking
employees ultimately settle the strike and also conditioning
permanency on the absence of an NLRB order to reinstate the

outsiders, to take jobs in [a] strike-bound plant which would necessitate violating the picket line, in
the absence of some assurance of job security vis-A-vis striking employees at the time of the
discontinuance of the strike."); Westfall, supra note 46, at 150 ("[I]n order to induce him to take the
job, it may be important for a replacement to know that his employment at least has the potential for
permanency and will not automatically cease when the strike ends.").
313. See Aqua-Chem, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 1108, 1109 (1988); cf Serv. Elec. Co., 281 N.L.R.B.
633, 641 (1986) ("[The ability to set employment terms for replacements is a necessary incident of
the very right to hire them in the first place during an economic strike."). See generally Chamber of
Commerce v. New Jersey, 445 A.2d 353, 362 (NJ. 1982) ('The methods an employer sees fit to use
in obtaining replacements are part and parcel of his federal right.").
314. See Proxy Communications, Inc., 290 N.L.R.B. 540, 541-42 (1988) (observing that "the
interest of replacements for unfair labor practice strikers ... is illusory or ephemeral at best,"
because "they must give way to strikers who choose to return"); Westfall, supra note 46, at 144
("Replacement employees... receive at best only an illusory permanency of employment");
Estreicher, supra note 34, at 899 (observing that "the promise of 'permanency' made to
replacements may be illusory where.., they may... be ousted by returning strikers if the strike
turns out to be an unfair labor practice strike or... 'bumping' [the replacements] is the price of
reaching a strike settlement with the union"). For an extended academic discussion of this issue, see
Janes, supranote 6.
315. See Harvey Mfg., Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 465, 470 (1992). This authority encompasses the
right to require the termination of replacements. See id; Stephenson-Yost Steel, 294 N.L.R.B. 395,
406 (1989), enforced, 904 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1990); Westfall, supranote 46, at 156.
316. This obviously is in contrast to the situation in which individuals who were not assured of
permanence-that is, temporary replacements-are discharged to make room for strikers. See
Teledyne Indus., Inc., 298 N.L.R.B. 982, 985 (1990) (noting that temporary replacements "have no
expectation of continuing employment, so displacement in favor of a striker would not disturb
settled expectations"); cf.NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 871 (2d Cir. 1938)
(observing that "most [individuals] taking jobs ... made vacant [by a strike] realize from the outset
how tenuous is their hold").
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17
strikers-hires those replacement employees at the employer's peril.

V. BELKNAP'S OWN SUGGESTED RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM

In an attempt to minimize the dilemma its holding had created for
employers," 8 the Belknap Court indicated that an employer can
"condition" its offers to permanent replacements, and thus avoid
conflicting obligations to strikers and replacements in the event of a
settlement or Board ruling providing for reinstatement." 9 With respect to
that issue, the Court stated:
An employment contract with a replacement promising permanent
employment, subject only to settlement with its employees' union and

to a Board unfair labor practice order directing reinstatement of
strikers, would not in itself render the replacement a temporary

employee subject to displacement by a striker over the employer's
objection during or at the end of what is proved to be a purely

economic strike.320
Conditioning offers in such a manner, the Court noted, would
minimize the replacements' incentive to assert breach of contract
claims.321 In other words, the employers in Bubbel v. Wien Air Alaska,'22
Baldwin v. PirelliArmstrong Tire Co.,s 3 and Branson v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc.,2 all of which applied Belknap to uphold such claims,'"
might have avoided potential state law liability if their offers had
included the conditional language discussed in Belknap."6
317. Midwest Motor Express, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 120,512 N.W.2d 881, 890
(Minn. 1994).
318. See generally NLRB v. Bingham-Willamette Co., 857 F.2d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 1988)
(referring to the employer's "need to hire permanent replacements while, at the same time,
protecting itself from liability under Belknap").
319. See Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 503, 505 n.9; see also Midwest Motors Express, Inc., 512
N.W.2d at 890 (noting that "the Supreme Court has declared that a 'permanent' replacement
contract may be... conditioned"). One commentator has characterized this observation as a
"remarkable feature" of the Court's opinion. Finkin, supranote 18, at 552; see also Stromire, supra
note 36, at 1222 ("[T]he [Belknap] Court altered the traditional perception of permanent
replacement workers by stating that replacements who employers hire under conditional contracts
would satisfy the ... permanency requirement.").
320. Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 503.
321. See Id. at 505 n.9.
322. 682 P.2d 374 (Alaska 1984).
323. 3 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
324. 126 F.3d 747 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1047 (1998).
325. See supra notes 240-300 and accompanying text.
326. See, e.g., Braun, supra note 43, at 403 ("The Belknap Court suggests that an employer
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Not surprisingly, employers have begun conditioning their offers to
permanent replacements as suggested in Belknap.3 27 Some employers
have gone even flrther,32 advising "permanent" replacements they can
be terminated not only for the reasons specified in Belknap, but at the
"will" of the employer-that is, "for any reason consistent with
applicable state or federal law."329

This latter development gives rise to two related but distinct legal
problems for an employer facing an economic strike: (1) whether
characterizing strike replacements as "permanent" abrogates their status
as at-will employees,33 thus giving rise to potential state law claims if
they are terminated to make room for returning strikers, 33 ' and (2)
whether characterizing replacements as at-will employees precludes a
finding that they are permanent, 332 thus obligating the employer to
condition permanent offers of employment to the replacements, and asserts that this would insulate
the employer from liability to the replacements...."); Corbett, supra note 40, at 852 n.209
(suggesting that the result in Bubbel would have been different if the employer had used "the
'conditionally permanent' language recommended in Belknap").
327. See Iowa Mold Tooling Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 828, 847 F. Supp. 125, 127 n.1
(S.D. Iowa 1993) (observing that "employers hiring 'permanent' replacement workers sometimes
send letters to the replacements alerting them they may nevertheless be displaced if the NLRB, a
court or arbitrator orders the company to reinstate strikers"), aft'd, 16 F.3d 311 (8th Cir. 1994);
Westfall, supra note 46, at 150 (observing that "the well-advised employer [will] follow[] the
formulation suggested.., in Belknap v. Hale and maker] the offer of permanency expressly subject
to the terms of a strike settlement as well as a Board determination that strikers have an unqualified
right to reinstatement as unfair labor practice strikers") (footnotes omitted).
328. See generally Midwest Motor Express, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 120, 494
N.W.2d 895, 899 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that "actual offers made by employers to
replacement workers in labor dispute situations will be of many different kinds"), rev'd, 512
N.W.2d 881 (Minn. 1994).
329. Target Rock Corp. 324 N.L.R.B. 373, 374 (1997) (emphasis added), enforced, 172 F.3d
921 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Morie Co., Nos. 4-CA-24574-1, 4-CA-24574-2 & 4-CA-2923, 1997
NLRB LEXIS 570, at *41 (July 16, 1997) (discussing employer who required each of its
replacements to "sign a confirmation that he was an 'at will' employee who could be terminated 'at
any time with or without cause and without prior notice').
330. See, e.g., Hindey v. Seltel, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1093, 1095 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (discussing the
ability of employees to "overcome the presumption of an employment-at-will by alleging a promise
of permanent employment and valid consideration"); cf.Bussard v. Coll. of St. Thomas, Inc., 200
N.W.2d 155, 161 (Minn. 1972) (describing "the somewhat arbitrary rule of most jurisdictions that a
contract for 'permanent employment' will be construed to be terminable at the will of either party
except in compelling circumstances" as "arguably too mechanical an answer to the more basic issue
of ascertaining the real intent of the parties").
331. See, e.g., Verway v. Blincoe Packing Co., 698 P.2d 377, 379 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985)
(finding "sufficient [evidence] to justify sending the case to the jury" where the employer
"advertised for permanent employees" and the replacements testified that they were "seeking
permanent employment and would not have accepted work with [the employer] absent such
assurances"); Fmkin, supra note 18, at 552 (observing that "[ain assurance of permanence...
would increasingly be actionable in contract").
332. See, e.g., Target Rock Corp., 324 N.L.R.B. at 374 n.9 (stating that "offers of permanent
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reinstate the strikers at the conclusion of the strike. 33
VI. LOWER COURT REACTIONS TO BELKNAP

A. Tobin v. Ravenswood Aluminum Corp.
The Belknap Court's analysis of the impact of conditioning offers
to replacements has generally proven to be correct insofar as the
replacements' common law rights are concerned.3 3 In Tobin v.
Ravenswood Aluminum Corp.,35 for example, the court implicitly
concluded that by using "Belknap Agreements" 336 and other appropriate
disclaimer language,337 an employer can hire permanent strike
replacements on an at-will basis. 33s

Each of the replacement workers in Tobin had signed a Belknap
Agreement,339 as well as a separate employment application that stated:
employment [do] not include offers advising replacements that they could be fired at... will")
(internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Giddings & Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 926, 930 (7th
Cir. 1982) (observing that replacement workers who were "guarantee[d] ... employment only until
a layoff occurred" could "hardly be called 'permanent'). See generally Sepanske v. Bendix Corp.,
384 N.W.2d 54, 59 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that an individual with a contractual right to an
"at-will position" has "no actionable expectation that [the position] would be permanent").
333. Where replacements are merely temporary, "economic strikers' reinstatement rights are
identical to those of unfair labor practice strikers." Harvey Mfg., Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 465, 469
(1992). Thus, "even economic strikers are entitled to reclaim their jobs ... if their jobs... are
occupied only by temporary replacements." Teledyne Indus., Inc., 298 N.L.R.B. 982, 985 (1990),
enforced, 938 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1991); see also Daniel Finley Allen & Co., 303 N.L.R.B. 846, 869
(1991) ("Mhe hiring of temporary replacements does not excuse the employer's refusal to reinstate
economic strikers who make an unconditional offer to return to work.").
334. See Iowa Mold Tooling Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 828, 847 F. Supp. 125, 127 n.l
(S.D. Iowa 1993) (indicating that conditional offers of permanent employment to replacements may,
"protect the company from breach of contract or misrepresentation claims that may be filed in the
event the 'permanent' replacements are laid off"), aft'd, 16 F.3d 311 (8th Cir. 1994); Note, supra
note 33, at 675 (observing that "courts have been willing to enforce so-called 'Belknap waivers"'.
335. 838 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.W.Va. 1993).
336. The term derives from the Belknap Court's reference to conditional offers of permanence.
See id. at 266 n.2; see also Corbett, supra note 40, at 854 n.217 (stating that the agreements used by
the employer in Tobin were "unmistakably based on the language suggested by the Supreme Court
in Belknap").

337. See Tobin, 838 F. Supp. at 266; see also Corbett, supranote 40, at 857 n.232 (observing
that "employers sometimes use variations" of the disclaimer language suggested in Belknap).
338. See Tobin, 838 F. Supp. at 270-71. Interestingly, the labor dispute at issue in Tobin has
been described as "perhaps the quintessential Belknap strike-and-replacement scenario." Corbett,
supra note 40, at 854.
339. The agreements executed in Tobin stated:
I hereby acknowledge that Ravenswood Aluminum Corporation made me a permanent
employee effective immediately .... I understand that my permanent employee status is
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"I affirm that no oral representation has been made to me regarding the

length of employment with Ravenswood Aluminum Corporation and
that I understand that employment is not for a definite period of time and
may be terminated with or without cause at any time."' 40 Although the
court was not directly faced with the issue, it indicated that, absent any
contrary representations by the employer, these agreements would have
rendered the replacements at-will employees. 4'
The employer in Tobin had made other representations to the
replacement workers 42 that may have altered the presumption of at-will
employment.343 Nevertheless, the court's analysis suggests that
employers should be more concerned with their potential liability to
strikers under the NLRA than with their potential state law contractual
liability to terminated replacements under Belknap.3"
B. Walker v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors
A similar result was reached in Walker v. Teledyne Cont'l
The employer in that case hired replacements during a

MotorsY

subject to a settlement with the union, a settlement with the National Labor Relations
Board, or an Order of the National Labor Relations Board directing that Ravenswood
Aluminum Corporation reinstate strikers.
Tobin, 838 F. Supp. at 266.
340. Id.
at 270 (observing that "explicit promises of job security may have altered the
341. See, e.g., id.
terms of Plaintiffs' at will employment contract") (emphasis added).
342. Among other things, the employer told the replacements it was committed to keeping
them, it "did not intend to agree with the [union] that the replacements would lose their jobs" to
returning strikers, and the replacements "need not worry about an NLRB order requiring
reinstatement of strikers." Id. at 266.
343. Like any other presumption, the presumption of at-will employment is rebuttable by
contrary evidence. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1036 (Ariz. 1985).
Under the state law at issue in Tobin, however, "only a very definite promise will serve to rebut the
at-will employment presumption." Thacker v. Peak, 800 F. Supp. 372, 384 (S.D.W.Va. 1992); see
also Tobin, 838 F. Supp. at 271. The Tobin court held that there was a genuine issue of material fact
with respect to this issue, and therefore denied the employer's motion for summary judgment on the
replacements' breach of contract claim. See Tobin, 838 F. Supp. at 270-71, 274.
344. See Corbett, supra note 40, at 855-56 (indicating that "[t]he lesson from the...
Ravenswood dispute regarding Belknap ...is that employers probably are more concerned with
potential back pay liability under an NLRB order than they are with potential civil liability to
discharged permanent replacements") (footnote omitted); cf William D. Turner, Restoring Balance
to Collective Bargaining: ProhibitingDiscriminationAgainst Economic Strikers, 96 W. VA. L.
REV. 685, 699 n.54 (1994) ("Competent management attorneys easily can advise employers how to
").
avoid potential liability to replacement workers under Belknap ....
345. No. C.A. 91-0128-T-S, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18089 (S.D. Ala. 1991), aft'd, 969 F.2d
1048 (llth Cir. 1992).
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strike.' 6 Each of the replacements was required to sign an agreement
stating, in pertinent part, as follows:
I understand that [the employer], in exercising its right to continue
operations during the strike in progress, has offered me a job as a

permanent strike replacement within the meaning of federal labor law.
I understand that my employment is at will and that I may quit or may
be terminated at any time for any reason.... I understand that no
manager, supervisor, employee or other company representative has

any authority to promise or has promised employment for a particular
length of time, or has authority to make any other promises or
representations about future employment with the company. 347

The employer assumed the strike was an economic one, and thus
initially took the position that the striking employees would not be
returning and the replacement workers would become part of its
permanent workforce.m However, the Board's General Counsel
subsequently concluded that the strike was an unfair labor practice
strike,34 9 and the Board notified the employer that if a strike settlement
was not reached, a complaint would be issued.3-°
The employer and the union ultimately did reach an agreement, at
which point the replacement workers were discharged. 5 Some of the
replacements then brought suit against the employer, alleging that their
discharges breached a unilateral contract of permanent employment
between them and the employer. 52
The employer moved for summary judgment,353 claiming that it had
346. See id. at *2-*3.
347. Id. at *3.
348. See id. at *3-*4; cf C.F. Indus., Inc., Nos. 18-CA-13017, 18-CA-13070 & 18-CA-13113,
1995 NLRB LEXIS 573, at *67 (June 1, 1995) (considering employer's position that its
replacements "would be considered temporary replacements if it was determined the strikers were
engaging in an unfair labor practice strike, though it was [the employer's] position the strikers were
engaged in an economic strike and, if... that position was correct, their replacements would be
considered permanent replacements").
349. See Walker, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18089, at *5.
350. See id. at *5 n.2. In any ensuing proceedings, the General Counsel would have had the
burden of proving that the strike was an unfair labor practice strike. See N. Am. Coal Corp., 289
N.L.RB. 788,792 n.16 (1988).
351. See Walker, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18089, at *5 n.2.
352. See id. at *6. In Alabama, where Walker arose, "an offer expressly stating that the
employment is 'permanent' ... will support a contract for the same." Chastain v. Kelly-Springfield
Tire Co., 733 F.2d 1479, 1481 (1lth Cir. 1984); see also Bates v. Jim Walter Res., Inc., 418 So. 2d
903, 906 (Ala. 1982) (observing that "if there is a promise of permanent employment..., the
relinquishment of prior employment may constitute sufficient consideration to bind the promisor").
353. Walker, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18089, at *1.
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been "blind-sided" by the General Counsel's ruling, and had no choice
but to terminate the replacements to make room for the returning
strikers.3 " The specific issue addressed by the court was whether the
agreement signed by the replacements was sufficient to shield the
employer from liability?55 The court concluded that it was. 356
Citing Belknap, the Walker court cautioned that an employer cannot
give assurances of permanent employment to replacement workers and
expect to avoid a conflict between its duties to those employees and its
legal obligations to its striking workers. 57 However, the court also noted

that the employer had specifically drafted the agreement to satisfy
Belknap,355 where the Court had indicated that an employer can condition
359
its employment of replacements in order to avoid such a conflict.
In particular, the agreement in Walker made it clear that the
replacements' employment was at-will, and that they could thus be

discharged for any reason. 3'0 Even absent this language, however, the

agreement's reference to permanent employment "within the meaning of
federal labor law" established an effective limitation on what the
replacements otherwise might have viewed as an offer of permanent
employment.36'
354. Id. at *6. The plaintiffs, by contrast, argued that the employer "should have been aware of
such a possibility and taken steps to clearly apprise the replacement employees of it upon them
entering on duty." Id.
355. See id. at *7; see also id. at *3 (referring to the agreement's language as the "crux" of the
case).
356. See id. at *7.
357. See id. The Belknap Court had found unacceptable "the notion that the federal law on the
one hand insists on promises of permanent employment if the employer anticipates keeping the
replacements in preference to returning strikers, but on the other hand forecloses damage suits for
the employer's breach of these very promises." Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
358. See Walker, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18089, at *7; c Midwest Motor Express, Inc. v. Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 120, 494 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (discussing offers to
strike replacements that would be "outside the holding of Belknap"), rev'd, 512 N.W.2d 881 (Minn.
1994).
359. See Walker, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18089, at *7; see also NLRB v. Bingham-Willamette
Co., 857 F.2d 661, 665 (9th Cir. 1988) (indicating that employers can avoid liability to replacements
under Belknap "by making the permanent offers [conditional]").
360. Walker, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18089, at *7-*8. The Alabama Supreme Court has held
that where an employee has acknowledged "that employment was 'at will,"' no contract of
permanent employment is created. Abney v. Baptist Med. Ctrs., 597 So. 2d 682, 683 (Ala. 1992).
Indeed, the employer's intent to commit to such a "weighty obligation" must have been expressed in
"clear and unequivocal terms" before a court will find that a contract for permanent employment
exists under Alabama law. Chastain v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 733 F.2d 1479, 1484 (11th Cir.
1984).

361.

Walker, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18089, at *8. But see Gibson Greetings, Inc., 310
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In this regard, the court noted that many contingencies can arise
that would require the reinstatement of striking workers and the
termination of their replacements.162 Because an employer cannot
reasonably be expected to anticipate every such contingency, the
employer's characterization of the replacements' tenure was a practical
way of addressing the problem.363 In short, the employer had included
unambiguous language preserving the at-will status of its replacement
workers, 364 and thus was entitled to365 judgment on the terminated
replacements' breach of contract claim.
VII. NLRB REACTIONS TO BELKNAP

A. Some Pre-Belknap HistoricalPerspective:Cyr Bottle Gas Co.
The Board apparently does not dispute the judiciary's conclusion
that Belknap permits employers to avoid state law contractual liability to
terminated replacements by conditioning their offers of permanent
employment.3' 6 Nor would permitting employers to hire permanent
N.L.LB. 1286, 1291 (1993) (rejecting the contention that "under Belknap v. Hale, an employer
needs merely to hire replacements on an other than temporary basis within the meaning of the
National Labor Relations Act"), affid in part and rev'd in part,53 F.3d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
362. See Walker, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18089, at *8; see also Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 515
n.2 (Blackmun, ., concurring) (referring to "all the contingencies that might affect [the] tenure" of
replacements) (quoting Board's amicus brief); Estreicher, supranote 34, at 906 (observing that the
"continued employment [of replacements] depends upon a host of contingent factors").
363. See Walker, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18089, at *8; cf.Midwest Motor Express, Inc., 494
N.W.2d at 899 ("Mhe creation of a contract in an actual striker replacement situation is very much
dependent upon the facts and circumstances which give rise to that contract.").
364. See Bingham-Willamette, 857 F.2d at 665 (stating that "the way to avoid liability under
Belknap is to be frank with the replacements"); cf Bardane Mfg. Co. v. Jarbola, 724 F. Supp. 336,
342 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (advocating "honesty and frankness from a potential employer" in order to
assure that a potential strike replacement has "full knowledge of the situation into which he can
potentially place himself').
365. See Walker, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18089, at *9-*10. But cf.Estreicher, supra note 34, at
907 ("It is not sufficient to say.., that all that is required is that an employer fairly and accurately
represent the tenuous nature of a replacement's job.").
366. See Hansen Bros. Enters., 279 N.L.R.B. 741, 741 n.6 (1986) ("Belknap ...holds that to
avoid civil liability to the replacements should they be replaced pursuant to a Board order or a
settlement agreement providing for reinstatement of the strikers, the employer may promise the
replacements permanent employment subject to such conditions subsequent."), enforced, 812 F.2d
1443 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Bingham Willamette, 282 N.L.R.B. 1192, 1197 (1987), enforced, 857 F.2d
661 (9th Cir. 1988):
In Belknap v. Hale, the Supreme Court held that an employer may be sued for breach of
contract instate court by striker replacements if, having offered them permanent
employment, they are later displaced by reinstated strikers pursuant to a settlement with
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replacements on an at-will basis seem to run afoul of federal law,
because at-will employment is not prohibited by the NLRA.3 67 Indeed,
the Board itself has described as "so thoroughly established as to have
become a truism" the proposition that employers can discharge their
employees for any reason or even for no reason, as long as the discharge
is not premised upon the employee's union activities.?6
Nevertheless, the Board often disagrees with the courts'
interpretation of the NLRA, 6 9 presumably because the Board, rather than

the union or a Board unfair labor practice order. The Court held that an employer could
protect itself from such suits by promising permanent employment subject to these
contingencies ....
Id.
367. See, e.g., NLRB v. Union Pac. Stages, Inc., 99 F.2d 153, 177 (9th Cir. 1938) (stating that
the NLRA "did not deprive the employer of the right to... dismiss his employees for any cause
except where the employee was actually discriminated against because of his union activities or
affiliation"); Coastal Elec. Coop., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 1126, 1127 (1993) (holding that employer's
"maintenance of an employment-at-will policy" was not "inherently unlawful"); San-Tul Hotel Co.,
198 N.L.R.B. 462, 465 (1972) ("[The Act does not prohibit discharge without just cause .. ");
Fruitland Mut. Water Co., No. 19-CA-22291, 1992 NLRB GCM LEXIS 55, at *2 (Oct. 30, 1992)
(concluding that "an employer does not violate the Act... by attempting to [preserve] its right to
terminate employees at will"). But ef Massillon Hosp. Ass'n, 282 N.L.R.B. 675, 676 (1987)
(holding that a "terminable-at-will contract" was "inconsistent with the basic policy of the Act,"
because "the primary objective of collective bargaining... is to stabilize labor relations for periods
of reasonable duration").
368. San-Tul Hotel Co., 198 N.L.R.B. at 465; see also NLRB v. M & B Headwear Co., 349
F.2d 170, 173 (4th Cir. 1965) ("An employer may dismiss an employee for any reason [it] chooses
except the employee's union activity."); NLRB v. McGahey, 233 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1956)
("Management can discharge for good cause, or bad cause, or no cause at all. It has, as the master of
its own business affairs, complete freedom with but one specific, defimite qualification: it may not
discharge when the real motivating purpose is to do that which [the Act] forbids."); Tara Corp., Inc.,
273 N.L.R.B. 221, 222 n.8 (1984) (quoting McGahey with approval).
369. See Ithaca Coll. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing the Board's
"consistent practice of refusing to follow the law of the circuit unless it coincides with the Board's
views"); Fla. Steel Corp., 220 N.L.R.B. 260, 266 n.5 (1975) (noting that "the Board has frequently
emphasized" that it is "not bound by [a] circuit's decision"). Moreover, the Board takes the position
that its administrative law judges (formerly known as trial examiners, see Avco Corp., 199 N.L.R.B.
505, 505 n.1 (1972)) are "required to follow Board cases where they are inconsistent with those of
various circuit courts." Aqua-Chem, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 1108, 1120 n.2 (1988). The Board has
explained its view in the following terms:
It has been the Board's consistent policy for itself to determine whether to acquiesce in
the contrary views of a circuit court of appeals .... But it is not for a Trial Examiner to
speculate as to what course the Board should follow where a circuit court has expressed
disagreement with its views. On the contrary, it remains the Trial Examiner's duty to
apply established Board precedent which the Board or the Supreme Court has not
reversed. Only by such recognition of the legal authority of Board precedent[] will a
uniform and orderly administration of... the National Labor Relations Act] be
achieved.
Ins. Agents Int'l Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768, 773 (1957).
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the courts, is generally deemed to be the "expert" in this field.3 70 Thus, it

is not clear that the Board would find that replacements offered
conditional employment are permanent employees37 so as to relieve the

employer of its obligation to reinstate strikers at the conclusion of an
economic strike. 2 That is true despite the clear indication in Belknap
that conditional employment offers do not preclude a finding of
permanence. 73
Indeed, the Board has stated that in order for replacement workers
to be considered permanent, the hiring offer must indicate that their

positions would be permanent "and not merely a temporary expedient
subject to cancellation if the employer so chooses. 374 In Cyr Bottle Gas

Co.3 5 for example, employees commenced an economic strike after
indicating they would return to work when the employer set a date for
negotiations with their collective bargaining representative.376 When the
employer subsequently set a date for negotiations, the striking
370. Oshman's Sporting Goods, Inc. v. NLRB, 586 F.2d 699, 702 (9th Cir. 1978); see also
McNealy v. Caterpillar, Inc., 139 F.3d 1113, 1123 (7th Cir. 1998) (observing that "the Board has
special expertise in the interpretation and application of the NLRA"); Macy's Mo.-Kan. Div. v.
NLRB, 389 F.2d 835, 846 (8th Cir. 1968) (referring to the Board's "expertise and experience in
handling labor-management relations"). But see Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 970
(3d Cir. 1979) (observing that "the Board is not... equal to [a] court in matters of statutory
interpretation").
371. The Board's authority to disregard judicial precedent is debatable. See Local 777,
Democratic Union Org. Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("While the Board
may change its mind it cannot change the statutory and decisional law as fixed by court decisions
following the express mandate of Congress. The Board's failure... to follow, not its own
vacillating decisions, but the decisions of the federal courts cannot be condoned."); Labor Servs.,
Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 479, 484 (1985) ("Circuit courts have repeatedly admonished the Board for
continuing to issue decisions contrary to the court's decision rendered previously on the same
point."). For commentary on the issue, see Scott Kafker, Nonacquiesence by the NLRB: Combat
Versus Collaboration, 3 LAB. LAW. 137 (1987); and Rebecca Harmer White, Time for a New
Approach: Why the Judiciary Should Disregard the "Law of the Circuit" When Confronting
Nonacquiescenceby the National LaborRelationsBoard, 69 N.C. L. REV. 639 (1991).
372. See Target Rock Corp., 324 N.L.R.B. 373,382 (1997) (asserting that Belknap "was a state
misrepresentation and breach of contract action" involving "only civil liability"), enforced, 172 F.3d
921 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Braun, supranote 43, at 400 ("It is ...uncertain whether the Board will be
willing to find that replacements offered employment conditionally are 'permanent' replacements,
so as to abrogate an employer's duty to reinstate economic strikers should they offer to return to
work.").
373. See Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 503 (1983). Without citing any supporting
authority, one of the Board's administrative law judges recently characterized Belknap as "an
anomalous case, notable for having been distinguished more often than followed by federal circuit
courts." Webco Indus., No. 17-CA-20143, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 172, at *12 (Mar. 20,2000).
374. Covington Furniture Mfg. Corp., 212 N.L.R.B. 214, 220 (1974), enforced, 514 F.2d 995
(6th Cir. 1975).
375. 204 N.L.R.B. 527 (1973), enforced, 497 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1974).
376. See id. at 527.
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employees gave notice of their desire to be reinstated.37 The employer
responded by informing them that they had been permanently

replaced.37
The employees' union then filed an unfair labor practice charge
against the employer. 379 The union contended that the striking employees
had not been permanently replaced, and that the employer therefore had
violated section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act38 ° by refusing to reinstate
striking workers who had made an unconditional offer to return to
work.' The Board's regional director subsequently issued a complaint,
and the matter was assigned to an administrative law judge 82 who
characterized the relevant issue as whether the employer had hired

permanent replacements prior to receiving the strikers' unconditional
offer to return to work. 3
The General Counsel argued that at least some of the replacements

were not hired on a permanent basis because the employer had indicated
they would be subject to discharge if the Board found that the employer
should take the strikers back.3 The administrative law judge concluded
that, given the employer's prior strike history,3 it was only being fair to
the replacements by informing them that their tenure depended on
whether it was ordered to replace them.3 6 Qualifying the permanence of
their jobs in this manner, the judge concluded, did not prevent the
replacements
from being characterized as permanent within the meaning
37
of the Act. 1
The General Counsel filed exceptions to the administrative law
377. See id.
378. See id.
379. See id. at 530.
380. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) & (3) (1994).
381. See Cyr Bottle Gas Co., 204 N.L.R.B. at 530.
382. Unfair labor practice hearings under the NLRA are held before administrative law judges,
whose decisions are subject to review by the Board. 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.15, 102.16, 102.34, 102.45(a)
& 102.48(b) (1998). The Board's decisions are, in turn, subject to limited federal judicial review. 29
U.S.C. § 160(f) (1994).
383. See Cyr Bottle Gas Co., 204 N.L.R.B. at 530. Once strikers offer to return to work, their
replacements' status as either temporary or permanent effectively becomes fixed. See J.M. Sahlein
Music Co., 299 N.L.RB. 842, 842 n.2 (1990) ("[I]t is the status of... the striker replacements at
the time the Union made its unconditional offer to return to work[ ] that is determinative of the issue
of whether the striking employees had a right to immediate reinstatement.").
384. See Cyr Bottle Gas Co., 204 N.L.R.B. at 533.
385. A prior strike had resulted in a Board decision and subsequent settlement that provided for
the return of striking employees. See itL at 530.
386. See id at 533 ("With the background of the prior strike, charges, decision, and settlement,
it seems that [the employer] was being fair to the replacements by informing them of that possibility
and qualifying the permanence of their jobs in that manner.").
387. See id
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judge's decision,388 again arguing that the replacement workers had been
hired on a temporary basis." 9 The Board disagreed with the judge's
analysis of the employer's statement that the replacements could be
discharged if the Board ordered the strikers to be reinstated.3" It
concluded that this statement, while perhaps indeed reflecting a genuine
attempt to deal fairly with the replacements, was hardly an assurance
that their jobs would be permanent."' On the contrary, the warning
established that the employer was not offering permanent employment to
the replacements 3 The Board therefore concluded that the employer
had violated the Act by failing to reinstate the striking employees upon
receipt of their unconditional request for reinstatement? 3
B. The NLRB's InitialPost-Belknap Decisions

1. HansenBros. Enters.
In HansenBros. Enters.,394 the first significant post-Belknap Board
decision discussing the issue, Chairman Donald Dotson asserted that the
Belknap Court had rejected the argument that making the employment of
replacement workers subject to a strike settlement or Board order
requiring that they be displaced by returning strikers would make them
temporary rather than permanent replacements 9 Although this appears
to be an accurate reading of Belknap,3 the majority in Hansen disagreed
with the chairman's interpretation:
Contrary to our dissenting colleague, we do not read the Supreme
Court's decision in Belknap... as converting such vague
statements... into an offer of permanent employmentfor the purposes
388. The Board's rules permit any party to an unfair labor practice hearing to file exceptions to
the administrative law judge's decision. 29 C.F.R. § 102.46(a) (1999).
389. See Cyr Bottle Gas Co., 204 N.L.R.B. at 527.

390. See id.
391. See id.
392. See id.
393. See id. at 528.
394. 279 N.L.R.B. 741 (1986), enforced, 812 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
395. See id. at 743 (Chairman Dotson, dissenting).
396. See Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 503 (1983) ("[P]romising permanent
employment, subject only to settlement with [the] union and to a Board unfair labor practice order
directing reinstatement of strikers, would not in itself render the replacement a temporary
employee .... "). But see Braun, supra note 43, at 400 n.138 ("The Supreme Court in Belknap only
suggested the offering of conditionally permanent employment to replacements .... ").
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of determining strikers' reinstatement rights. Belknap does not hold

that an employer need no longer promise replacements permanent
employment to render them permanent; it holds that to avoid civil

liability to the replacements should they be replaced pursuant to a
Board order or a settlement agreement providing for reinstatement of
the strikers, the employer may promise the replacements
permanent
7
employment subject to such conditions subsequent.3

2. Concrete Pipe & Prods.Corp.
In Concrete Pipe & Prods. Corp. the Board appeared to retreat
from the view expressed in HansenBros. Enters.3 9 In Concrete Pipe, the
Board rejected the argument that replacement workers had not been
offered permanent positions because they had been told their
employment would be permanent unless the strikers were reinstated as
part of a strike settlement.4 m The Board concluded that the existence of
this contingency did not make the workers temporary rather than
permanent, and distinguished Hansen Bros. on the ground that the
employer in that case had never informed its replacements they were
permanent. 41
Despite this indication that the use of Belknap agreements does not
preclude a finding of permanent employment, the result may be
otherwise when the employer goes beyond the use of a typical "Belknap
agreement" and attempts to establish at-will employment relationships

397. Hansen Bros. Enters., 279 N.L.R.B. at 741 n.6 (emphasis added). In his dissenting
opinion in Belknap, Justice Brennan also suggested that disclosing to prospective replacements the
possibility that the employer might be ordered to reinstate the srikers and terminate the
replacements "might have the... effect of rendering the replacements temporary under federal
law." Belknap, 463 U.S. at 537-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
398. 305 N.L.R.B. 152 (1991), aff'd, review denied sub nom. United Steelworkers, Local
Union 14534 v. NLRB, 983 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
399. 279 N.L.R.B. 741 (1986), enforced, 812 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
400. See Concrete Pipe & Prods. Corp., 305 N.L.R.B. at 154 n.9.
401. See id; see also Karmazin Prods. Corp., No. 7-CA-27767, 1988 NLRB GCM LEXIS 12,
at *6 (Dec. 23, 1988) (noting that the employer in Hansen Bros. "never told the replacements they
were permanent"). See generally Gibson Greetings, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1291 (1993)
(observing that "Belknap does not hold that an employer need no longer promise replacements
permanent employment to render them permanent"), affd in part and rev'd in part, 53 F.3d 385
(D.C. Cir. 1995).
402. But see Bingham Willamette, 282 N.L.R.B. 1192, 1197 (1987) (indicating that an offer of
permanent employment that advised replacements they could "later [be] displaced by reinstated
strikers pursuant to a settlement with the union or a Board unfair labor practice order" makes the
replacements "temporary rather than permanent"), enforced, 857 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1988).
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with its replacement workers.4 Indeed, there is considerable doubt that,
for purposes of the NLRA, individuals hired on an at-will basis would be
considered permanent replacements. 44 Some indication of the Board's
view of this issue can be drawn from its treatment of replacements hired

on a probationary basis,4°5 because probationary employment is often
equated with at-will employment.4
C. CasesInvolving ProbationaryEmployment

1. Kansas Milling Co.
In Kansas Milling Co.,4 the Board found that strike replacements
who were offered permanent employment, but required to complete a

thirty-day probationary period, were permanent replacements even if the
probationary period had not expired when the strikers offered to return
to work43 The Board explained:
When hired [the replacements] were assured that they would retain
their jobs not for a period of limited duration but indefinitely, provided
403. See generally 11 & F. Binch Co. Plant of the Native Laces and Textile Div. of Indian
Head, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 F.2d 357, 362 (2d Cir. 1972) (observing that the hiring of replacement
workers is "almost always oral and at will"); Janes, supra note 6, at 148 (asserting that contracts of
permanent employment involving replacement workers "will more than likely arise from a mere
oral understanding between the parties" that "usually remains terminable at will by either party").
404. See generally Anderson, supra note 24, at 322 ("The recruitment, employment, and
possible dismissal of strike replacements are currently accompanied by a growing uncertainty as a
result of a heightened awareness. . . of common law protection in certain circumstances from unjust
discharge.").
405. Employers frequently subject even their "permanent" strike replacements to an initial
probationary period "to determine if they [can] do the job." Dino & Sons Realty Corp., No. 2-CA29306, 1997 NLRB LEXIS 1009, at *13 (Dec. 31, 1997). See generally G & H Prods., Inc., 261
N.L.R.B. 298, 304 (1982) ("The purpose of a probationary period is to determine the fitness and
aptitude of an individual to become a permanent employee.").
406. See Kosulandich v. Survival Tech., Inc., 997 F.2d 431,432 (8th Cir. 1993) (observing that
probationary employees are "clearly at-will employees"); Moe v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 246 F.2d 215,
219 (5th Cir. 1957) ("In effect, the employment relationship during [a] probationary period is an
employment at will, or so long as is mutually agreeable to both of the parties."); Coleman v. Special
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 959 F. Supp. 1112, 1119 (D. Minn. 1997) (stating that the "common meaning of
'probationaryFl' ... usually denotes an employment at-will status"); c. Don Lee Distrib., Inc., 322
N.L.R.B. 470, 494 (1996) (considering a probationary clause that "permitted termination without
cause"); Anderson, Clayton & Co., Foods Div., 120 N.L.R.B. 1208, 1214 (1958) (discussing a
probation period in which the employer "was free to discharge.., an employee without recourse on
his part").
407. 97 N.L.R.B. 219 (1951).
408. See id.
at 225-26.
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only they proved themselves qualified. True, the ultimate
determination of whether they were to be retained on a temporary or
permanent basis was deferred. But when the qualifying condition was
met with the passage of 30 days' employment, it established their
status ab initio as that of permanent replacements for the striking

employees whom they displaced. 4w

2. Liston Brick of Corona,Inc.
There are numerous other Board decisions reaching similar
results. 4 0 For example, in one post-Belknap decision, Liston Brick of
Corona, Inc.,4 the Board held that individuals hired on the condition
they demonstrate their ability to perform could properly be considered
permanent employees.1 2 Citing Kansas Milling, the Board reasoned that
the imposition of such a condition is analogous to establishing an initial
of
probationary period of employment, and affirmed that the imposition
41 3
temporary.
employment
render
not
does
a probationary period
D. The NLRB's Recent Discussions of the Belknap Issue

1. Karmazin Prods. Corp.
In contrast to the holdings in Kansas Milling and its progeny, the
Board has held that employees who do not complete their probationary
periods are only temporary employees, and therefore cannot be
considered permanent strike replacements.41 4 Because the "probationary"
status of genuine at-will employees never ends,4

5

this analysis suggests

that individuals hired on an at-will basis may only be temporary
409. See id. at 226.
410. See, e.g., C.H. Guenther & Son, Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. 1202, 1212 (1969), enforced, 427 F.2d
983 (5th Cir. 1970); Bowman Transp., Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 1093, 1098 (1963); Anderson, Clayton &
Co., Foods Div., 120 N.L.R.B. at 1214; Tex. Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1362 (1951).
411. 296N.L.R.B. 1181 (1989).
412. See id. at 1197.
413. See id.
414. See C.H. Guenther & Son, Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. at 1212; accord Kan. Milling Co., 97
N.L.R.B. 219,226 (1951).
415. See News Printing Co. v. Roundy, 597 A.2d 662, 665 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (indicating
that an at-will employee is "on probation indefinitely from the day ... he [is] hired"); Norris v.
Filson Care Home Ltd., 115 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,244, at 79,118 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990) (observing
that "there is no need to describe a 'probationary' period in a true employment at-will relationship
as the relationship may be severed at any time in any event").
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replacements for purposes of the NLRA.41 6
The Board's General Counsel nevertheless reached a different
conclusion in Kannazin Prods. Corp.4 7 The General Counsel noted that
an employer's use of at-will language when hiring strike replacements is
consistent with the Belknap principle that an employer can condition its
offers of permanent employment to avoid state law liability in the418event
it subsequently terminates the replacements and reinstates strikers.
The language at issue was contained in the replacements'
employment application, which stated:
I recognize that this application is not an offer for a contract of
employment. I further recognize and agree that if I am employed by
Karmazin Products Corporation, I am employed as a strike
replacement and that such employment will not result in a contract for
employment and that the company may terminate my employment
with or without notice and [with] or without cause at any time... I
further recognize that nothing in any documents published by the
company shall in any way modify the above terms and that these terms
cannot be modified in any way by any oral or written representations
made by anyone employed by the company, except by a written
document signed by the president of Karmazin Products
Corporation.419
The General Counsel concluded that this language did not preclude
the existence of a mutual understanding between the employer and the
replacements that the replacements' employment was to be permanent. 420
The General Counsel noted that the application referred to the applicants
as potential strike replacements, and there was nothing in it suggesting
that they would only be temporary employees. 41 In the General
Counsel's opinion, the mere fact that the replacements were employed at
will, and thus could be terminated without notice or cause, was not
416. See, e.g., Gibson Greetings, Inc., Nos. 9-CA-26706, 9-CA-27660 & 9-CA-26875, 1996
NLRB LEXIS 492, at *5 (Aug. 2, 1996) (indicating that a replacement's position "was
temporary ... pending duration of (the] probationary period"); cf.Cyr Bottle Gas Co., 204 N.L.R.B.
527, 527, 533 (1973) (holding that replacements who were told their tenure depended upon "how
well they performed" were "[iln essence ... subject to [an indefinite] probationary period," and thus
had been hired "on a temporary basis"), enforced,497 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1974).
417. No. 7-CA-27767, 1988 NLRB GCM LEXIS 12 (Dec. 23, 1988).
418. See id. at*8.
419. Id. at *l-*2.
420. See id.
at *7.

421. See id. But cf. NLRB v. Augusta Bakery Corp., 957 F.2d 1467, 1474 (7th Cir. 1992)
(declining to "make the inference that replacement employees hired during an economic strike are
permanent absent evidence that they were told they were merely temporary").
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inconsistent with permanent employment status 422 because they may
have understood that while they could be terminated for other reasons,42
the employer would not necessarily discharge them in order to reinstate
the strikers. 4
2. Gibson Greetings,Inc.

Subsequent Board decisions have rejected the view expressed in
Kannazin Prods. In Gibson Greetings, Inc.,426 for example, the Board

indicated that hiring replacements on an at-will basis cannot be
construed as offering them permanent employment. 427 The replacements
in that case were advised that they were being hired as "full time
associates," but could be laid off if the employer and the union
4
renegotiated an agreement that permitted the strikers to return to work. 21
422. At-will employment generally is not considered synonymous with temporary
employment. See, e.g., Moe v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 246 F.2d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 1957) (rejecting the
contention that hiring employees on an at-will basis "make[s] the employment 'temporaryl'");
Daniels v. Barfield, 71 F. Supp. 884, 887 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (finding "untenable" the proposition that
"every employment at will ... would be 'temporary"'). And even if the terms were synonymous for
state law purposes, that fact would not be dispositive of what appears to be a "separate and distinct
issue] raised under the National Labor Relations Act." Keco Indus., Inc., 301 N.L.R.B. 303, 304
(1991). But see Midwest Motor Express, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 120, 494 N.W.2d
895, 899 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that the meaning of the term "permanent" under the
NLRA is not "completely separate and distinct" from its meaning under "the common law of
contracts and case law modifying the employment-at-will rule"), rev'd, 512 N.W.2d 881 (Minn.
1994).
423. See generally Westfall, supra note 46, at 150 (observing that permanent replacements
"remain subject to discharge for a variety of reasons, despite the widely heralded inroads on the
doctrine of employment at will").
424. See Karmazin Prods. Corp., 1988 NLRB GCM LEXIS 12, at *7-*8; cf Gibson Greetings,
Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1291 (1993) (addressing the contention that "[a]ll that matters under
Belknap... is that the replacements understand that their employment is not temporary"), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 53 F.3d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1995). But cf Titan Metal Mfg. Co., 135 N.L.R.B.
196, 211 (1962) (indicating that "[a]lthough it may be a necessary element of 'permanent
replacement' that an employer assures employees newly hired during an economic strike that they
will not be terminated ... to make room for a returning striker, proof of that fact alone is not
sufficient").
425. The General Counsel's decision in Karmazin is not binding on the Board. See George
Banta Co., 256 N.L.R.B. 1197, 1221 (1981) ("General Counsel's understanding [of the law] is not
binding upon the Board."), enforced, 686 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1982); McBride's of Naylor Road, 229
N.L.R.B. 795, 797 n.2 (1977) (observing that "administrative constructions of the General
Counsel... are not binding on the Board").
426. 310 N.L.R.B. 1286 (1993), aff'd in partand rev'd in part,53 F.3d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
427. Id. at 1291 n.23.
428. See id. at 1289. Interestingly, the employer and the union had negotiated an agreement
before the employer even advertised for replacements which would have averted the strike
altogether. However, the union membership declined to ratify that agreement. See Gibson
Greetings, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Firemen, 141 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2974, 2976 (E.D. Ky. 1990), affd,
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The employer admitted it had not specifically characterized the
replacements as permanent employees due to the erosion of the
employment-at-will doctrine. 429 The Board concluded from this that the
employer had deliberately phrased its offer in terms that would allow it
to give the offer any construction that would serve its purpose,430 "such
as in this case, an offer that could be construed as offering permanent
employee status,
but in an employment-at-will situation, something less
43'
1
that.
than
In the Board's view, this evidence, coupled with one replacement
worker's testimony that she understood she was being hired only until
the strike was over, precluded the employer from establishing the
requisite mutual understanding that the replacements' employment was
permanent.432 In reaching that conclusion, the Board analyzed Belknap in
the following terms:
The applicability of Belknap depends in the first instance on whether
there has been an offer of permanent employment to replacement
workers.... Belknap does not hold that an employer need no longer

promise replacements permanent employment to render them
permanent; it holds that to avoid civil liability to the replacements
should they be replaced pursuant to a Board order or a settlement
agreement providing for reinstatement of the strikers, the employer
947 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1991).
429. Gibson Greetings,Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. at 1291 n.23. Specifically, the employer argued that
"in this day and age of the erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine, no prudent employer uses the
word 'permanent.' hL at 1291; cf Hansen Bros. Enters., 279 N.L.R.B. 741, 746 (1986) (referring
to a situation in which "Belknap had alarmed [the employer] to the point that [its] dealing[s]
with.., replacements deliberately skirted any commitment of permanence"), enforced, 812 F.2d
1443 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See generally Corbett, supra note 40, at 852-53 ("Out of concern for
potential civil liability to replacements in the event the employers agreed, or were ordered, to
reinstate the strikers, some employers made offers of employment to replacements using ambiguous
language regarding permanent status.").
430. The Board acknowledged that one possible interpretation of the employer's offer was that
"the replacements would be retained regardless of the outcome of the strike, and that the strikers
would be reinstated only to the extent there were new openings for employees." Gibson Greetings,
Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. at 1290. However, the Board maintained that this was not the only reasonable
interpretation of the offer, which "could also be read to mean that ...the (employer] intended to
return the strikers to their jobs once the strike ended under any one of several scenarios, and that
accordingly, [the replacements] should consider themselves to be temporary employees." Id.
431. Id. at 1291 n.23; cf Gehnrich & Gehnrich, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 1122, 1129 n.17 (1977)
(discussing employer's assertion that it "had not made an 'absolute determination' that [its]
economic replacements were permanent or temporary").
432. See Gibson Greetings, Inc., at 1289-91. The administrative law judge had found the
replacement's testimony to be "so vague as to be meaningless." Id. at 1313 n.21. One Board
member also refused to rely on her testimony, although he did acknowledge that it was "consistent
with temporary status." Id. at 1293 n.3 (Raudabaugh, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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may promise the replacements permanent employment subject to such
conditions subsequent. Belknap does not convert vague [employer]
statements... into an offer of permanent
employment for purposes of
4 33
determining reinstatement rights.

However, a federal appellate court subsequently reversed this
portion of the Board's decision in Gibson Greetings.43 The court
concluded that the Board's determination that the replacement workers
were temporary employees was not supported by substantial evidence. 435
Although the court agreed that the statement read to employees at the
time of hire was equivocal, 436 it relied on a memorandum issued to the
replacements shortly after they were hired, which stated:
(1) The Company has refused the Union's demands to replace all of
the employees who crossed the picket line with strikers; (2) Every
additionalreplacement hired means one less job for the strikers at the
conclusion of the strike; and (3) The Company has no intention to

modify its position on not discharging or requiring Union membership
of those who have been through so much to do the work.437

The Board had disregarded this memorandum because it did not
specifically state that the company considered the replacements to be
permanent employees,438 and because it was not distributed until after the
replacements had been hired.439 The court rejected this assessment, 4

relying on prior Board decisions holding that post-hiring statements can
establish the permanency of strike replacements. 44' The court also
433. Id. at 1291; cf Finkin, supra note 18, at 553 (observing that "the [Belknap] Court
predicted the Labor Act consequences of... a conditional commitment, in a case in which that
precise question was not in issue or passed on by the Board").
434. See Gibson Greetings, Inc. v. NLRB, 53 F.3d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
435. See iL at387,391.
436. See id. at 390. The court stated that "the hiring statement provides no evidence in either
direction ...[in] determin[ing] whether the replacements were permanent or temporary hires." Id.
437. Id. (internal punctuation omitted).
438. The Board acknowledged that the memorandum "may imply that the [employer]
considered the replacements to be permanent," but noted that "it [did] not clearly state this." Gibson
Greetings,Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. at 1290 n.19.
439. See id.
440. See Gibson Greetings, Inc., 53 F.3d at 390. The Board had stated that the memorandum
"came nearly two months into the strike and [did] not reflect what the understanding of the
[employer] and the workers was at the time of their hire some weeks before." Gibson Greetings,
Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. at 1290 n.19. However, employers who hire temporary replacements can
"convert [them] into permanent employees so long as they are holding jobs to which no striker has
made an unconditional offer to return." Teledyne Indus., Inc. 298 N.L.R.B. 982, 985 (1990),
enforced, 938 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1991).
441. See Gibson Greetings,Inc., 53 F.3d at 390 (citing J.M.A. Holdings, 310 N.L.R.B. 1349
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did state that the

The [Board] itself has not required an employer to have used "the
magic word 'permanent"' in order to establish that it indeed hired
replacements as permanent employees. More important, the
memorandum makes it abundantly clear that the replacement
employees would not be replaced by returning strikers. Indeed, any
replacement worker reading the memorandum could not have helped
but to conclude that he or she was now a permanent employee...
[T]he promises made in the.., memorandum clearly establish the
required "mutual understanding"
that the replacement workers were
' 442
hired "pennanently.
While not specifically discussing the employer's admission that it
had not characterized the replacements as permanent due to the erosion
of the employment-at-will doctrine, 443 the court found that the "other
evidence in the record"444-which obviously included this admission 4 failed to undermine the assurances of permanence reflected in the posthire memorandum.4 The court therefore reversed the Board's
determination and held that employees who received the memorandum
were permanent replacements.447

(1993) and Assoc. Grocers, 253 N.L.R.B. 31 (1980), enforced sub nom. Transp. & Local Delivery
Drivers Local 104 v. NLRB, 672 F.2d 897 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). The court noted that the Board had
"failed to give a 'reasoned justification' for its apparent departure from the path it has worn" in
considering such statements. Id. (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. NLRB, 977 F.2d 652, 655 (D.C.
Cir. 1992)).
442. IL (citations omitted); cf.Target Rock Corp., 324 N.L.R.B. 373, 373 (1997) (observing
that "proof of whether an offer of employment is permanent cannot rest solely on the wording of the
offer"), enforced, 172 F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
443. See GibsonGreetings, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. at 1291 & n.23.
444. Gibson Greetings, Inc., 53 F.3d at 391.
445. See generally Ewing v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 1117, 1120 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Normally, a
reviewing court will not reject a decision of the Board unless, after canvassing the entire record, it is
not supported by substantial evidence.") (emphasis added).
446. Gibson Greetings,Inc., 53 F.3d at 391.
447. See id. Interestingly, the Board's administrative law judge had also concluded that these
employees (and, for that matter, all others hired during the strike) were permanent replacements. See
Gibson Greetings, 310 N.L.R.B. at 1286, 1313-14. On remand, the administrative law judge reached
the same conclusion again, noting that because the memorandum had been posted, and bulletin
board publication is "an effective method of communicating such matters," all of the replacements
had effectively received the assurances in the memorandum, and thus "all such workers were
permanent employees." Gibson Greetings, Inc., Nos. 9-CA-26706, 9-CA-27660 & 9-CA-26875,
1996 NLRB LEXIS 492, at *4-*6 (Aug. 2, 1996).
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3. TargetRock Corp.
The Board addressed the at-will employment of strike replacements
again in TargetRock Corp.44' In that case, the Board concluded that the
employer failed to satisfy its burden of establishing that the individuals
hired to replace economic strikers were permanent employees,'4 9 and
held that it had therefore violated the NLRA by refusing to reinstate the
strikers following their unconditional offer to return to work.45
451
The Board considered numerous factors in reaching this result.
First, the employer had placed advertisements stating that work as a
replacement "could" lead to permanent employment after the strike.45 2
The Board noted that individuals hired as the result of this advertisement
(which represented the majority of employees at issue) 53 had a
reasonable basis for assuming their jobs were not permanent, and that a
determination as to whether they would become permanent was to be
deferred until the strike's conclusion.44
The replacements were also told they would be considered
permanent at-will employees unless the Board decided otherwise, 45 or a
448. 324 N.L.R.B. 373 (1997), enforced, 172 F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
449. See Harvey Mfg., 309 N.L.R.B. 465, 467 (1992) ('The permanent replacement of
economic strikers ... is an affirmative defense and the employer has the burden of proof."). At one
time, strike replacements were presumed to be permanent employees in representation (as opposed
to unfair labor practice) cases. In O.E.Butterfield, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 1004 (1995), however, the
Board "put an end to this inconsistency" and held that "in all cases, representation cases as well as
unfair labor practice cases, the burden is on the employer to prove that the strike replacements are
permanent employees." Id. at 1006.
450. Indeed, the Board stated that there had been "a substantial showing that the replacements
did not understand that they were hired as permanent employees and that the [employer] did not
intend for them to be so." Target Rock, Corp., 324 N.L.R.B. at 373 (emphasis added).
451. See generally Midwest Motor Express, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 120, 494
N.W.2d 895, 899-900 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) ("The character of an actual offer will, of course,
depend on various factors-the language used, the parties' relationship, the context in which the
offer is made, as well as other facts and circumstances taken as a whole."), rev'd, 512 N.W.2d 881
(Minn. 1994).
452. See Target Rock, Corp., 324 N.L.R.B. at 373. Specifically, the advertisement stated:
"Target Rock Corporation... is in the midst of negotiations with striking union members. We have
IMMEDIATE POSITIONS AVAILABLE ....All positions could lead to permanent full-time after
the strike." Il
453. The Board noted that "at least 26 of the 32 replacements still employed at the end of the
strike indicated on their employment applications that they were responding to [the] advertisement."
Id.
454. See i. at 374; see also id.at 377 (Higgins, concurring) ("[T]he advertisement for
replacements said that 'all positions could lead to permanent full time after the strike[.]' ... The
reasonable understanding of this statement is that the intention was for nonpermanence, albeit the
positions could become permanent after the strike.").
455. See id. at 374. The Board stated: "To the extent that the [employer] reserved to the Board
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settlement with ,the union altered their status.456 In addition, the
employer's negotiators represented to the union that the replacements
were temporary, and that their employment would be terminated if the
strikers made an-unconditional offer to return.457
Finally, the employment applications completed by the
replacements contained at-will language allowing the employer to
terminate them at any time and for any reason.4 5 ' The Board observed
that the inclusion of this language did not support the employer's
assertion that the replacements were permanent.4 9 Implicitly rejecting
the view of one Board member that preserving the at-will status of
replacements does not preclude their permanency for NLRA purposes,W
the Board stated:
Although in Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983), the Supreme
Court expressed the view that the inclusion of conditions in an offer of
employment would not necessarily foreclose a finding that the offer
was permanent, none of the examples given or referenced by the Court
included statements to the effect that the employee could be discharged
at any time for any reason. Indeed, the Court... made clear that the
kinds of "conditional" offers it believed could be defended as offers of
permanent employment did not include offers advising replacements
that they "could be fired at the will of the employer for any reason. 46'
4. Morie Co.
A similar conclusion was reached in Morie Co. 4 62 In that case, the
the authority to determine the status of the replacement employees, it is apparent that the
[employer] ... was willing to accept as authoritative our determination that the replacements be
regarded as temporary employees." Id. This argument is unconvincing. The employer instead
undoubtedly recognized that it might be required to accept as authoritative a Board determination
that the replacements were temporary. See Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 542 (1983)
(Brennan, L dissenting) ("Workers hired to replace striking employees on a permanent basis are
nonpermanent to the extent that a strike may be determined to have been an unfair labor practice
strike and that an employer may be ordered to reinstate strikers.").
456. See TargetRock, Corp., 324 N.L.R.B. at 374.
457. See id.
458. See id. at 374.
459. See id.
460. See id. at 376-77 (Higgins, concurring); see also infra notes 493-99 and accompanying
text.
461. Target Rock, Corp., 324 N.L.R.B. at 374 n.9 (quoting Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 504-05
n.8).
462. Nos. 4-CA-24574-1, 4-CA-24574-2 & 4-CA-24923, 1997 NLRB LEXIS 570 (July 16,
1997).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol18/iss1/3

70

Moberly: Striking Bargains: The At-Will Employment of Permanent Strike Rep

2000]

Striking Bargains

employer had required its replacement workers to acknowledge that they
were at-will employees and thus could be discharged "at any time with
or without cause and without prior notice." 4 The administrative law

judge held that this requirement not only failed to corroborate the

employer's assertion that it intended to hire permanent replacements,
but was, in fact, inconsistent with any commitment to make the
replacements permanent&47
In reaching this result, the judge relied in part upon the fact that the
collective bargaining agreement became effective once the union
accepted the employer's final offer and the strikers offered to return to
work.4" Under those circumstances, the judge observed, "any truly
'permanent' replacements... could not be purely 'at will' employee[s]

but would have been subject to the various tenure provisions of the
bargaining agreement, including seniority, discharge, and grievance
procedures."' 9 In other words, any permanent replacements could not

have been employed at will because, by definition, they would have
continued to be employed after the bargaining agreement-and in
particular its tenure provisions47 -became effective. 47'
463. See id. at *26.
464. Id. at*41.
465. If, as apparently was the case in Modie Co., no exceptions to an administrative law judge's
decision are filed, "the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the administrative law
judge ... automatically become the decision and order of the Board and become its findings,
conclusions and order." 29 C.F.R. § 102.48(a) (1999); see also NLRB v. Wash. Star Co., 732 F.2d
974, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Croley Coal Corp., 269 N.L.R.B. 182, 182 n.1 (1984); Brownstone,
supra note 26, at 235-36.
466. See Morie Co., 1997 NLRB LEXIS 570, at *41. Because there must be a mutual
understanding between the employer and the replacements, "an employer's own intent to employ
replacements permanently is insufficient." Chi. Tribune Co., 304 N.L.R.B. 259, 261 (1991).
However, the employer's testimony with respect to its intentions may establish the requisite
understanding if "none of the replacements testify] about their status." Chi. Tribune Co., 318
N.L.R.B. 920,925 (1995).
467. See Morie Co., 1997 NLRB LEXIS 570, at *41. See generally H. & F. Binch Co. Plant of
the Native Laces & Textile Div. of Indian Head, Inc., 188 N.L.R.B. 720, 723 (1971) ("The question
of what constitutes a real commitment will... vary with the circumstances of each situation ...
enforced as modified, 456 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1972).
468. See Morie Co., 1997 NLRB LEXIS 570, at *41-*42. See generally Reed Tool Co., Nos.
16-CA-16262, 16-CA-16354 & 16-CA-16411, 1995 NLRB LEXIS 924, at *28 (Aug. 31, 1995)
(indicating that "replacement employees' terms and conditions of employment [become] governed
by the new contract" upon the union's "acceptance of [the] final offer").
469. Id. at *42; cf.Bldg. Serv. 32B-32J, Legal Serv. Trust Fund, No. 2-CA-27352, 1995 NLRB
LEXIS 681, at *25 (July 18, 1995) ("[l]f allowed to become a permanent employee, any attempt to
discharge [an individual] would become subject to the grievance and arbitration provisions of the
parties['] collective bargaining agreement ...").
470. Most collective bargaining agreements contain provisions requiring just cause for
termination. See Sanders v. Parker Drilling Co., 911 F.2d 191, 196 (9th Cir. 1990) (Reinhardt, J.,
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This analysis is questionable.472 The terms and conditions of
employment established for the employer's replacement workers at the
time of hire may well have been superseded by the terms of the
subsequently negotiated bargaining agreement. 473 However, the employer
and the union could have negotiated an agreement that contained no
"just cause" termination standard or other comparable tenure
provisions,474 which presumably would have preserved the at-will status
of the replacements remaining employed after the agreement became
effective. 4 5 Alternatively, the union might never have accepted the
concurring); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 891 (Mich. 1980); cf. Shah v.
Am. Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489, 492 (Ky. 1983) ("Protection of employees against
discharge without cause is routinely provided under collective bargaining agreements ... ."). The
agreement in Morie Co. appears to be no exception, since the administrative law judge stated that
the employees subject to it "were not 'at will' employees." Morie Co., 1997 NLRB LEXIS 570, at
*41-*42.
471. Morie Co., 1997 NLRB LEXIS 570, at *42. See generally Pilkington v. United Airlines,
Inc., 921 F. Supp. 740, 748-49 (M.D. Fla. 1996) ("Once the striking workers retum] to work under
the newly negotiated collective bargaining agreement the rights and duties of all parties, including
[the replacements] ... must be governed by that agreement ....).
472. In any event, such unreviewed administrative law judge decisions are not binding Board
precedent. See Gilbert d/b/a T-n-T's Plumbing, 321 N.L.R.B. 470, 470 n.3 (1996); Fiesta Publ'g
Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 660, 660 n.2 (1984); cf.Educ. & Recreational Servs., Inc. 261 N.L.R.B. 448,
448, 450 n.7 (1982) (contrasting "officially reported Board precedent" with "[u]npublished Board
decisions" that have "no binding precedential value").
473. See Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 507 n.10 (1983) (stating that "replacements are
bound.., by those agreements that a union makes... regarding the terms and conditions of
employment for the employer's work force after the termination of the strike"); Serv. Elec. Co., 281
N.L.R.B. 633, 640 (1986) (indicating that a strike settlement renders the employment terms of
replacements "no more than a footnote to the overall bargaining process that led to agreement
between the parties").
474. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local No. 715, 279 F.2d 533,
534 (5th Cir. 1960) (discussing a situation in which the employer's "common law right to select its
employees and terminate their employment at will.., was not abridged... in the bargaining
agreement"); Inner City Broad. Corp., 281 N.L.R.B. 1210, 1217 (1986) (referring to negotiations in
which "the parties agreed that the Company would have the absolute right to discharge any
employee with or without cause"); cf Coastal Elec. Coop., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 1126, 1129 (1993)
(discussing employer's insistence upon "the inclusion of an 'employment at will' provision in any
collective-bargaining agreement"); Va. Holding Corp, 293 N.L.R.B. 182, 184 (1989) (describing the
employer's attempt "to eliminate the 'just cause' for discharge requirement from the bargaining
agreemene'). See generallyFruitland Mut. Water Co., No. 19-CA-22291, 1992 NLRB GCM LEXIS
55, at *2 (Oct. 30, 1992) ("The Act does not require an employer to agree to a just cause for
termination provision in a collective bargaining agreement.").
475. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local Union 238 v. C.S.R.T., Inc., 795 F.2d 1400,
1404 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that an employee's right to be discharged only for just cause is "strictly
a creature of the collective bargaining agreement"); Holmes v. Schneider Power Corp., 628 F. Supp.
937, 942 (W.D. Pa. 1986) ("[l]n the absence of an express or clearly implied just cause provision,
the employment-at-will doctrine applies."). But see Smith v. Kerrville Bus Co., 709 F.2d 914, 919
(5th Cir. 1983) ("Mindful that we are bound to exercise a reasoned flexibility in construing the
terms of a labor contract, we are loath to conclude.., that no just cause limitation inheres in the...
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employer's final offer,4 76 in which case the replacements' at-will status
also would have continued unabated.477
In any event, it is difficult to see how the inclusion of job security

provisions in a subsequently negotiated bargaining agreement could
establish that the employer did not intend to make its replacements
permanent at the time of hire.478 If anything, the employer's retention of
the replacements even though the union's acceptance of its final offer
effectively abrogated its right to terminate them at will would seem to
strengthen the case for characterizing them as permanent. 479 In short, the
existence of job security provisions that became effective upon
acceptance of the employer's final offer may have abrogated the
replacements' status as at-will employees'4 8 but it should not have
collective bargaining agreement.") (citations omitted).
476. See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 280 N.L.R.B. 429, 433 (1986) (discussing a
situation in which "no new contract was reached because the Union never accepted the Company's
final offer"); Inner City Broad. Corp., 281 N.L.R1B. at 1213 (describing negotiations in which the
employer "stood on [a] final offer" that was "not accepted by the Union").
477. See, e.g., Kosulandich v. Survival Tech., Inc., 997 F.2d 431, 432 (8th Cir. 1993)
(observing that individuals who were "not yet covered by the protections of any collective
bargaining agreement" are "clearly at-will employees"); Bates v. Jim Walter Res., Inc., 418 So. 2d
903, 906 (Ala. 1982) (rejecting the contention that "the employment at will doctrine should not be
applied where, at some future date, the employment would be covered by a written collective
bargaining agreement").
478. The Board has held that "[t]he controlling factor is the employer's intent at the time of
hiring." H. & F. Binch Co. Plant of the Native Laces & Textile Div. of Indian Head, Inc., 188
N.L.R.B. 720, 742 n.39 (1971), enforced as modified,456 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1972); see also Target
Rock Corp., 324 N.L.R.B. 373, 377 (1997) (Higgins, concurring) (indicating that the "mutual
intention that the replacements be permanent" is to be determined "at the time of hire"), enforced,
172 F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1998). See generally Estreicher, supra note 34, at 907 ("At the outset of [a]
strike, the employer in all likelihood hopes that the replacements will continue to occupy their
positions, but [it] cannot predict with any confidence what will ensue upon the strike's end ....
").
479. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 963 F. Supp. 805, 822 (N.D. Iowa
1997) (suggesting that the adoption of a provision authorizing termination only for cause would
convert employees "from an at-will employment status to a more permanent status"). In other
words, an employer may be willing to tolerate conduct from permanent replacements that, while
undesirable, does not rise to the level of just cause for discharge, see, e.g., Ortiz v. Unemployment
Ins. Appeal Bd., 305 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973) (referring to "act[s] of misconduct [that]
did not constitute just cause for discharge [which] the employer had tolerated"), rev'd, 317 A.2d
100 (Del. 1974), while refusing to tolerate the same conduct "by a person whom [it] had decided not
to retain as a permanent employee." Zeppelin Elec. Co., 161 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1201, 1205 (1999)
(Hurtgen, dissenting).
480. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 708 F. Supp. 750, 752 (E.D. Va. 1989)
(observing that a "just cause provision contained in a collective bargaining agreement remove[s] an
employee's contract from the at will category") (citing Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Harris, 59 S.E.2d 110
(Va. 1950)); Hamer v. Nashawena Mills, Inc., 52 N.E.2d 22, 26 (Mass. 1943) (stating that at-will
employees are "subject to the governing principles of law by which the terms of their
employment... might be superseded by a new collective bargaining agreement"). See generally
McDaniel v. Am. Red Cross, Johnstown Region, 58 F. Supp.2d 628, 630 n.2 (W.D. Pa. 1999) ('The
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affected their status as permanent replacements.48'

Nevertheless, the administrative law judge's conclusion that at-will
employment is inconsistent with permanent replacement is in accordance
412

with the majority opinions in Gibson Greetings

and Target Rock

Corp.48
' 3 It is also at least arguably consistent with an earlier Board
decision, Harvey Mfg., 4 which held that replacement workers who the
employer viewed as at-will employees subject to discharge with or
without cause' were merely temporary strike replacements, despite
having received verbal assurances that their employment would be

permanent.

6

In addition, the view expressed in Morie Co. is shared by

however, it has never
some commentators. 4 As discussed below,
488
commanded the support of the full Board.
E. The "Minority" View
In Gibson Greetings, Inc.,4

9

Board Member John Raudabaugh

parties to an employment relationship, of course, may agree to something other than an at-will
employment, either in an individual or collective bargaining agreement."),
481. See 470 Stratford Holding Co. v. Local 32B-32J, Serv. Employees Int'l Union, 805 F.
Supp. 118, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[T]he fact that a collective bargaining agreement includes a
justifiable discharge provision in no way indicates that the employer waived [its) statutorilyprotected rights to hire permanent replacement workers.").
482. 310 N.L.R.B. 1286 (1993), aff'd in partand rev'din part,53 F.3d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
483. 324 N.L.R.B. 373 (1997), enforced, 172 F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
484. 309 N.L.R.B. 465 (1992).
485. Seeid. at469n.ll.
486. See id.at 468. However, the critical evidence in Harvey may not have been, the
replacements' at-will status, but their receipt of employment documents that contradicted the
employer's oral representations by characterizing the replacements as temporary employees. Id.; see
also Sidney Square Convalescent Ctr. & Pers. Care Residence, No. 6-CA-27897, 1996 NLRB GCM
LEXIS 37, at *7 n.5 (Aug. 30, 1996) (observing that "in determining whether replacements were
permanent or temporary, the Board [in Harvey] discussed what the replacements had been told").
487. See, e.g., Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects
for Union Representation,98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 391-92 (1984) (asserting that "there is nothing
permanent in... indefinite, nonunion 'employment at will,' subject as it is not only to layoffs for
business reasons, but also to dismissal at the employer's discretion"); cf. Estreicher, supra note 34,
at 899 (observing that "the promise of 'permanency' made to replacements may be illusory where
their employment is terminable at-will").
488. This issue is not unique in this regard. See Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm. v.
NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussing an issue on which "the only determinative
elementol seems to be the composition of the [Board] panel which happens to hear the case");
Oshman's Sporting Goods, Inc., v. NLRB, 586 F.2d 699, 702 (9th Cir. 1978) (quoting a study of
another issue on which "Board members disagree with one another"); Birkenwald, Inc., 282
N.L.R.B. 954; 957 (1987) (discussing an issue on which "the Board members.., have been so
divided ... that it cannot even be said that there presently is a Board majority approach to follow in
resolving ie').
489. 310 N.L.R.B. 1286 (1993), aff'd in partand rev'd in part,53 F.3d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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disagreed with the majority's conclusion that employers cannot hire
permanent replacements on an at-will basis. 490 He reasoned that in the
lexicon of labor law, "permanent" does not mean "forever," but only that
the employer intended to retain the replacements even after the strike
was over.49' He went on to state:
[The term "permanent replacement" does not mean that there is an
unconditional promise to retain the replacement. Rather, there is only
the present intention to retain the replacement after the strike is over.
Indeed, [under Belknap] the employer can affirmatively disclaim any
unconditional promises. In that way, the employer can lawfully have
permanent replacements and can nonetheless avoid breach-of-promise
claims if it thereafter reinstates the strikers and lays off the
replacements, e.g., pursuant to an agreement with the union, a
settlement of an N.L.R.B. case, or a Board order or court decree.
... [Thus], an employer may clearly communicate words of permanent
being
status, but then go on to say that no unconditional promises are
492
made.... [T]his statement is consistent with permanent status
Board Member John Higgins reached a similar conclusion in Target
Rock Corp.493 He agreed with the Board's conclusion that the employer
in that case failed to establish that its replacement workers were
permanent employees. 494 Unlike the other Board members in that case,
however, he declined to base his decision on the employer's inclusion of
at-will language in its employment application. 49s
Member Higgins noted that Belknap permits an employer to couple
an offer of permanent employment with a statement that a Board
decision or a settlement with the union may result in the replacement's
termination. 96 In his view, the same analysis should apply to an
employer's decision to couple its offer with a statement that employment
is at will. 497 Because, under Belknap, such conditional offers do not
preclude a finding of permanent employment for purposes of the NLRA,
a finding of temporary employment cannot be based on the employer's

490.
491.
492.
493.
494.

See il at 1293 n.2 (Raudabaugh, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1293 (Raudabaugh, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Ie (Raudabaugh, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted).
324 N.L.R.B. 373 (1997), enforced, 172 F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
See id. at 376 (Higgins, concurring).

495. See id. at 376-77 (Higgins, concurring).
496. See id. at 376-77 & n.2 (Higgins, concurring).
497. See id. at 376 (Higgins, concurring).
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Member

[T]he employer can exercise its statutory privilege to hire permanent
replacements, and can nonetheless leave open the possibility of
immediate reinstatement of strikers pursuant to a settlement agreement
with the union, or the settlement or adjudication of a... Board case. In
addition, the employer can preserve its legitimate interest in protecting
itself from individual-employee lawsuits grounded in state law. 9
VIII. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
There are certain inconsistencies in the Board's view of the present
issue.' In particular, replacements can now be considered permanent
even if they have been told they could be discharged if strikers are
reinstated as part of a strike settlement, °' despite the Board's previous
indication that assuring replacements they will not be terminated to
make room for returning strikers- is essential to a finding of
permanence5 3 On the other hand, replacements hired on an at-will basis
apparently cannot be considered permanent"" even if they were assured

498. See id. at 376-77 & n.2 (Higgins, concurring).
499. Il at 377 (Higgins, concurring).
500. Compare Karmazin Prods. Corp., No. 7-CA-27767, 1988 NLRB GCM LEXIS 12, at *7*8 (Dec. 23, 1988) with Target Rock Corp., 324 N.L.R.B. 373, 374 n.9 (1997), enforced, 172 F.3d
921 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
501. Concrete Pipe & Prods. Corp., 305 N.L.R.B. 152, 154 n.9 (1991), aff'd, review denied,
983 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
502. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 3 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)
(describing replacements who were told that they "would not be terminated solely to make room
for... returning strikers"); Bingham Willamette, 282 N.L.R.B. 1192, 1192 (1987) (discussing
replacements who "were told by [the employer] that they were being hired as regular and permanent
replacements... and they could expect that they would not be replaced by a negotiated settlement
in returning strikers"), enforced, 857 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1988).
503. See, e.g., Titan Metal Mfg. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 196, 211 (1962) (characterizing such
assurances as "a necessary element of permanent replacement") (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, Dist. No. 8 v. J. L. Clark Co., 471 F.2d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 1972)
(stating that "the term 'permanent replacement' ... describe[s] those employees, hired during the
strike, who would be protected from displacement by returning strikers"); Corbett, supra note 40, at
818 n.12 ("[P]ermanent replacement means the employer does not intend to discharge the
replacement in order to reinstate a striking employee when the strike ends or when the striker
otherwise requests reinstatement.").
504. See Target Rock Corp., 324 N.L.R.B. at 374 n.9; cf Sitek v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 587
F. Supp. 1381, 1385 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (finding no "promise of permanent employment" where the
employer's documentation "stated [that] ... employment was at will").
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they would not be terminated to make room for returning strikers.0 5
Given these inconsistencies, as well as the generally unsettled
nature of the question," the Board's view of the issue may continue to
evolve. 7 In that process, the present "minority" view-that at-will
employment does not preclude a finding of permanence 5s- ultimately
could emerge as the prevailing view,' although the Board's propensity
to reverse itself in this manner has occasionally been criticized.5 0
505. See, e.g., Karmazin Prods. Corp. 1988 NLRB GCM LEXIS 12, at *7-*8 (indicating that
at-will strike replacements "may have understood that, although they may be fired for other reasons,
the [e]mployer would not necessarily fire them to reinstate the strikers").
506. See generally Sub-Zero Freezer Co., 271 N.L.R.B. 47, 48 (1984) (Zimmerman,
dissenting) (stating that "a certain degree of instability in Board law" is "inevitable"); Westfall,
supranote 46, at 148 (referring to "the recognized instability of Board doctrine").
507. It is not uncommon for the Board's view of an issue to change with changes in its
membership. See, e.g., Bus. Servs. by Manpower, Inc. v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 442,447 (2d Cir. 1986)
(discussing an issue on which "a differently constituted Board switched positions"); Newspaper
Drivers Local Union No. 372 v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 116, 117 (6th Cir. 1982) (discussing a Board
reversal that "appear[ed] to be entirely related to a change in the composition of the Board");
Howard Univ., 224 N.L.R.B. 385, 385 n.2 (1976) (observing that "reconsideration after a change in
Board composition is not novel"). See generally Spencer v. NLRB, 548 F. Supp. 256, 264-65
(D.D.C. 1982):
One need not pejoratively characterize the Board as a politically pliable agency to
recognize that existing Board precedent is inevitably, and necessarily, subject to some
modification as the composition of the Board changes in response to electoral
developments. A new national administration may have a decidedly different view of the
appropriate balance between the statutory values of free choice and bargaining stability
than its immediate predecessor, and the composition of the Board may ultimately tend to
reflect that view.
Id.
508. See Target Rock Corp., 324 N.L.R.B. 373, 376-77 & n.2 (1997) (Higgins, concurring),
enforced, 172 F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Gibson Greetings, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1293 & n.2
(1993) (Raudabaugh, concurring in part and dissenting in part), affd in part and rev'd in part,53
F.3d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Karmazin Prods. Corp., 1988 NLRB GCM LEXIS 12 at *7-*8.
509. Cf. NLRB v. Ensign Elec. Div. of Harvey Hubble, Inc., 767 F.2d 1100, 1102 n.1 (4th Cir.
1985) (describing a Board decision "coming on the heels of changes in composition of the Board"
that was a "clear example of an administrative body reviewing its earlier decisions... and creating
a new majority to support an earlier viewpoint expressed in dissent"); Brownstone, supranote 26, at
243 n.74 (discussing "shifting" Board decisions in which "the dissenting view in one decision
became the majority's rationale in the subsequent reversal").
510. See, e.g., Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 894 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) ("mhe only significant development that impacted on the Board's current decision is the
recent change in the composition of the Board that... construed the ... existing precedents to the
point of extinction. Such erratic decisionmaking is unacceptable... ') (footnote and internal
quotation marks omitted); Howard Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. 727, 727 (1975) (Jenkins, dissenting) ("If
precedent is to be reconsidered each time there is a change in the membership of the Board, it is
likely that the lifespan of precedent on which reliance may be placed may be reduced to 18
months."); Sub-Zero FreezerCo., 271 N.L.R.B. at 48 (Zimmerman, dissenting):
Certainly the Act allows for shifts in the law when the composition of the Board
changes, and undoubtedly Congress intended for the Board to respond to changing times
and conditions.... At the same time, however, such changes undermine the goals stated
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As a matter of policy, the minority view may have the benefit of
encouraging strike settlements5" that contemplate the reinstatement of
strikers. Unions typically make reinstatement a condition to the
settlement of economic strikes,513 while employers concerned about

potential liability under Belknaps14 may refuse to agree to that condition
55

to avoid terminating replacement workers in order to comply with it. '
Thus, the holding in Belknap serves as a potential impediment to one of
by a long succession of Board Members of maximizing the voluntary settlement of cases
and minimizing the litigation of labor disputes. Those goals call for giving due regard for
both stability in the law and finality in litigation. Avoiding unnecessary instability and
uncertainty is critical to the efficient administration of the Act.
Id.
511. See generally Gem City Ready Mix Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 1260, 1260-61 (1984) ("The policy
of the National Labor Relations Act is to encourage the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining as a means of resolving labor disputes, including the encouragement of the negotiation of
strike settlement agreements.") (footnotes omitted); Energy Coop., Inc., 290 N.L.R.B. 635, 637
(1988) ('[W]e look favorably on private strike settlements that result in the amicable resolution of
labor disputes and thus serve the public interest as well as that of the parties.") (footnote omitted);
Colonial Press, Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. 673, 680 (1973) ("Mt needs no citations to show the Act
encourages [strike settlement agreements].").
512. Although the NLRA's only specific provision for the reinstatement of strikers applies
where an unfair labor practice has occurred, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1994), there is also a statutory
interest "in protecting economic strikers by an entitlement to reinstatement." NLRB v. Mars Sales &
Equip. Co., 626 F.2d 567, 573 (7th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added); see also Woodlawn Hosp., 233
N.L.R.B. 782, 789 n.31 (1977) (observing that "participants in both types [of strikes] have
statutorily protected reinstatement rights," and that the "only relevant difference is the extent of
such rights"); Brooks Research & Mfg., Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 634, 636 (1973) ("The reinstatement
rights of economic strikers ... are statutory... "'); Finkin, supra note 126, at 598 n. 33 (asserting
that the reinstatement rights of economic strikers "are no less statutory rights than the reinstatement
rights of unfair labor practice strikers"). See generally NLRB v. Am. Potash & Chem. Corp., 113
F.2d 232, 234 (9th Cir. 1940) ("The duty of an employer to reinstate arises ... to effectuate the
purposes of the Act.").
513. See Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc. v. NLRB, 859 F.2d 362, 369 (5th Cir. 1988)
(Williams, J., dissenting), rev'd, 494 U.S. 775 (1990); Corbett, supra note 40, at 846; see, e.g., S.
Fla. Hotel & Motel Ass'n, 245 N.L.R.B. 561,579 (1979); Gehnrich & Gehnrich, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B.
1122, 1128-29 (1977); Local 457, United Rubber Workers, 147 N.L.R.B. 980, 985 (1964).
514. See Bingham Willamette, 282 N.L.R.B. 1192, 1196-97 (1987) (discussing an employer
seeking to "avoid... a lawsuit by its striker replacements" under Belknap for "replacing them with
returning strikers"), enforced, 857 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1988); Karmazin Prods. Corp., 1988 NLRB
GCM LEXIS 12, at *6 (describing "an employer apparently attempting to protect itself from
liability under Belknap").
515. See Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491,521 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[Wihere
the employer has chosen to promise permanent employment to strike replacements, its potential
liability to them would make the employer reluctant to settle by giving the strikers their old jobs.");
Bingham Willamette, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1197 ("Because of its concern about the possible impact of
the Belknap decision [an employer] may have.., a good reason for not entering into a strike
settlement... calling for the reinstatement of the strikers and the discharge of the striker
replacements."); Estreicher, supra note 34, at 907 ("[S]tate tort suits create an incentive on the part
of employers not to accede to the one thing the union will invariably insist upon if it is to have any
future in the plant: the retum of its members to their jobs.").
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primary goals-fostering labor peace through the settlement of
the Act's
516
strikes.
Addressing this very issue, the Board filed an amicus brief in
Belknap in which it argued that employers should be entitled to
terminate permanent replacements in the event of a strike settlement." 7
The Board reasoned that subjecting employers to liability for entering
into settlements that involve the reinstatement of strikers would conflict
with the federal policy favoring the settlement of labor disputes." 8
The Board's argument provides a persuasive basis for interpreting

Belknap's holding that an employer can condition its offers to permanent2

basis. 0
replacements1 9 to include the right to employ them on an at-will
Specifically, interpreting Belknap in this manner would minimize, and
perhaps eliminate, the decision's perceived impediment to strike
settlements52' by permitting employers to avoid liability for terminating
such replacements to resolve a labor dispute."2
516. See, e.g., Cent. States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Midwest Motor Express, Inc.,
1998) (suggesting that strike had been prolonged by the
999 F. Supp. 1153, 1164 (N.D. Ill.
employer's negotiating stance, including specifically its refusal "to displace the permanent
replacement workers for the striking employees, a significant issue for the [union]"), afftd, 181 F.3d
799 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 497 (1999); Estreicher, supranote 34, at 907 (observing that
"federal labor policy is disserved if the prospect of state tort liability hardens the employer's initial
resolve so decisively as to foreclose a strike settlement"). See generally Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at
532 (Brennan, J., dissenting):
If an employer is confronted with potential liability for discharging workers he has hired
to replace striking employees, he is likely to be much less willing to enter into a
settlement agreement calling for.., the reinstatement of strikers. Instead, he is much
more likely to refuse to settle and to litigate the [unfair labor practice] charges at issue
while retaining the replacements. Such developments would frustrate the strong federal
interest in ending strikes and in settling labor disputes.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
517. See Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at499, 502.
at 499; see also Braun, supranote 43, at 401 ("The Office of the General Counsel
518. See id.
for the [Board] has asserted that if state actions for breach of contract and misrepresentation brought
by discharged permanent replacements [are] allowed, the employer's license to offer employment to
replacements would be defeated. Permanent replacements, according to the General Counsel, [must]
bear the risk of being laid off or discharged.").
519. See Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 505 n.9.
520. See Target Rock Corp., 324 N.L.R.B. 373, 376-77 (1997) (Higgins, concurring), enforced,
172 F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
521. See Stromire, supranote 36, at 1230 (indicating that an employer who "can argue.., that
[it] merely terminated the contract at will" can "afford to be flexible in settlement negotiations"
because it can "retain the replacement workers or rehire the striking employees without fear of
liability"). But cf Findn, supra note 18, at 555 ("In a number of jurisdictions, the wrongfully
terminated, even if otherwise at-will, [replacement] employee may be able to secure a judgment for
the current discounted value of the employee's lost future wages with the employer ...").
522. In Gibson Greetings, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1286 (1993), affd in part and rev'd in part, 53
F.3d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1995), for example, one Board member indicated that by "affirmatively
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In fact, this is precisely how Justice Blackmun interpreted Belknap

in his concurring opinion in that case.5 3 Justice Blackmun acknowledged
that an employer's potential contractual liability to terminated strike

replacements is a perplexing problem

4 inherent in

the decision to permit

employers to offer permanent employment to such replacements?'
However, he did not favor a solution that would permit employers to
hire permanent replacements on an at-will basis, 26 because he believed
that permanently replacing economic strikers can be justified only if, in
order to continue operating its business, the employer was forced to
obligate itself to the replacements in a manner that precluded the
strikers' reinstatement 5 2

disclaim[ing] any unconditional promises" to permanent replacements, an employer can "avoid
breach-of-promise claims if it thereafter reinstates the strikers and lays off the replacements...
pursuant to an agreement with the union." Id. at 1293 (Raudabaugh, concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 504 n.8 (indicating that if "replacements
could be fired at the will of the employer for any reason[,] the employer would violate no promise
made to a replacement if it discharged some of them to make way for returning strikers").
523. In Target Rock, the Board asserted that the Belknap Court, "in distinguishing Covington
Furniture Mfg. Co., 212 N.L.R.B. 214 (1974), made clear that the kinds of 'conditional' offers it
believed could be defended as offers of permanent employment did not include offers advising
replacements that they 'could be fired at the will of the employer for any reason."' Target Rock
Corp., 324 N.L.R.B. at 374 n.9 (quoting Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 504-05 n.8). However, Justice
Blackmun reached a different conclusion, asserting that the Belknap majority had rejected
Covington Furniture's holding that replacements cannot be considered permanent if their
employment is "subject to cancellation at the employer's option," and instead effectively held that
they may be permanent even if what they are told is that their employment will be permanent
"unless the employer decides otherwise." Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 514-15 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (citing Covington FurnitureMfg. Co., 212 N.L.R.B. at 220).
524. See Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 523 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
525. See id. at 521 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
526. See id. at 519 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[I]t
is difficult to explain the employer's
power to prefer permanent strike replacements over returning economic strikers unless, through the
promise of permanent employment, the employer has incurred an obligation to those
replacements."); cf Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 132 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2422, 2423 (W.D. Mo. 1989) ("A promise made in the context of a strike exposes the
employer to a breach of contract suit if later repudiated to accommodate returning strikers and
thus ... provides an adequate business justification for keeping new hires.").
527. See Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 519 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("This power to override
the economic strikers' statutory entitlement to reinstatement must be based on the common-sense
notion that, in order to continue to operate the business, the employer was required to obligate itself
to third parties in a manner inconsistent with the strikers' right to subsequent reinstatement."); Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 458 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("The employer's legal right to resist a union demand for reinstatement flows from the
necessity of the offer of permanence; absent such necessity, the employer may be required to
furlough (or discharge) the replacements to make room for the strikers' return."); see also Indep.
Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2423 n.1 ("Justice Blackmun would place the
onus on employers to explain ...why they could not make do during a strike with temporary
replacements, thus preserving a place for strikers to return and reducing the risk of striking.").
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Although Justice Blackmun's view has also been, advanced by
others5 (including the dissenting justices in Belknap),529 it has not been

widely embraced.530 Perhaps most importantly, it has been rejected by
the Board, which instead holds that "it is not required that offers of
permanent tenure to strike replacements must be justified by showing
that the particular form of offer was necessary to keep a business in
operation during a strike."53'
The Belknap majority clearly favored the Board's view532 over that
528. See, e.g., NLRB v. Mars Sales & Equip. Co., 626 F.2d 567, 573 (7th Cir. 1980)
(indicating that economic strikers are entitled to reinstatement unless the employer "had to offer the
jobs on a permanent basis as an inducement to continuing his operations"); MCC Pac. Valves, 244
N.L.R.B. 931, 933 n.10 (1979) (asserting that an employer's right to deny reinstatement to
economic strikers arises from "the employer's need to assure replacements of permanent
employment in order to insure the labor force necessary to continue operations during the strike");
Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. 862, 862 (1967) (observing that "the employer's right to
replace is no greater than its proven need to carry on its business"); see also Indep. Fed'n of Flight
Attendants, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2423 n.1 (asserting that Justice Blackmun's approach has
"considerable appeal" as a matter of policy).
529. See Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 526-27, 537 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 504 n.8
("The dissent and the concurrence suggest that if offers of permanent employment are not necessary
to secure the manpower to keep the business operating, returning strikers must be given preference
over replacements who have been hired on a permanent basis.").
530. See Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2423 (stating that "the
existence of a strike and the use by the employer of a promise of permanent tenure are the only
factual matters that need be established to show business justification for turning away ...strikers
seeking to reclaim their jobs"); cf H. & F. Binch Co. Plant of the Native Laces & Textile Div. of
Indian Head, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 F.2d 357, 362 (2d Cir. 1972) (concluding that it is "not necessary
[to a finding of 'permanency'] that.., the 'replacement' would have a cause of action if a striker
was allowed to return to work").
531. Waterbury Hosp., 300 N.L.R.B. 992, 1006 (1990). In other words, the Board "does not
require employers to justify the choice of permanent, as opposed to temporary, replacement,"
because it "presumes that an employer's motive in permanently replacing its employees is to serve
its legitimate business interest of continuing operations." TNS, Inc., 1999-2000 NLRB Dec. (CCH)
15,322, at 28,546 (Sept. 30, 1999) (Hurtgen, dissenting) (emphasis added). This is in direct
contrast to the view of Justice Blackmun, who saw "no need to afford the [employer] the benefit of
a... presumption of business necessity" in hiring replacements. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 489
U.S. at 463-64 n.4 (Blacknun, J., dissenting).
532. In Belknap, the Court quoted that portion of the Board's decision in Hot Shoppes, Inc.
rejecting the view that "an employer may [permanently] replace economic strikers only if it is
shown that he acted to preserve efficient operation of his business." Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 504
n.8 (quoting Hot Shoppes, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 802 (1964)). The Court also noted that this aspect of
Hot Shoppes has never been repudiated by the Board, that there are no Supreme Court cases to the
contrary, and that, like Hot Shoppes, the Court's decision in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co.,
304 U.S. 333 (1938), can be read as holding that "the [employer's] motive for hiring permanent
replacements is irrelevant." Id. at 504-05 & n.8; see also Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 132
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2424 (indicating that Belknap is one of the cases "articulat[ing] support for the
Hot Shoppes rule"); Waterbury Hosp., 300 N.L.R.B. at 1006 ("[F]rom the Supreme Court's
discussion in Belknap ...of the Board's decision in Hot Shoppe [sic].... it appears that it is not
required that offers of permanent tenure to strike replacements must be justified by showing that the
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of Justice Blackmun, 533 and thus (at least in Blackmun's opinion)
effectively held that hiring replacements on an at-will basis does not
preclude a finding of permanency. " This holding has also been
suggested by other courts5 35 and, at least at one time, was the view held
by the Board's General Counsel.536 Two former Board members have
also expressed their agreement with it,537 and 53its conceivably could one
day command the support of a Board majority.
However, the proper resolution of the present issue actually may
rest on an even simpler foundation.539 Most states hold that offering
permanent employment to a strike replacement gives rise to a

particular form of offer was necessary to keep a business in operation during a strike.").
533. See Sinai Hosp., No. 5-CA-16952, 1985 NLRB GCM LEXIS 97, at *5 n.14 (July 17,
1985):
mhe concurring and dissenting justices [in Belknap] took the view that returning
strikers must be given preference over replacements hired on a permanent basis if
promises of permanence had not been necessary to secure the replacements' services.
The Belknap majority rejected this view, citing the Board's holding in Hot
Shoppes ...that an employer's motive for hiring replacements to continue operations is
irrelevant.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
534. See supranote 523.
535. See, e.g., H. & F.Binch Co. Plant of the Native Laces & Textile Div. of Indian Head,Inc.,
465 F.2d at 362:
Since [the hiring of permanent replacements is] almost always oral and at will, it is not
necessary that conversations should have taken a form where the replacement would
have a cause of action if a striker was allowed to return ....[That the replacement
would have reasonable grounds for indignation if he were ...denied the promised job[]
is about as good a formulation of the appropriate standard as can be achieved.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
536. See Karmazin Prods. Corp., No. 7-CA-27767, 1988 NLRB GCM LEXIS 12, at *7-*8
(Dec. 23, 1988).
537. See Target Rock Corp., 324 N.L.R.B. 373, 376-77 & n.2 (1997) (Higgins, concurring),
enforced, 172 F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Gibson Greeting, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1293 & n.2
(1993) (Raudabaugh, concurring in part and dissenting in part), affd in part and rev'd in part, 53
F.3d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
538. See, e.g., Waterbury Hosp., 300 N.L.R.B. 992, 1006 (1990) (citing H. & F. Binch Co.
with apparent approval); cf United Auto. Workers of Am., 266 N.L.R.B. 952,960 (1983) ("Because
of the change in Board composition ....the position of the present majority of the Board is open to
pure speculation."). See generallyMesa Verde Constr. Co. v. N. Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861
F.2d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 1988) (acknowledging "the NLRB's ability to change its interpretation [of
the Act] in accord with its experience and altered objectives"); Spencer v. NLRB, 548 F. Supp. 256,
265 (D.D.C. 1982) (discussing the "salutary efforts of a reconstituted Board to modify existing rules
and practices in the face of... the Board's own evolving experience with the actual effects of those
rules and practices").
539. The Board occasionally declines to address the "legal-policy considerations" of issues that
can be resolved on other grounds. Local 334, Laborers Int'l Union of N. Am., 205 N.L.R.B. 1191,
1191 n.4 (1973).
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relationship that is terminable at the will of either party

even in the

absence of specific language to that effect.54' Thus, an employer's
52
express reservation of its right to terminate the relationship at will
merely eliminates confusion created by Belknap (on an issue the Court
there did not actually address) 3 by advising the replacement that the

employer's offer of permanent employment may not give rise to a
cognizable state law claim for breach of contract.' 4
In other words, an employer that informs its replacements of their
at-will status is simply being candid about the nature of the relationship
into which they are entering.54' It is difficult to see why that candor
540. See, e.g., Bixby v. Wilson & Co., 196 F. Supp. 889, 901-02 (N.D. Iowa 1961) (holding
that replacements hired "under assurances that their employment would be permanent" could not
recover for breach of contract upon being discharged to make room for returning strikers, because
"the parties intended only a contract terminable at the will of the parties"). See generally Janes,
supra note 6, at 148 ("To qualify as a permanent employee under the Mackay doctrine the
replacement must have accepted an offer of permanent employment. ...American jurisdictions
consistently hold that, barring any superseding circumstances, 'permanent' employment is
employment for an indefinite term and usually remains terminable at will by either party.").
541. See generally Smith v. Kerrville Bus Co., 709 F.2d 914, 922 (5th Cir. 1983) (Clark, C.J.,
dissenting) (asserting that a finding of at-will employment does not depend upon the existence of "a
negat[ive] proviso such as 'The employer reserves the right to discharge any employee for any
reason or no reason at all."'); Berardi v. Fundamental Brokers, Inc., 126 Lab. Cas. (CCII) 1 57,452,
at 84,250 (S.D.N.Y. 1992):
[E]mployment contracts, because they are by law terminable at-will, need not contain...
express [termination] provisions ....Indeed, it would be counter-intuitive to require or
even expect such an express term in the employment context, when [the] law clearly
provides that an express term is necessary to rebut the presumption that the employment
is at-will.
Id. (emphasis added).
542. Because either party to an employment relationship generally has the right to terminate it
"in the absence of an agreement to the contrary," Byle v. Anacomp, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 738, 745 n.3
(D. Kan. 1994), "a disclaimer that makes it clear employment is at-will" merely "preserves... atwill employment," as opposed to creating it. James v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 F.3d 989,998 (10th
Cir. 1994) (emphasis added); see also Nickerson v. Kolbe & Kolbe Millwork Co., No. C-93-2679
DL, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8709, at *11 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 1994) (indicating that an at-will
disclaimer "leaves undisturbed the presumption of at will employment").
543. Belknap did not consider whether the claims asserted by the permanent replacements in
that case were viable as a matter of state law, but whether they were preemptedby federal law. See
Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. United Air Lines, Inc., 802 F.2d 886, 910 (7th Cir. 1986); Baldwin v.
Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1046, 1051 (M.D. Tenn. 1996); Gardner, supranote 258,
at 515.
544. See Corbett, supra note 40, at 852 n.207 ("Even absent [a disclaimer,] the employment-atwill doctrine.., makes recovery by a discharged 'permanent' replacement unlikely."). See
generally Leikvold v. Valley View Cmty. Hosp., 688 P.2d 170, 174 (Ariz. 1984) ("Employers are
certainly free to... tell] their employees ... that their jobs are terminable at the will of the
employer with or without reason. Such actions... instill no reasonable expectations of job security
and do not give the employees any reason to rely on [other employer] representations ....
").
545. See Alstad v. Office Depot, 10 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 689, 692 n.2 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (observing that "an employer need not gain the consent of an employee to reaffirm the
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should undermine the employee's status as a permanent replacement.16
Indeed, the Belknap Court appears to have rejected that very proposition
when it stated: "If... implied conditions, including those dependent on
the volitional act of [a strike] settlement, do not prevent the replacements
from being permanent employees, neither should express conditions
which do no more than inform replacements what their legal status is in
any event."5 47

In short, subjecting an employer that informs its replacements they
are being hired on an at-will basis to the enormous potential back pay

liability that may result from a finding that they were merely temporary
employees would discourage precisely the sort of candor the Belknap
Court appears to have been advocating.549 That is presumably a result to
be avoided.

presumption that... employment is at will") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See
generally Bardane Mfg. Co. v. Jarbola, 724 F. Supp. 336, 342 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (discussing the need
for "honesty and frankness" in dealing with a potential strike replacement so that he has "full
knowledge of the situation into which he can potentially place himself").
546. Cf Cyr Bottle Gas Co., 204 N.L.R.B. 527, 533 (1973) (indicating that employer who
advised its replacements that their tenure depended upon "how well they performed" was simply
being "fair"
to them), enforced, 497 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1974).
547. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491,504 n.8 (1983) (emphasis added); cf. Kansas Milling
Co. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 413,420 (10th Cir. 1950) (concluding that an employer had not lost its right
to hire permanent replacements by providing employees with "a warning of what the company had a
rightto do, without notice") (emphasis added).
548. When an employer hires temporary replacements, "economic strikers are entitled to
reclaim their jobs - not just be placed on a rehire list - if... they make... unconditional offers to
return." Teledyne Indus., Inc., 298 N.L.RtB. 982, 985 (1990), enforced, 938 F.2d 627 (6th Cir.
1991). Thus, an employer who refuses to reinstate economic strikers on the mistaken assumption
that they have been permanently replaced is liable for back pay running from the date of the
strikers' unconditional offer to return to work. See Harvey Mfg., Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 465, 470-71
(1992). That sum can be enormous. See Douglas E. Ray, Some Overlooked Aspects of the Strike
Replacement Issue, 41 KAN. L. REV. 363, 375 (1992) ("An employer who improperly fails to
reinstate one hundred strikers after they request reinstatement can easily be exposed to millions of
dollars in liability.").
549. See Belknap, Inc., 463 U.S. at 503 (rejecting the view that employers should be "free to
deceive" when offering permanent employment to potential strike replacements); id. at 523
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (deploring "lies and broken promises to strike replacements"); see also
NLRB v. Bingham-Willamette Co., 857 F.2d 661, 665 (9th Cir. 1988) (indicating that Belknap
requires employers to be "frank with the replacements"). But cf Madison Kipp Co., 240 N.L.R.B.
879, 891 (1979) (observing that "the Act does not require candor in all circumstances by an
employer").
550. See Gibson Greetings, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1291 n.23 (1993) (noting the employer's
"obligation to make clear its intent.., when it is hiring employees during a strike"), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 53 F.3d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1995); cf.Murray Prods., Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 268, 269
(1977) (criticizing employer's "lack of candor as to permanent replacements"), enforced, 584 F.2d
934 (9th Cir. 1978); see generallyBohemia, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 1128, 1133 (1984) (indicating that
the NLRA should be interpreted to "encourage greater candor by employers").
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IX. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion suggests that, as a matter of federal labor
policy, the fact that strike replacements have been hired on an at-will
basis should not preclude a finding that they are permanent employees
within the meaning of Mackay Radio.5 ' This conclusion is consistent
with, and actually may be compelled by, the Supreme Court's analysis in
Belknap. 2 Thus, as the Board itself recently stated, replacements are
properly considered permanent if the evidence, taken as a whole,
supports the conclusion that the employer offered them "permanent"
employment553 (that is, employment that was not specifically limited to
the duration of the strike),"' and the offer was so understood by the
replacements themselves.55 Whether the replacements were also told
they could be terminated at the "will" of the employer should simply be
one factor to consider in this analysis.: 6

551. Whether replacement workers are considered temporary or permanent is in large measure
dependent upon their own understanding of the nature of their employment. See Harvey Mfg., Inc.,
309 N.L.R.B. 465, 468 (1992). In that regard, even an at-will employee may have "every reason to
expect that his employment [will] be continuous and for the indefinite future." Moe v. E. Air Lines,
Inc., 246 F.2d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 1957). That expectation should be sufficient to support a finding of
permanence. See A-T. Massey Coal Co., Nos. 9-CA-23298-1 to 9-CA-23298-23, 1987 NLRB GCM
LEXIS 161, at *7 n.5 (Mar. 11, 1987) (stating that "pennanent" means "for an indefinite period, not
tied to the duration of the strike"); cf. NLRB v. Augusta Bakery Corp., 957 F.2d 1467, 1474 (7th
Cir. 1992) (upholding Board's finding that a replacement who "concluded his job was for an
unlimited time" was a temporary employee, but noting that this was a "close call"). But cf. Rahn
Sonoma Ltd., 322 N.L.R.B. 898, 900 (1997) (concluding that "employees... hired for indefinite
periods of time without limits on the duration of their employment" were "not hired as permanent
replacements").
552. See supranotes 519-38 and accompanying text.
553. See Target Rock Corp., 324 N.L.R.B. 373, 375 (1997), enforced, 172 F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
554. See A.T. Massey Coal Co., 1987 NLRB GCM LEXIS 161, at *7 n.5; see also Westfall,
supra note 46, at 150 (indicating that "'permanent' in this context... mean[s] merely employment
that is not expressly limited to the duration of the strike or some shorter period"); cf. Gibson
Greetings, 310 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1293 (1993) (Raudabaugh, concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(indicating that the term "permanent replacement" means only that the employer has "the present
intention to retain the replacement after the strike is over"), aff'd in partand rev'd in part,53 F.3d
385 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
555. Target Rock Corp., 324 N.L.R.B. at 375; see also Midwest Motor Express, Inc v. Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 120,494 NAv.2d 895, 899-900 (Minn. CL App. 1993) (indicating that the
nature of an offer to a strike replacement depends on the "facts and circumstances taken as a
whole"), rev'd, 512 N.V.2d 881 (Minn. 1994).
556. See Midwest Motor Express, Inc., 494 N.W.2d at 899-900 ("The character of an actual
offer will, of course, depend on... the language used [and] the parties' relationship.... as well as
otherfacts and circumstances.... ) (emphasis added).
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